Transnational Influences and Democratic Socialization in Authoritarian Contexts

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Acknowledgment

« Il suffit qu'un être humain soit là,
sur notre route, au moment voulu,
pour que tout notre destin change. »
Driss Chraïbi, *Une enquête au pays*, 1981

This dissertation is about social influence – the changes in people caused by what others do. We certainly are free to make decisions, but immersed as all of us are in a social world, we cannot escape the subtle or strong inputs from others that may tip our decisional scales in favor of one option over another. Social influence is pervasive. It goes on everywhere, all the time. In this sense, this dissertation deals not only with social influence but is also the product of it. I would like to use the opportunity to thank all those that encouraged me, often without realizing it, to develop the ideas in this study.

This is the starting point for this dissertation. The idea that domestic actors in authoritarian regimes are subject to subtle processes of democratization as a consequence of exchange with individuals from established democracies is intriguing. However, the adequacy of this assumption about effects of democratic socialization via transnational influences has never been properly investigated. Hence, when I learnt that hundreds of European experts are sent to (stable) authoritarian regimes, settle down in ministries for a few years in order to jointly work on solutions to policy problems on a daily basis, I was convinced that if transnational exchange matters in terms of democratic socialization, then this intense interaction should leave traces in the minds of state officials involved on the part of the authoritarian regime – and I decided to examine whether there is such an effect. I am extremely happy to have been able to try to contribute a very small share to explore this phenomenon and, at the same time, learn so much. The complexity of the problem, the methodological challenges and social dynamics on site when conducting fieldwork in Morocco often frustrated me and made me feel like 'trying to nail down jelly', as says a German proverb. But: the fact that a new facet of the problem lurked behind every corner was both extremely challenging and rewarding.

I was very lucky to have been able to share this research with scholars whose work has been a great source of inspiration. First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor Frank Schimmelfennig for his strong interest in my research and his extremely valuable feedback to uncountable paper drafts. I am notably very grateful for his constant stimulation, for the trust he gave me from the outset and his intellectual guidance. Not once, not even when I first walked into his office entirely open as regards my future dissertation topic, did he attempt to dissuade me from conducting this 'risky project', as he said. I am equally indebted to Sandra Lavenex, who integrated me as a full member in her own research group albeit she was formally not responsible for me. I greatly appreciated her enthusiasm, her strong support and critical, often unorthodox thinking. It is likewise important to me to thank her for the opportunity to partake in the adventure to build a new institute in Lucerne. I would like to thank both, Sandra and Frank, for the many opportunities they granted me to participate in international conferences and methodological summer schools, as well as for the outstanding conditions provided by the

research project "Promoting Democracy in the EU's Neighbourhood" within the research program "NCCR Democracy". Furthermore, I would like to express my gratitude to Tanja Börzel. To a large extent, it is her 'fault' if this dissertation exists. She was the one who first granted me a look 'backstage' of university life, who initiated my interest in academic research and who kept encouraging me to stay in academia. I am also very grateful for her invitations to present my work to outstanding scholars in the field, notably Jeffrey Checkel and Thomas Risse. Finally, Liesbet Hooghe has kindly accepted to be part of my dissertation committee. I very much appreciate that she commented on an earlier version of parts of this thesis and helped me to make my short stay in Amsterdam a stimulating experience.

Over the four years of this dissertation project, I have benefited enormously from conversations, comments and criticisms by many colleagues and friends. I cannot possibly mention every single person who deserves my gratitude, but I would like to single out those whose 'social influence' I particularly appreciated. I owe special thanks to my fellow NCCR colleagues Daniela Floss, Anna Kalbhenn, Gabi Spilker, Doreen Spörer-Wagner and Judith Vorrath. Most of the work on this project was done at the Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich, which provided an excellent research environment. I thank the European Politics research group for their valuable feedback and uncountable advice, in particular Dirk Leuffen, Thomas Jensen, Guido Schwellnus, Tatiana Skripka, Edina Szöcsik, Rebecca Welge, Anne Wetzel, and Thomas Winzen. The informal young researchers' network 'External Democracy Promotion' with Sonja Grimm, Pamela Jawad, Julia Leininger, Solveig Richter, Tatiana Reiber, Vera van Hüllen, and Jonas Wolff added an ideal interdisciplinary forum to discuss a great variety of questions related to democratization processes. Without all of them, writing this volume would not have been such a – most of the time – pleasurable experience.

I would like to also warmly thank those who are the subject matter of the study – the 150 state officials in Morocco and those 69 representatives of governmental and non-governmental institutions whom I interviewed in Europe and Morocco; almost without exception they were courteous and extremely helpful. I am equally grateful to the Foundation Friedrich Ebert and the University V, in particular Prof. Mahdi ElMandjra, in Rabat for their hospitality and assistance. Primarily, however, I am deeply indebted to Naima Qadimi and Elisa Fornale with whom the survey became an enjoyable adventure and who shared most of the funny and frustrating moments of my field work in Morocco.

Besides the academic world, there were numerous people in the "real world" that supported me during this time. I am especially grateful to Sibylle & Nike, Charlotte, Julia, Philipp & Pema, Sergio and Benny for being my friends for so many years now – and to Alexandre for his invaluable support.

The greatest thanks, however, I would like to reserve to my family: to my parents, Jürgen and Maria, to my brother Hans-Jürgen and his wife Lydia, and to my grand-mother Lore. I am pleased to dedicate this volume, though quite inadequate repayment for their unfailing love and support, to them.

Tina Freyburg
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Abstract

To what extent can processes of democratic change be externally encouraged in authoritarian contexts? This dissertation aims at exploring subtle processes of democratization that are possibly a side-product of external activities undertaken for purposes other than democratization. It seeks to pin down processes of norm transfer via transnational interaction and cooperation at the level of state administration and to empirically trace democratic imprints that transnational influences leave on domestic actors, here state officials in authoritarian contexts. In so doing, it examines the first intermediate step in a chain of mechanisms that may finally lead from transnational exchange at the level of state administration to democratic change at the level of the regime.

This thesis comprises three papers that address the issue from different theoretical and methodological angles as they investigate the democratizing potential of transnational influences, notably linkage and functional cooperation in Morocco. The results suggest that whereas linkage alone hardly yields any significant effect, functional cooperation is a promising way of encouraging democratic developments in countries where more direct forms of external democracy promotion fail. Functional cooperation is not only able to implant elements of democratic governance in domestic legislation but also to positively shape the attitudes toward these elements among administrative staff.

Overall, this dissertation concludes that an understanding of the attitudes toward appropriate governance of state officials who exercise everyday rule and how these attitudes are influenced by transnational influences is crucial in assessing external influences on authoritarian regimes. Surprisingly, the democratization literature has typically ignored this arena despite its importance in shaping perceptions of how a political system functions. This study endeavors to draw attention to the democratizing potential of transnational influences, notably functional cooperation in authoritarian contexts.

Zusammenfassung

Inwiefern können Demokratisierungsprozesse in autoritären Regimen von außen angestoßen und unterstützt werden? Diese Dissertation untersucht subtile Prozesse der Demokratisierung, welche als ein Nebeneffekt von externen Aktivitäten entstehen können, die nicht primär der Demokratieförderung dienen. Konkret hat sie zum Ziel, Normentransferprozesse zu erforschen, welche als das Ergebnis von transnationaler Interaktion und Kooperation auf der Ebene staatlicher Verwaltung gedacht sind. Damit versucht sie, Spuren der Demokratisierung durch transnationale Einflüsse auf innerstaatliche Akteure, hier staatliche Beamte in autoritären Regimen, empirisch aufzuzeigen. Auf diese Weise analysiert diese Arbeit die erste Stufe in einer Abfolge von Mechanismen, von der angenommen wird, dass sie von transnationalem Austausch schliesslich zu demokratischem Wandel auf Regimeebene führt.

Diese Dissertation umfasst drei Papiere, welche das Demokratisierungspotential transnationaler Einflüsse, nämlich Verflechtung (*linkage*) und funktionale Kooperation in Marokko, untersuchen. Die einzelnen Papiere betrachten den Gegenstand aus verschiedenen theoretischen und methodischen Blickwinkeln. Zusammengefasst weisen die Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass Verflechtung allein kaum einen signifikanten Effekt zeitigt. Vielmehr erweist sich funktionale Kooperation als eine vielversprechende Möglichkeit, demokratische Entwicklungen in Staaten zu ermutigen, in denen direktere Formen der Demokratieförderung zum Scheitern verurteilt sind. Funktionale Kooperation scheint nicht nur Elemente demokratischen Regierens in die Gesetzesbücher einzuführen, sondern auch die Einstellung zu diesen Elementen unter den staatlichen Beamten positiv zu beeinflussen.

Die Dissertation kommt zu dem Schluss, dass Wissen über die Einstellung zu angemessenem Regieren von staatlichen Beamten, die Herrschaft im Alltag ausüben und darüber wie diese Einstellung durch transnationale Einflusse beeinflusst wird, bedeutend ist, um externe Einflusse auf autoritäre Regime zu bestimmen. Daher erstaunt es, dass dieser Bereich trotz seiner Bedeutung für die Betrachtung der Funktionsweise eines politischen Systems bisher von der Demokratisierungsliteratur vernachlässigt wurde. Diese Studie möchte dazu anregen, das Demokratisierungspotential transnationaler Einflüsse in autoritären Kontexten verstärkt ins Blickfeld zu nehmen.

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Chapter 1. Transnational Influences and Socialization into Democratic Governance in Authoritarian Contexts

Introduction

External efforts to democratize authoritarian regimes with a functioning strong statehood are ultimately confronted with one inherent problem: Why shall the ruling political elite agree with and adopt reforms that affect its core practices of power preservation? Why shall it be willing to commit the political and economic suicide of true democratic change? All instruments and strategies adopted by external actors to directly promote democracy such as democratic assistance, political dialogue and conditionality – apart from intervention by force – require the (tacit) consent of the regime members. Straightforward attempts of openly promoting democratic norms and practices in stable authoritarian contexts are condemned to produce at best window-dressing reforms. The ruling elite agree to establish formally democratic institutions, however, without granting them any content that would impact their political and economic power. Eventually, it is hard to think of any incentive that would be strong enough to make a rational elite engage in such a potentially dangerous endeavor if it rules a stable and effective authoritarian regime. Hence, if external efforts of inducing democratic norms and practices are to bear fruits, an indirect, gradual approach appears to be more suitable to transfer democratic features 'through the backdoor' of activities not aimed to promote democratic rules in the first place. Such an approach is based on subtle processes of democratization.

This dissertation aims at exploring subtle processes of democratization that are possibly a side-product of external activities undertaken for purposes other than democratization. It seeks to pin down processes of norm transfer via transnational interaction and cooperation at the level of state administration and to empirically trace democratic imprints that transnational influences leave on domestic actors, here state officials in authoritarian contexts. In so doing, it examines the first intermediate step in a chain of mechanisms that may finally lead from transnational interaction and cooperation to democratic change at the level of the regime.

This thesis comprises three papers that address the issue from different theoretical and methodological angles as they investigate the democratizing potential of transnational influences, notably linkage and functional cooperation in Morocco. The results suggest that whereas linkage alone hardly yields any significant effect, functional cooperation is a promising way of encouraging democratic developments in countries where more direct forms of external democracy promotion fail. Functional cooperation is not only able to implant elements of democratic governance in domestic legislation but also to positively shape the attitudes toward these elements among administrative staff.

At the empirical level, this dissertation selects the respective "most-likely" cases. It explores the democratizing impact of transnational linkages to Europe and functional cooperation of the European Union (EU) in Morocco. Morocco is particularly suitable to empirically test the overall argument. On the one hand, it belongs to the Arab countries, which are, as a whole, the world's most durable authoritarian region. Among these countries, however, it presents one of the politically most liberalized regimes (Diamond 2010; Panebianco 2006; Guazzone and Pioppi 2004; Jerch 2004; Chourou 2002). On the other hand, it has developed strong ties to Western democracies through various linkages between economies, polities and societies (Scheffler 2006; Perthes 2004; Tessler 2000; Ben-Dor 1995; Haddadi and Harrison 1993). Moreover, Morocco benefits from reform policies, most notably the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) which provide stable frameworks for long-term functional cooperation (Lavenex *et al.* 2009; Barbé *et al.* 2009; Bendiek 2008; Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005). Hence, if transnational interaction and cooperation democratizes administrative governance in authoritarian regimes, then such an effect should occur in the case of transnational exchange between Morocco and the EU. Correspondingly, in case of a negative finding, we cannot expect that transnational cooperation and interaction yield a significant democratizing effect in cases where cooperation is less institutionalized, social interaction is less dense and the target countries' degree of political liberalization is less high.

Methodologically, this dissertation applies a diverse set of approaches, most notably exploratory factor analysis, multivariate regression analyses and qualitative comparative case studies. To this end, I created a unique data set on attitude toward democratic governance of 150 Moroccan state officials and interviewed a variety of governmental and non-governmental actors in Europe and Morocco in the summers 2007 and 2008.

In theoretical terms, studying the transfer of democratic principles and practices from established liberal democracies to non-democratic regimes, this piece of research is anchored in the strand of literature that analyzes transnationalization from an international relations perspective (cf. Orenstein *et al.* 2008). Some of the studies belonging to this strand of research tend to 'separate the properties and motivations of external actors guiding transfer of rules from the study of those domestic actors who have to cope with problems of implementation' (Bruszt and Holzacker 2009: 7). This dissertation seeks to avoid this tendency by devoting more attention to the study of interactions among domestic and non-domestic factors. By focusing on transnational influences that are not imposed by external actors but demanded by the state officials themselves, it emphasizes the properties of the actors to be socialized.

More precisely, this study seeks to explore the micro-foundations of two models of external democracy promotion, the "linkage model" and the "governance model" (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2011; Freyburg *et al.* 2009b). It examines whether strong ties to established liberal democracies (the linkage model) and participation in policy networks set up to implement functional cooperation (the governance model) can positively influence the attitudes of state officials toward democratic modes of decision-making. With regard to the governance model it also examines whether elements of democratic governance are actually adopted in domestic legislation and applied in day-to-day administrative governance. Both the linkage and the governance model build on subtle mechanisms of norm transfer that require no explicit policy of democracy promotion. This study wishes to test the theoretical micro-foundations of these models, namely the individual attitudinal and behavioral modifications that are triggered by international factors and needed in order to produce change (Keck and Sikkink 1998). To this end, it explores the effect of transnational linkages and functional cooperation on domestic actors', notably state officials' attitudes toward democratic governance in authoritarian regimes.

State officials employed by authoritarian regimes are a relevant target group for scrutinizing whether transnational influences can induce subtle processes of democratization. Arab authoritarian regimes are particularly characterized by traditional paternalistic structures, which attach great importance to the state bureaucracy for the maintenance and stability of the regime (Pawelka 2002: 432). First, if state officials develop an understanding of appropriate governance that is no longer compatible with the prevalent authoritarian

administrative culture and ultimately start implementing this understanding in their day-to-day business, this paternalistic structure may fade off. Second, in their role as 'government in action' (Jreisat 2007) state officials not only formulate but also implement policy (Hyden *et al.* 2004; Baker 2002; Heady 2001; Page 1985). In contrast to the political elite and diplomats, they present that part of the public sector with which citizens actually have contact (Baker 2002: 4; Berger 1957: 5). State officials thus shape citizens' perceptions of how a political system functions. Third, in order to be fruitful, democratic reforms at the polity level require state officials familiar with democratic modes of governance. Otherwise, democratization processes risk resulting in 'enlightened dictatorship' that circumvents rather than allows effective democratic control by the citizens when used by specific classes and oligarchies to control political power and sustain ineffective, corrupt regimes (Jreisat 2006; Baker 2002: 5). In this view, state officials play a central role in creating stable institutions of democratic representation. Finally, state officials themselves constitute a significant social group. In countries like Morocco they represent a large proportion of the educated population and comprise a major part of the (emerging) middle class (Zerhouni 2004: 61), attributes commonly seen as social conditions or 'requisites' supporting democratization (Lipset 1981) as a bottom-up process.

This dissertation is structured as follows: The remainder of this introductory chapter encompasses four sections. Section two presents the empirical puzzle, a remarkably high appraisal of democratic governance among state officials employed in a non-democratic polity. The subsequent section three reviews to what extent existing studies can provide solutions to this puzzle. Section four outlines the research design and delivers insights into the measurement of attitude toward democratic governance, the dependent variable. The last section then summarizes the individual contributions of this dissertation and briefly previews its results. The next three chapters subsequent to this introductory chapter are the individual papers; Paper III is presented in the version as it is originally published by the *Journal of European Public Policy*. The last chapter summarizes the findings and outlines possible venues for future research.

PUZZLE: Democrats without Democracy?

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region consists of authoritarian regimes that have experienced no noteworthy, genuinely endogenous democratization processes. Albeit a few countries show some regime transformation, no regime changes have occurred since

independence and the wave of national revolutions in the fifties and sixties of the 20th century. In order to gain a rough idea of where the region stands in terms of political liberalization, a look at some of the most widely used democracy indicators is helpful.

Figure 1. Political Rights and Civil Liberties in Inter-regional Comparison, 1980-2008



Descriptive statistics. *Black lines are linear trend lines for individual regions (dashed line for Sub-Saharan Africa). Values represent the regional combined average value of political rights and civil liberties that ranges between 1 ("free") and 7 ("non-free"). The numbers in brackets are the number of countries on which the regional average is based.*[1]

Figure 1 uses aggregate data provided by Freedom House (2009) in a cross-time comparison of Arab countries with other developing regions. Political rights and civil liberties are measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest degree of political rights and civil liberties and seven the lowest. The figure demonstrates that all states belonging to the Arab world are not only far from being democracies, but also that, according to Freedom House, this region shows the worst performance in inter-regional comparison. The broad picture remains the same if one compares these figures to other indices such as Polity IV (Schlumberger 2006: 36), which uses indicators for 'institutionalized democracy' and 'institutionalized autocracy', emphasizing more procedural aspects.[2]

[1] A list of countries per region can be obtained from the author. East Timor in South-East Asia counts as of 1999, Eritrea adds the 46th country to Sub-Saharan Africa as of 1993.
[2] For the use of 'standardized authority scores', see Marshall and Jaggers (2008: 17-18).

The Arab world represents the largest block of states under firmly and durably authoritarian rule. There are, however, differences in degree between the countries. Figure 2 displays the values Freedom House provides for each Arab country in the period of 2000 to 2008. The figure clearly demonstrates that even Morocco and Jordan, which are widely referred to as the politically most liberalized countries in the Arab world, still belong to the group of authoritarian regimes. Jordan and Morocco are the only countries that Freedom House has consistently ranked as "partly free". For 2000-08 their combined ratings of political rights and civil liberties are 4.7 on average. Lebanon is ranked as "partly free" since 2005, but generally ranked as "not free" since the mid 1990s, just as Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia, with averages around 5.5. Finally, Libya scores worst possible during the whole period with an average of 7.0; Syria performs slightly better toward the end of the considered period.

Figure 2. Political Rights and Civil Liberties in the Arab World, 2000-2008



Descriptive statistics. *Freedom House classifies countries whose combined average value of political rights and civil liberties falls between 3.0 and 5.5 as "partly free" and between 5.5 and 7.0 as "not free". The averaged value for Algeria constantly lies at 5.5; the line is overlapped by the lines for Lebanon (2000-04) and Egypt (2004-08).*

This picture is largely confirmed by one of the World Bank's World Governance Indicators (WGI), namely 'Voice and Accountability'. While all seven countries are located in the lower third in a world-wide comparison, there are still important variations between countries. As none of them shows significant and lasting changes over time, their average values for 1996-2008 display a similar picture as the Freedom in the World index (Kaufmann *et al.* 2009).

Across all three indicators (Freedom House, Polity IV and WGI) Morocco appears to particularly qualify as 'liberalized autocracy' (Brumberg 2002) – its mixture of 'guided pluralism, controlled elections, and selective repression' has lead to a particular durable and resilient authoritarian regime whose institutions, rules and logic defy any linear model of democratization (Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002). Attitude toward democratic governance by domestic actors is thus likely to be negative, and democratic socialization effects are unlikely to happen in the absence of external factors.

Yet, despite the stable authoritarianism, according to my survey, Moroccan state officials show a remarkably high appraisal of democratic governance, notably participatory, transparent and accountable modes of administrative decision-making. As the analysis of the survey revealed, they appreciate administrative governance enabling decisions close to the concerns and interests of the people.[3] A cursory glance at the descriptive statistics in Figure 3 discloses that on average Moroccan state officials agree with democratic principles of governance: The middle values (boxes), the mean values (crosses) and the median values (black lines) are clearly located in the realm of a positive attitude toward democratic governance. However, as in particular the ends of the vertical lines indicate some state officials disregard democratic principles. How do state officials employed in a non-democratic environment come to appreciate democratic elements of governance? And, why do some officials consider democratic governance as appropriate and others not?[4] This thesis sets out to answer these questions.

[3] Details on this survey including the measurement of attitude toward democratic governance will be outlined in the section on methodology. Detailed interpretation and descriptive statistics of the attitudes of the state officials toward the individual dimensions and the individual items is given in Freyburg (2009).

[4] If, despite the precautions in questionnaire design and survey setting, this high agreement is partially rooted in socially desirable response behavior, it still remains to be explained how state officials employed in a non-democratic environment come to learn what kind of governance Europeans apparently acknowledge as appropriate.

Figure 3. Attitude toward Democratic Governance



Box plot. *Scores display attitude toward democratic governance overall and in its three dimensions, values range from 1 ("non-democratic") to 5 ("democratic"); N = 110, cases with missing values excluded listwise. The dashed line represents the mean value of democratic governance as overall category (right box).*

THEORY: Transnational Influences and Democratic Socialization

In order to solve the puzzle of democrats without democracy, this study bridges two strands of literature that have hitherto remained somewhat uncoupled, namely the literature on international socialization, on the one hand, and that on the democratizing effect of transnational influences, on the other. Considering that both the linkage and the governance model of externally triggered democratization is ultimately built on the assumption that exposure to democratic norms shapes the attitude of domestic actors toward these norms, the bridge is built by bringing democratic socialization of domestic actors to the core of the analysis of democratization in authoritarian contexts.

With respect to international socialization, this thesis adopts a focus different from existing research. It views transgovernmental policy networks as site of socialization that may induct participants into transnational norms, here democratic governance. In so doing, it integrates the two predominant strands of research on international socialization. Whereas one strand analyzes the transfer of transnational norms but considers socialization as the outcome of direct promotion efforts of external actors at the level of the state (government) (e.g., Gheciu

2005; Flockhart 2004; Risse *et al.* 1999; Finnemore 1993), the other views international institutions as site of socialization but is predominantly interested in identity transformation on the part of individuals being delegated to international organizations (e.g., Checkel 2005; Hooghe 2005; Scully 2005; Kerr 1973).

With respect to democracy promotion, this volume provides a differentiated analysis of democratization processes that can occur as a side-effect of external activities that are not aimed at promoting democratic norms in the first place. In so doing, it builds upon recent literature emphasizing the democratizing potential of transnational exchange and aims at further theorizing about how possible effects can be thought at the level of attitude change, which is not automatically and necessarily behaviorally realized. The analysis notably shows that transnational influences can indeed yield processes of democratization that are only visible if one descends to the micro-level of individuals' attitudes.

This study suggests that the two models of indirect democracy promotion, namely the linkage and the governance models, can be used to solve the puzzle of democrats without democracy if they are applied at the level of attitudes. While focusing on democratization processes expressed in behavior such as free and fair elections or the adoption of a certain law guaranteeing elements of democratic governance, respectively, existing studies widely disregard attitudinal changes. Yet, if one takes into account that subtly appearing transnational influences may trigger processes of democratic socialization that did not yet translate into effective regime change, a high appraisal of democratic governance among state officials becomes the expected outcome.

In a nutshell, this study argues that state officials may have a positive attitude toward democratic governance as a consequence of transnational influences albeit they are employed in authoritarian regimes. Models of indirect democracy promotion, notably the linkage and the governance models suggest how state officials can get socialized into democratic norms of decision-making through social interaction and cooperation with peers and experts from established democracies and exposure to their media products.

Models of Indirect Democracy Promotion

The domestic effects of international factors have attracted increasing attention within comparative and international relations scholarship. Whereas comparativists have pointed

out that transition from autocratic to democratic rule is largely driven by internal factors such as the behavior of national elites and domestic structural factors (Pridham 2000; Merkel and Puhle 1999; Merkel 1999; Dawisha and Parrott 1997; Linz and Stepan 1996), they nowadays generally acknowledge that external factors can have considerable formative effects by influencing governmental decision-making processes or supporting pro-democratic forces (Burnell 2004: 113; Schraeder 2003: 23; Gillespie and Youngs 2002; Schmitter and Brouwer 1999: 9; Whitehead 1996). International relations' scholars recognized a causal effect from the international to the national level far earlier albeit they made no explicit link to regime change (cf. Schmitz 2004). With the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, at the latest, scholars started to decidedly suggest the significant role of international processes in challenging authoritarian practices (Grabbe 2006; Schimmelfennig *et al.* 2006; Wejnert 2005; Knack 2004; Henderson 2002; von Hippel 2000; Risse *et al.* 1999; Diamond 1997, 1991). Earlier studies that explicitly addressed the role of international factors emerged in the aftermath of transformation processes in Southern Europe and Latin America with particular reference to the United States as external actor (Cox *et al.* 2000; Robinson 1996; Halperin 1993; Lowenthal 1991; Pridham 1991; Carothers 1991). Hence, contemporary scholars of democratization commonly see democratic change as a domestic process embedded in an international normative order.

Domestic processes of democratization can be induced and supported from the outside by a variety of foreign policies and transnational influences. If one focuses on the promotion and stabilization of transformation processes with civilian means,[5] the democracy promotion efforts of the European Union present a particularly prominent example (Kopstein 2006; Youngs 2001). Accounts of EU external democracy promotion usually fall into two categories: studies of top-down democracy promotion by way of political conditionality ('leverage'), on the one hand, and analyses of bottom-up democratization efforts through democratic assistance ('linkage'), on the other (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2011; Freyburg *et al.* 2009b, based on Levitsky and Way 2005). According to the leverage model, democratization presents a conditionality-induced process. The most prominent example is the EU's enlargement policy. In order to ensure that candidate countries effect the political and democratic changes desired, the EU has made its support of these countries strictly conditional upon their compliance with certain democratic criteria. The literature widely acknowledges that this conditionality brings about substantial change if the expected political

[5] Externally initiated transition through coercion, notably military intervention follows a substantial different dynamic (Merkel 2010; Beetham 2009).

costs of compliance with EU requirements do not exceed the benefits of a (credible) membership perspective (Ethier 2003; Grabbe 2006; Schimmelfennig *et al.* 2006; Vachudova 2005).[6] Next to political conditionality, democratic assistance presents the second traditional strategy of EU democracy promotion. The linkage model of external democracy promotion focuses on the emergence of a democratic civil society and public sphere. It sees the role of an external democratizing actor in launching civil society projects, supporting political opposition groups and training of reform-minded journalists, among others, through programs such as the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) (Bicchi 2009; Raik 2006; Holden 2005; Jünemann 2002; Youngs 2008, 2003; Carothers 1999). However, political conditionality and democratic assistance alike require (at least in practice) the consent of the regime members, which makes their successful application, let alone the intended democratic impact on stable authoritarian regimes more than unlikely. Even if the ruling political elite accept such external engagement, recent studies stress the limits both strategies of democracy promotion face in the EU's Southern neighborhood. As to political conditionality, they show that this strategy is widely ineffective toward the neighboring Arab countries (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008, 2010). Since compliance with EU democratic criteria equaled regime change in these countries, the incumbent governments would not be interested in EU accession – the highest EU incentive possible, even if the EU were willing to offer a credible membership perspective.[7]

The literature is also rather skeptical as regards the impact of linkage in the EU's Southern neighborhood. Analyses generally point out that external support for civil society in authoritarian countries is often challenged by governmental resistance. In addition, it might also easily produce counterproductive effects in countries where "non-governmental" bodies […] often turn out to be […] government-owned [or] controlled' (Schlumberger 2006: 45), and true social movements rooted in society are hard to recognize from the outside and yet more difficult to support (Carapico 2002). Systematic empirical studies on the concrete effects of (EU) democracy assistance that go beyond single case studies are, however, missing. Moreover, by focusing on institutional democratization processes at the regime-level, existing studies fail to assess the outcome that logically results from their argument, the

[6] Recent studies, however, point to the limited democratic impact of political conditionality in the Western Balkans. They raise serious doubts about whether the EU will be able to repeat its success story in South Eastern Europe where candidate states are characterized by legacies of ethnic conflict (Freyburg and Richter 2010; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2010).
[7] This holds also true for Morocco despite its economically-motivated application for EU accession in July 1987, which was rejected only few months later (Tocci 2005; Bahaijoub 1993). A different dynamic can be observed in some Eastern neighboring countries, notably Moldova and Ukraine that strongly aspire after membership (Wolczuk 2009; Sasse 2008; Verdun and Chira 2008).

development of a democratic civil society (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2011 with reference to research undertaken by Youngs 2008, 2002: 55-57; Haddadi 2003, 2002; Jünemann 2002).

In light of the limits of straightforward democracy promotion policies, democratization scholars specify indirect approaches of how democratic principles and practices can be transferred into non-democratic regimes without being openly suggestive of undermining the regimes' political and economic power basis. These transnational influences are conceptualized by the second, 'indirect' pillar of the linkage model and an alternative third model, the governance model. Both the linkage and the governance model view democratization not as result of various instruments and strategies intentionally used by external norm- or policy-entrepreneurs. Instead, they build on subtle mechanisms of norm transfer that do not require a policy actively promoting democratic principles and practices.

Table 1 displays the ideal-typical juxtaposition of the two models specifying indirect modes of democracy promotion as conceptualized by Freyburg *et al.* (2009b) and refined by Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2011). The linkage model devises how democratization processes at the level of society can be induced and supported from the outside. Next to the 'direct' channel of democracy promotion through the support for civil society, political opposition groups and journalists outlined above, it specifies an 'indirect' channel of democracy promotion due to intensified social, economic and political exchanges between democratic and non-democratic countries. This channel encompasses various linkages such as economic flows of investment and assistance, penetration by Western media and social linkages including elite education and migration. Most recently, a third model, the governance model, was proposed that acknowledges the democratizing potential of transgovernmental cooperation at the level of policy sectors.[8] In this perspective, norms and practices of democratic administrative governance are transferred indirectly, as a side-effect of joint problem-solving.

Table 1. Models of Indirect Democracy Promotion

	Linkage	**Governance**
Target level	Society	Sector
Outcome	Democratic culture	Democratic governance
Channel	Transnational	Transgovernmental

[8] This model is developed in the framework of a project to which I considerably contributed as member of the research staff. The project was led by Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig and undertaken within the National Center of Competence in Research "Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century" (NCCR Democracy, **http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch/nccr**), 2006-10. Paper III of this dissertation summarizes the project findings.

In seeking an answer to the outlined puzzle, high appraisal of democratic governance among state officials serving an authoritarian regime, this study aims at exploring the micro-foundations of the two models of indirect democracy promotion. It examines to what extent transnational influences shape the attitude toward democratic governance of domestic actors, notably state officials in authoritarian regimes. To this end, it regards state officials as part of the society and hence as equally exposed to transnational influences such as foreign media broadcasting. In this view, the two dimensions 'target level' and 'outcome' of the linkage model approximate those of the governance model. The typical outcome becomes 'democratic governance' understood as democratically legitimated administrative decision-making rather than the emergence of a democratic 'civic' culture with civic associations, political parties and a democratic public sphere. In its attempt to explore the effect of these two models of indirect democracy promotion at the level of attitudes, this study relies on the literature examining international socialization. It considers attitude change toward democratic governance through exposure to transnational influences as externally triggered democratic socialization.

International Socialization into Democratic Governance

Democratic socialization is defined as being present to the degree that individuals change their attitude toward democratic governance through exposure to transnational influences. This definition largely corresponds to the classical understanding of socialization as a 'process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community' (Checkel 2005: 804)[9] as the socializing impact is equally based on social interaction and cooperation and refers to attitudinal changes. By focusing on attitude change this study adopts a constructivist understanding of international socialization that goes beyond mere behavioral adaptation. In recent years constructivist research has emerged as a serious competitor to hitherto dominating rational choice approaches in international relations theory. Whereas rationalist institutionalism has either largely ignored international socialization as a relevant process or conceptualized it as a power-driven process underlying mere cost-benefit calculations (Schimmelfennig 2005; Kelley 2004), (social) constructivist institutionalism basically argues that international institutions can shape the identity of agents – be it states, governments or individuals – by socializing them into their norms. That is, institutions might induce actors to comply despite their opposing preferences and may, at least partly, change actors'

[9] For a discussion of alternative definitions, see Pollack (1998) and Johnston (2001).

preferences and underlying attitudes (Adler 2002; Checkel 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Hopf 1998; Wendt 1992).[10]

Democratic socialization through transnational influences can take many forms with regard to how exactly norms are transferred. Studies on transnational linkage point to the distinguished role of exchange programs and foreign media as transferring democratic norms into non-democratic states. Whereas exchange programs allow citizens of non-democratic states to experience democratic decision-making firsthand in a democratic country (Atkinson 2010; Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010; Nye 2004), exposure to foreign media familiarizes state officials with democratic governance by confronting them with media content that delineates administrative practices in established democracies, exemplifies the involvement of the public in these processes and reports on infringements against democratic governance (Kern and Hainmueller 2009; Way and Levitsky 2007; Wejnert 2005; Whitehead 1996). An application of the governance model at the level of attitudes suggests a third mean of transfer: Democratic socialization through joint problem-solving in transgovernmental policy networks.

Socialization in international organizations has been the subject of numerous studies even before constructivist-minded European specialists and international relations' theorists started to deal with the internalization of transnational norms and changes in attitudes, identities and preferences of national agents delegated to international organizations (IOs) (Peck 1979; Ernst 1978; Karns 1977; Volgy and Quistgaard 1975; Jacobson 1967; Alger 1963). Moreover, today's research on international socialization explicitly and implicitly builds on predictions and applies categories of analysis that had been developed by (neo-) functionalist integration theorists (cf. Egeberg 1999; Martin and Simmons 1998: 735; Pollack 1998).[11] Neo-functionalists understand regional integration processes as social processes partially defined by the shifting of political actors' loyalties toward a new decision-making center beyond the nation-state. The implications for empirical research on international institutions from such an understanding were that participating individuals are expected to exhibit altered attitudes toward their usefulness and effectiveness (Haas 1958: 16; 1961: 366-

[10] Today, we see the pendulum swinging back as socialization researchers turn toward rationalist concepts, primarily with regard to the incorporation of mechanisms and conditions provided by rational choice approaches into their research design, see in particular the exercise of 'double interpretation' by Zürn and Checkel (2005).
[11] For early empirical studies testing neo-functionalist propositions on institutions' socialization effects, see Riggs (1977), Kerr (1973) and Wolf (1973).

7).[12] This early theorizing on socialization has been also complemented by social psychological studies providing important insights into individuals' attitudes and behavior toward their own and other nations and, by extension, toward IOs (Bonham 1970; Kelman 1958; Kerr 1973). With the constructivist turn, the number of studies on international socialization increased (Gheciu 2005; Flockhart 2004; Checkel 2003; Trondal 2001). This trend also did not stop at European studies as in particular the excellent special issue 59(4) in *International Organization* edited by Jeffrey Checkel testifies.

Scholars following a constructivist line of reasoning consider international institutions as sites of socialization in which participating actors internalize transnational norms and values as a consequence of social interaction and cooperation (Checkel 2005; Johnston 2001). In line with this perspective, this study views the EU as a system of external governance 'integrating'[13] third parties into its influence sphere of governance (Lavenex 2004; Friis and Murphy 1999). External governance refers here to institutionalized forms of EU cooperation with non-member states at the level located between polity and society within the framework of association relations (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009; Lavenex 2008). This functional cooperation is translated into action by policy networks. These networks are transgovernmental as they operate among sub-units of governments 'when they act relatively autonomously from higher authority in international politics' (Keohane and Nye 1974: 41). They are defined as 'a pattern of regular and purposive relations among like government units working across the borders that divide countries from one another' (Slaughter 2004: 14). Transgovernmental policy networks bring together specialists from EU member states and neighboring countries' administrations in order to implement policy solutions and enact legal requirements that approximate legal and administrative standards in the ENP countries to those of the Union. Given that the rules to be transferred were developed for advanced democracies, they incorporate elements of democratic governance (Freyburg *et al.* 2009b). By participating in these networks, third state officials become acquainted with democratic principles of decision-making – and may change their attitude toward them.

[12] Importantly, Ernst B. Haas does not argue that a pro-European attitude toward, or rather identification with the European Community is a precondition for integration. The assumption is that, over time, the attitudes of political elites become more favorable toward international organizations as a result of participation in those organizations which, in turn, then lead to further integration (Risse 2005: 294; cf. Pollack 1998; Rosamond 2005).

[13] Such a perspective allows for regarding functional cooperation between administrations of EU member states and neighboring countries as 'sectoral integration', that is integration 'only at the level of selected policy areas and without access to the core decision-making bodies of the EU' (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2006: 143).

METHODOLOGY: Measuring Attitude toward Democratic Governance

This thesis also contributes to existing research in methodological terms. The individual studies composing this dissertation employ a diverse set of methodological approaches, namely conceptual, quantitative and qualitative analyses, or a combination thereof. In this vein, I examine my overall research question in a sequential multi-method research design, complementing quantitative research with qualitative analyses. The first step is conceptual (and quantitative): I develop an original scale that measures attitude toward democratic governance using exploratory factor analysis. Subsequently, I run multiple regression analyses in order to examine the effect of transnational influence on attitude toward democratic governance. My analyses are based on an original survey among 150 Moroccan state officials. In a third step, qualitative comparison sheds light on the regression results and embeds them into a broader context that goes beyond mere attitude change. To this end, I collected data on the basis of 69 interviews conducted in 2007 and 2008 with governmental and non-governmental policy-makers, Commission officials, representatives to international organizations, journalists and scientists in Morocco, Berlin, Vienna and Brussels. Since the first, conceptual step is extremely abbreviated in the individual papers due to space constraints, it will be demonstrated in more detail in the Annex to this introductory chapter.

For the purpose of assessing state officials' attitudes toward democratic governance, I use a multidimensional concept. Democratic governance may vary in quality along three dimensions: transparency, accountability and participation (Freyburg *et al.* 2007; cf. Bovens 2007; Hyden *et al.* 2004; Brinkerhoff 2000). I define transparency as the provision of and access to various kinds of information on sectoral policies and its consequences for citizens, civil society associations and the media (Zaharchenko and Goldenman 2004). Accountability at the administrative level refers to the obligation for officials to justify the use of resources and the achievement of outcomes toward citizens and independent third parties and the establishment and application of procedures for administrative review including the possibility of sanctions in case of infringement (Grant and Keohane 2005: 29; Diamond *et al.* 1999: 3). Finally, participation largely corresponds to the key feature in the conventional understanding of democracy at the level of the nation-state (Dahl 1971; Verba 1967). Transferred to administrative governance, participation means that all willing members of the public should have an equal and effective opportunity to make their interests and concerns known, thereby shaping the outcome of the decisions.

EMPIRICS & OUTLOOK: Transnational influences in Morocco

At the empirical level, this dissertation goes beyond existing research in two respects. First, studies on democracy promotion mostly focus on countries that have already turned into the road toward regime change; they seek to explain success and failure of domestic and external promotion strategies. Concentrating on attitudes rather than behavior allows this thesis to analyze processes of democratization that may even occur in authoritarian regimes hitherto reluctant to pursue any noteworthy political liberalization, although this is not yet visible at the regime-level. Second, this thesis takes interaction effects of transnational influences into account. In so doing, it not only goes beyond existing studies that examine the effect of transnational factors separately, notably the influence of foreign media broadcasting or of stays abroad, but also includes factors that have hitherto been overlooked, as in the case of functional cooperation. As it will be shown, most transnational factors do not yield an independent significant effect. Rather, their influence depends on previous experiences made by the socializee.

The core of the dissertation comprises three papers, which address the issue of democratization via transnational influences from different angles. In more specific terms, this thesis addresses the following research questions:

- To what extent do linkages to established democracies shape the attitude of state officials in authoritarian regimes toward democratic governance? (Paper I)
- To what extent do state officials get acquainted with democratic modes of governance through participation in transgovernmental policy networks set up to implement functional cooperation between democracies and non-democratic regimes? (Paper II)
- In what way are the elements of democratic governance incorporated in EU functional cooperation legally adopted and applied in administrative governance of (semi-)authoritarian neighboring countries? (Paper III)

Figure 4 categorizes the individual studies according to their main perspective. Roman numerals (I, II and III) refer to the individual papers and identify their positioning within the general argument.

Figure 4. The Link between the Individual Dissertation Papers



The first paper titled *Democratic Socialization: The Missing Link between Transnational Linkages and Diffusion of Democratic Governance* examines the effect of transnational linkages on attitude toward democratic governance of domestic actors in authoritarian regimes, notably Moroccan state officials. Regression analyses using data from the survey among state officials reveal that prominent social and communication linkages to established democracies display no independent significant effect. They influence attitudes toward democratic governance but yield a positive effect only under specific favorable conditions. This finding challenges the conventional wisdom that attitudes are shaped by exposure to norms through linkages, as theoretically assumed in the literature on the diffusion of norms.

The second paper, *Planting the Seeds of Change Inside? Functional Cooperation with Authoritarian Regimes and Socialization into Democratic Governance,* investigates to what extent state officials get acquainted with democratic modes of governance through participation in transgovernmental policy networks, notably the Twinning program set up by the European Union in its Southern neighborhood. The study complements regression analyses of survey data on Moroccan state officials' attitudes toward democratic governance with a qualitative comparison of different networks. The findings demonstrate that the Twinning projects positively shape the attitudes toward democratic governance of involved state officials as a consequence of joint problem-solving and social interaction. Whether and under what conditions such a positive attitude toward democratic governance will ultimately be implemented in daily administrative practices, warrants further study.

The third paper on *EU Promotion of Democratic Governance in the Neighbourhood* (co-authored with Sandra Lavenex, Frank Schimmelfennig, Tatiana Skripka, and Anne Wetzel) analyzes the effectiveness of the EU's promotion of democratic governance through functional cooperation in the European neighborhood. In the context of this dissertation, this paper takes up the question of potential behavioral consequences in that it looks at the adoption and application of democratic practices and rules in administrative governance. A comparative study of three policy sectors in three countries (Moldova, Morocco, and Ukraine) demonstrates that albeit functional cooperation appears to be fairly successful in shaping legislation in line with democratic governance provisions, these provisions have generally not been applied in administrative decision-making and implementation.[14]

In conclusion, the dissertation provides many theoretical and empirical insights into the likelihood of transnational influences in yielding subtle processes of democratization. The results reveal that, apparently, transnational linkages such as foreign media broadcasting and stays abroad in Western democracies are not strong enough to significantly shape attitudes toward democratic socialization. Rather, the analysis of the democratizing potential of functional cooperation demonstrates that transnational influences need to be institutionalized and guided in order to socialize domestic actors into transnational norms.[15] These subtle processes of democratization are worth being further explored, in particular against the background that all instruments and strategies adopted by external actors to directly promote democracy (apart from intervention by force) are deemed to fail toward authoritarian regimes with a functioning strong statehood. By examining how officials in public administrations of these regimes understand core principles of democratic governance and how transnational exchange with liberal democracies shapes this understanding, this study further contributes to an ongoing debate about democracy in Muslim dominated countries. While the public debates in Western democracies strongly focus on Islamic influences in Europe, this study rather looks at European influences in the Arab world.

[14] Whereas the theoretical argument was jointly developed by the research team, I was responsible for the Moroccan case study.
[15] This comparison is cross-checked by additional regression analyses, see Annex to this chapter: 26-30.

ANNEX

Measuring Attitude toward Democratic Governance

To measure the attitudes toward democratic governance of Moroccan state officials, I construct a closed-end questionnaire. Given the lack of similar surveys, the creation of suitable democratic governance items is crucial to developing suitable questions. To this end, the three theoretically derived dimensions of democratic governance – transparency, accountability and participation – are operationalized with issue indicators pertaining to various aspects of administrative governance. I draw on conceptual work on public administration (reform), and linkage of (good) governance and development (Hyden *et al.* 2004; Baker 2002; Page 1985; Berger 1957). Using a 5-point Likert scale, which enables a reduction of complex beliefs into straight agree/disagree statements, respondents are asked to indicate whether they 'strongly agree' (5), 'agree' (4), 'disagree' (2) or 'strongly disagree' (1) with the given item. The provision of a neutral position (3) and the possibility 'don't know' allows for distinction between indifference and abstained responses.[16] The items are randomly distributed in two out of 36 different sets of questions; some of the items appear reformulated in different statements, and some capture statements on non-democratic governance features (negatively-oriented items).[17]

Table I lists the eight items pertaining to various aspects of the three proposed dimensions of governance. The first dimension concerns public participation. Three items address the involvement of non-state actors in administrative decision-making to different degrees. Item 5 asks whether citizens should have the opportunity to express their interests and concerns; item 2 goes one step further by arguing that these interests and concerns should be taken into account before making decisions, and item 3 postulates that they should actually shape the decisions made. The conflicting item to public participation addresses the authoritarian claim of unlimited approval. It reverses the direction of influence – citizens' views should not shape but are to be brought in line with governmental policies. Transparency is covered by three items asking whether civil servants should offer information to everyone by ensuring that it is generally comprehensible (item 4), updated (item 2) and that it corresponds to what is actually requested (item 6). The idea that information of interest to the general

[16] Abstained responses (blank and 'don't know' answers) were treated as missing values.
[17] The two sets of questions are introduced as follows: 'There are different understandings of what determines the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts in public administration. To what extent do you personally agree that the following items serve this function?' (item 1+2) / 'There are different opinions as to what it takes to be a 'good' civil servant. To what extent do you personally agree or disagree that a civil servant should have the following qualities?' (item 3-8).

public should be accessible to citizens directly threatens authoritarian thinking is embodied by a negatively-framed transparency item. Finally, the third dimension refers to the obligation for civil servants to justify their actions toward the public (item 8) and independent state institutions (item 7). The third negatively-oriented item addresses an attitude statement that distorts the meaning of accountability by ascribing the monitoring of the correctness of bureaucratic acts' to the higher authority.

I. Three Dimensions of Attitude toward Democratic Governance

		Factors/dimensions						
		Participation		Transparency		Accountability		
	Indicators/items	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.	Est.	S.E.	h^2
1	'A civil servant should take into account the views and concerns of affected citizens before making decisions'	**.981*** **	.104	-.050	.035	-.063*	.027	*.873*
2	'A civil servant should offer updated information on governmental policy'	**.433** **	.168	.051	.127	.250	.178	*.386*
3	'A civil servant should ensure that the citizens' views and concerns have an influence on shaping policies'	**.644** **	.226	.126	.155	.128	.215	*.585*
4	'A civil servant should work in a manner that is transparent and comprehensible for the general public'	.119	.198	**.568** **	.186	.242	.217	*.476*
5	'A civil servant should provide citizens with the possibility of advancing their views as an input for governmental decision making'	.299	.196	**.459** **	.147	.261	.179	*.542*
6	'A civil servant should make information available to anyone requesting it'	-.063	.063	**.878*** **	.169	-.134	.128	*.762*
7	'Monitoring by independent state institutions ensures the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts'	-.012	.058	-.068	.094	**.814*** **	.203	*.653*
8	'Possibilities for the general public and its associations to request scrutiny of the decision-making process and review of policies ensures the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts'	.028	.169	.001	.106	**.437***	.176	*.205*
	Eigenvalues	1.498		0.868		3.316		
	Variance explained (%)	18.73		10.85		41.45		

Factor loading matrix. *N = 148; Est. = factor loading (estimator), S.E. = standard error, h^2 = communality; factor loadings >.40 are displayed in bold; *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001.*

Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) helps to identify a set of latent variables ('factors') underlying a battery of manifest variables ('indicators') in order to understand the correlation structure. The indicators assess the degree of agreement with various specific attitude

statements; the factors are understood as the general underlying attitudes. EFA helps to examine which of the statement items are most suitable for measuring the three theoretically expected dimensions. I use the robust mean and variance-adjusted weighted least squares (WLSMV) extraction procedure, which is insensitive to non-normal distribution of categorical items and appropriate for small samples (Brown 2006: 388). The assumption of multivariate normality is violated as shown by skewness and kurtosis of measured variables and confirmed with significant Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests (see Table II). Due to a non-response rate of about ten per cent to the three negatively-oriented items, their number of missing values is comparatively high. These items are therefore not introduced in the EFA. Their incorporation would disproportionally decrease the number of cases and thus lead to a substantial loss of information on the regular items.

II. Multivariate Normality of Democratic Governance Items

	N	Skewness	Kurtosis
Item 1	145	**-2.679 (.201)**	**9.412 (.400)**
Item 2	139	-1.477 (.206)	2.165 (.408)
Item 3	142	-1.107 (.203)	.241 (.404)
Item 4	139	**-2.834 (.200)**	**7.801 (.397)**
Item 5	144	-1.812 (.202)	4.691 (.401)
Item 6	146	**-2.538 (.201)**	**6.525 (.399)**
Item 7	136	-1.455 (.208)	1.770 (.413)
Item 8	135	-1.480 (.209)	2.183 (.414)

Severe violation of normality is displayed in bold (skewness > 2; kurtosis > 6.5).

The oblique rotation method Oblimin is applied because I theoretically expect factor inter-correlation: All three dimensions belong to the overall concept of democratic governance. Careful analysis of the correlation matrix reveals that democratic governance items highly correlate with each other and can be retained in the analysis. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test of sampling adequacy meets the benchmark established by Worthington and Whittaker (2006: 832) with .676; Only item 6 misses the benchmark but is retained due to its theoretical importance. The corresponding values are displayed in Table II. Bartlett's Test of Sphericity supports the selection of these items ($p = .000$, $df = 28.000$, approx. $\chi^2 = 139.938$).

Each factor, or dimension, is defined by the items that load most heavily on it. Table I displays all item factor loadings (Est.), with those of at least .40 printed in bold. According to significance tests for loadings (Cudeck and O'Dell 1994), all included factor loadings are

(highly) significant. Additional tests (available upon request) indicate that the generated model has a good fit.[18]

III. Measures of Sampling Adequacy (MSA)

	Item 1	Item 2	Item 3	Item 4	Item 5	Item 6	Item 7	Item 8
Item 1	.672							
Item 2		.778						
Item 3			.681					
Item 4				.541				
Item 5					.795			
Item 6						.505		
Item 7							.703	
Item 8								.668

Anti-image correlation matrix. *M = .668.*

EFA substantiates that state officials' attitude toward democratic governance can be conceptualized along the three dimensions participation, transparency and accountability. Scree tests and replication of the factor analysis with randomly split sub-samples verified the existence of three latent variables (Thompson 2004: 31-6; Fabrigar *et al.* 1999; Fürntratt 1969: 64), see Tables IV to VI.

IV. Graphical Scree Plot for the Evaluation Data



Scree test of eigenvalues from the reduced correlation matrix. *Graph determines the last substantial decline in the magnitude of the eigenvalues; arrow indicate region of curve where slope changes.*

[18] The absolute fit indices – such as an insignificant Chi-square value at a .05 threshold (χ^2 = 6.313; df = 6; p = .3890) and a standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) of .035 – meet the required standards (Hooper *et al.* 2008; McIntosh 2007). The Comparative Fit Index (CFI) of .999 as an incremental fit index is also very close to the 1.0 benchmark (Hooper *et al.* 2008; Hu and Bentler 1999). The total variance explained by the three factors is 71.03 per cent. The findings are robust across alternative methodologies. Replications with the oblique rotation Geomin and the orthogonal rotation Varimax produce the same pattern of factor loadings. Individual results can be obtained from the author.

V. Replication of EFA on Sub-Samples

	complete sample			sample split1			sample split2		
item	**F1**	**F2**	**F3**	**F1**	**F2**	**F3**	**F1**	**F2**	**F3**
1	-.063 (.027)	**.981 (.104)*** **	-.050 (.035)	-.063 (.044)	**.943 (.125)*** **	-.054 (.044)	-.048 (.169)	**.815 (.183)*** **	.028 (.105)
2	.250 (.178)	**.433 (.168)** **	.051 (.127)	.231 (.175)	**.476 (.171)** **	.053 (.102)	.129 (.199)	**.515 (.180)** **	-.074 (.124)
3	.128 (.215)	**.644 (.226)** **	.126 (.155)	.067 (.182)	**.705 (.193)*** **	.057 (.136)	.017 (.155)	**.910 (.164)*** **	-.015 (.070)
4	.242 (.217)	.119 (.198)	**.568 (.186)** **	.116 (.259)	.264 (.251)	**.567 (.226)** **	.081 (.312)	.227 (.176)	**.572 (.261)* **
5	.261 (.179)	.299 (.196)	**.459 (.147)*** **	.360 (.217)	.291 (.241)	**.430 (.162)** **	.343 (.229)	.245 (.202)	**.377 (.144)** **
6	-.134 (.128)	-.063 (.063)	**.878 (.169)*** **	-.071 (.076)	-.071 (.072)	**.999 (.228)*** **	-.051 (.066)	-.084 (.118)	**.830 (.200)*** **
7	**.814 (.203)*** **	-.012 (.058)	-.068 (.094)	**.455 (.208)* **	.165 (.202)	-.029 (.127)	**.532 (.262)* **	.077 (.233)	-.031 (.125)
8	**.437 (.176)* **	.028 (.169)	.001 (.106)	**.754 (.171)*** **	-.074 (.042)	-.095 (.108)	**.588 (.137)*** **	-.093 (.061)	-.045 (.090)
EV	*3.316*	*1.498*	*0.868*	*1.536*	*3.356*	*0.876*	*3.296*	*1.337*	*0.933*
N		*148*			*115*			*110*	

Factor loading matrix. *Data set is randomly split in two separate sub-samples using 75-per cent rule due to small sample. F1: Accountability, F2: Participation, F3: Transparency. S.E. = standard error, Est. = factor loading (estimator), h^2 = communality. Factor loadings ≥.40 are displayed in bold; *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001. Replication shows same pattern of loadings for both sub-samples and the complete sample (shaded area).*

VI. Dependent Sample T-Test on EFA Results

	N	**t**	**df**	***p*-value**	**mean difference**
Democratic Governance					
complete sample	115	-1.425	114	.154	-.07866
sample split1	110	-1.771	109	.079	-.09354
sample split2	148	-1.561	147	.121	-.07321
Accountability					
complete sample	115	-1.042	114	.299	-.07562
sample split1	110	-.659	109	.511	-.04195
sample split2	148	-.426	147	.670	-.02555
Participation					
complete sample	115	-.102	114	.919	-.00677
sample split1	110	-1.352	109	.179	-.09559
sample split2	148	-.1.354	147	.178	-.08530
Transparency					
complete sample	115	-3.049	114	.003	-.19824
sample split1	110	-1.593	109	.114	-.09845
sample split2	148	-1.928	147	.056	-.10877

Dependent sample t-test on produced factor scores. *No significant differences.*

Correlation between the factors demonstrates that although the three dimensions of democratic governance present factors on their own, they are interdependent. In particular, a

positive attitude toward participation implies at least a partially positive attitude toward accountability (r = .554; p = .000). This is intuitively plausible because some of the accountability mechanisms imply involvement of the public (item 8). Factor inter-correlation of transparency with participation (r = .284; p = .110) and with accountability (r = .036; p = .816), respectively, is not significant. Nevertheless, loadings other than expected and (though insignificant) item cross-loading point to the relatedness of participation and transparency. Eventually, transparency as access to information is necessary to enable meaningful participation (item 2). Conversely, participation enhances transparency. Item 5 loads on both dimensions though less high and insignificantly on participation (r = .299; p = .126). In principle, however, the three dimensions form single factors as shown by relative unidimensionality, that is, the squared loading/squared communalities ratio of the two items that load highest on a factor differs to at least .25 (Fürntratt 1969: 66).[19]

The three generated factors – participation, transparency and accountability – are used to measure attitudes toward democratic governance in these three dimensions and the overall concept as their averaged value. In the paper on the influence of transnational linkages (Chapter 2), I use two separate scales, one for the positively-oriented items (the produced factor scores) and one for their logical opposites. In the paper on the influence of functional cooperation (Chapter 3), I assess the dependent variables using scales that aggregate the positively-oriented items with the corresponding negatively-oriented item. The items used for each scale are the positively-oriented items that were identified by the EFA as crucial for the respective factor (factor loading$\geq$ .4 ; Worthington and Whittaker 2006: 823) and the theoretically corresponding negatively-oriented item. Whereas two separate scales correspond to the different logic of the two statement types and allow a more differentiated analysis, the combination of both types of items is based on the theoretical idea that a true democrat is one who supports the regular democratic governance items and rejects their logical opposites. The measurement of the dependent variables is consequently tailored to the purpose of the individual study.

Does the different measurement of the dependent variables influence the results? Most importantly, can the difference in impact of linkage and functional cooperation be explained by the different scales used? In order to ensure that the marginal effect of linkage on the attitudes of state officials toward democratic governance is not due to the separate analysis

[19] The only exception is item 5, for which the difference is 22 per cent due to the mentioned cross-loading.

of positively- and negatively-oriented items, I re-run the regression analyses using the scale that aggregated the two types of items.[20] As in the paper on the influence of linkage, the analyses are done with the maximum likelihood parameter estimator (MLMV). Social and communication linkage variables are regressed on the three individual dimensions of democratic governance and the overall concept (Model 1), while controlling for the two alternative explanatory variables, politicization and administrative socialization (Model 2) and, additionally, for gender (Model 3). In order to test the conditional effects, cross-product terms of the two linkage variables and the two domestic factors are introduced; Model 4 (a-d) displays those interaction effects that are significant. In the control models, the two domestic factors are regressed alone on the democratic governance variables (Model 5) and together with the demographic factor gender (Model 6).

Table VII presents the estimation results for the likelihood of linkage in shaping attitude toward democratic governance if a combined scale of positively- and negatively-oriented items is used. The results mirror the results of the separate analyses. They not only present a robustness test of the analyses of an effect of linkage. They also corroborate the conclusion that it is not diffuse linkage but functional cooperation as a more institutionalized form of transnational exchange that significantly influences the attitudes of domestic actors toward democratic governance. In a nutshell, the results reveal that linkage does not yield a significant independent effect. Second, linkage has a positive influence on the state officials' attitudes only in non-politicized policy fields. If the policy field is politicized, it risks having a negative effect. Third, this conditional effect depends on the type of linkage: The pattern of interaction effect is similar to the one produced when using two separate scales. For obvious reasons the usage of a combined scale does not allow the detection of differences in impact for the negatively-and positively-oriented items. The analyses using an aggregated scale show, for instance, that both communication and social linkage significantly influence the attitudes toward transparent governance depending on the degree of politicization. A separate analysis allows a more differentiated finding; it reveals that stays abroad significantly shape attitude toward the negatively-oriented item of transparency whereas foreign media are relevant for the attitudes toward the positively-oriented transparency items. In sum, it does not make a difference whether a combined scale or two separate scales are used to measure the

[20] I also re-run the regression analyses for the impact of functional cooperation using separate scales for the positively- and negatively-oriented items. Since this robustness test produces 440 models in total, a detailed discussion is omitted due to space constraints. The 440 models are calculated as follows: (3 models on independent effects + 8 interaction models) x 4 (3 dimensions + overall concept) x 2 (negative + positive scale) x 5 (participation in Twinning as dummy + 4 individual projects). It suffices to say that the results also largely mirror the results produced with the combined scale. Regression results are available upon requests.

dependent variables; both reveal an only marginal effect of linkage on the attitudes of state officials toward democratic governance. If I would have used a combined scale in the paper on linkage, I had however missed the interesting findings regarding the differential impact of different types of linkage on different types of items.

VII. Impact of Linkage on Attitude toward Democratic Governance Using an Aggregated Scale

Democratic Governance	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4a)	(4b)	(4c)	(4d)	(5)	(6)
Communicat. Linkage	-.007 (.043)	.002 (.047)	.003 (.047)	**.179 (.054)*** **	-.100 (.052)				
Social Linkage	-.034 (.077)	.006 (.081)	.004 (.081)	.029 (.077)	.029 (.077)				
Politicization		**-.146 (.074)***	**-.145 (.074)***	**.265 (.112)***	**.265 (.112)***			-.118 (.073)	-.118 (.073)
Admin. Socialization		-.035 (.076)	-.030 (.076)	-.032 (.069)	-.032 (.069)			-.062 (.074)	-.057 (.073)
Gender			.036 (.073)	.045 (.069)	.045 (.069)				.040 (.074)
Comm. L. x 1: polit.				**-.279 (.076)*** **					
Comm. L. x 1: non-polit.					**.279 (.076)*** **				
R^2	.002	.040	.042	.126	.126			.034	.036
AIC	495.951	694.827	819.498	900.987	900.987			368.320	500.423
log likelihood	-243.976	-341.414	-402.749	-442.493	-442.493			-180.160	-245.211
N	104	94	94	94	94			99	99
Participation									
Communicat. Linkage	-.067 (.062)	-.063 (.067)	-.052 (.065)						
Social Linkage	-.090 (.108)	-.048 (.109)	-.045 (.109)						
Politicization		**-.305 (.104)** **	**-.299 (.102)** **					**-.331 (.098)*** **	**-.324 (.094)*** **
Admin. Socialization		-.136 (.111)	-.113 (.107)					-.184 (.099)	-.148 (.093)
Gender			**.227 (.106)***						**.265 (.098)** **
R^2	.016	.102	.136					.112	.159
AIC	690.543	932.685	1079.487					549.688	708.556
log likelihood	-341.271	-460.343	-532.744					-270.844	-349.278
N	122	112	112					122	122

Table VII continued

Transparency	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4a)**	**(4b)**	**(4c)**	**(4d)**	**(5)**	**(6)**
Communicat. Linkage	.025 (.047)	.037 (.045)	.041 (.046)	**.149 (.051)****	-.013 (.062)	.056 (.045)	.056 (.045)		
Social Linkage	-.011 (.078)	.034 (.078)	.033 (.078)	.046 (.079)	.046 (.079)	**.329 (.096)*****	-.128 (.099)		
Politicization		-.097 (.069)	-.095 (.068)	.143 (.125)	.143 (.125)	.106 (.080)	.106 (.080)	-.036 (.080)	-.036 (.079)
Admin. Socialization		-.048 (.078)	-.042 (.078)	-.054 (.078)	-.054 (.078)	-.073 (.075)	-.073 (.075)	-.065 (.076)	-.050 (.076)
Gender			.061 (.072)	.065 (.070)	.065 (.070)	.054 (.069)	.054 (.069)		.102 (.072)
Comm. L. x 1: polit.				**-.161 (.081)***					
Comm. L. x 1: non-polit.					**.161 (.081)***				
Social L. x 1 : polit.						**-.456 (.133)*****			
Social L. x 1 : non-polit.							**.456 (.133)*****		
R^2	.002	.026	.031	.057	.057	.108	.108	.008	.022
AIC	615.422	845.305	994.551	1098.909	1098.909	980.022	980.022	471.533	632.140
log likelihood	-303.711	-146.652	-490.275	-541.455	-541.455	-482.011	-482.011	-231.766	-311.070
N	123	112	112	112	112	112	112	120	120
Accountability									
Communicat. Linkage	.066 (.073)	.083 (.082)	.073 (.082)						
Social Linkage	-.042 (.119)	-.068 (.127)	-.066 (.127)						
Politicization		-.034 (.130)	-.033 (.129)					.012 (.133)	.014 (.132)
Admin. Socialization		.017 (.127)	.006 (.125)					-.013 (.124)	-.035 (.121)
Gender			-.130 (.117)						-.181 .121)
R^2	.007	.014	.022					.000	.016
AIC	686.965	921.073	1060.997					557.261	705.955
log likelihood	-339.482	-454.536	-523.498					-274.631	-347.978
N	119	108	108					114	114

Multiple regression analyses (MLMV). *Regression coefficients are unstandardized; standard errors in parentheses; cases deleted listwise; *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001.*

Chapter 2. Democratic Socialization: The Missing Link between Transnational Linkage and Diffusion of Democratic Governance

Studies on the diffusion of norms generally argue that strong ties to established democracies positively foster political transformation in non-democratic regimes. In doing so, they take for granted that agent attitudes are shaped by exposure to norms but neglect to empirically scrutinize this socialization effect. This paper aims at testing the theoretical micro-foundation of the diffusion argument. It explores whether social and communication linkages to established democracies can create domestic stakeholders for democratic change in authoritarian regimes by positively influencing attitudes of state officials toward democratic modes of decision-making. In order to directly examine attitudes rather than infer them from behavior, an original scale is developed that measures the degree of agreement with democratic governance. Empirically, the argument is tested on Morocco's linkage to Europe using data from a unique survey among state officials. The results challenge the conventional wisdom that attitudes are shaped by exposure to norms through transnational linkage.

Key words: Arab authoritarian regimes; democratic governance; democratization; diffusion; European Union; linkage; international socialization

Introduction

The idea that democracy is contagious in that it diffuses across the world map is today well established (Cederman and Gleditsch 2004; Gleditsch and Ward 2006). Yet, while many empirical studies confirm the existence of norm diffusion, few theoretical explanations exist. Some seem to consider it almost natural that proximate political regimes become more similar over time than more distant ones. At bottom, however, most studies build their argument on the (implicit) assumption that when countries are nearby they cultivate close political, societal and economic relations. These relations manifest themselves in various ways, such as economic flows of investment and assistance, transgovernmental ties to policy networks, penetration by Western media, and societal exchange, including elite education and migration. These linkages are said to raise not only the costs of authoritarianism by denouncing autocratic abuses, increasing pressure on the international community to intervene and changing domestic opportunity structures in favor of pro-democratic forces; They are also expected to form channels of ideological diffusion, changing attitude if not behavior toward democratic norms and practices. By influencing the attitudes of relevant

domestic actors, so the argument, close relations to established democracies create democrats within a predominantly non-democratic environment (Simmons *et al.* 2006; Levitsky and Way 2005; Nye 2004; Whitehead 1996).

This argument is, however, more theoretically assumed than empirically proven. Studies on diffusion of norms teach us that (and under what conditions) democracy can spread in the global system (Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Weijnert 2005; Doorenspleet 2004; Starr and Lindborg 2003). By concentrating on processes at the polity level, however, they largely overlook the problem of agency. Studies on policy diffusion, by contrast, highlight the role certain actors play in diffusing policy innovations. Some scholars even recognize that elite state actors may become familiar with certain policy solutions by spending time outside their home country (Wejnert 2002; Most and Starr 1990). Yet, both strands of diffusion literature focus on macro-level change, that is governmental transitions to democracy and adoption of (sub-) national policies, respectively. In so doing, they neglect to empirically test the theoretical micro-foundation of their argument, which is the individual attitudinal and behavioral modifications triggered by international factors and required in order to produce change (Keck and Sikkink 1998). The few studies exploring the effect at the micro-level have produced contradictory results, and each study is limited to one specific type of linkage, most prominently foreign media usage (Kern and Hainmueller 2009) and migration to Western democracies (Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010). Surprisingly, micro- and macro-level studies of democratic diffusion alike hardly consider the literature on international socialization that focuses on 'process[es] of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community' (Checkel 2005: 804), such as Western liberal democracies. Numerous and comprehensive studies on international micro-socialization show a pessimistic picture as they find 'little or no evidence of the predicted attitude changes' (Pollack 1998: 2; cf. Schimmelfennig 2003).

This paper argues that the assumption of democratic socialization through linkage is not as straightforward as postulated in the diffusion literature and needs to be directly examined. It wishes to undertake this task by exploring the effect of linkage to established democracies on the attitudes of domestic actors in authoritarian regimes. Concretely, I analyze the attitudes of Arab state officials as relevant actors for democratic change at the intermediate level between government and society. I argue that state officials in authoritarian regimes can adopt a positive mindset toward democratic principles and practices as a consequence of strong social and communication ties to 'the West', although this attitude change does in

itself not translate into effective regime change. Empirically, the argument is tested on 150 Moroccan state officials using data from a unique survey.

In this paper, I first synthesize the theoretical argument of democratic socialization as a result of exposure to democratic norms and rules via transnational linkages and formulate the hypotheses on under what conditions such an effect might take place. I then statistically test to what extent factors identified by the linkage model as spreading democratic values beyond borders actually yield democratic socialization. The regression results do only reveal a marginal conditional effect of linkage on state officials' attitudes. It seems as if the theoretical assumption that diffuse transnational exchange turns domestic actors into democratic-minded opponents of authoritarian regimes hardly holds empirically.

THEORY: Linkage and Democratic Socialization

Studies on diffusion identify subtle mechanisms of 'uncoordinated' (Elkins and Simmons 2005: 35) norm transfer such as 'emulation' (Simmons *et al.* 2006: 795-8) and 'contagion' (Whitehead 1996: 5-8), which do not require a policy that actively promotes democracy. Rather, they claim that norms are diffused through neutral, that is 'non-coercive and often unintentional, channels from one country to another' (Schmitter 1996: 30). In this, linkage serves as a transmitter of international influence by diffusion (Gleditsch 2001: 13). Linkage is a 'multidimensional concept that encompasses the myriad networks of interdependence that connect individual polities, economies, and societies to Western democratic communities' (Way and Levitsky 2007: 53).

The linkage model of external democratization contends that cross-border interaction and transnational exchange may extend democratic norms beyond borders into authoritarian regimes where they possibly trigger processes of voluntary democratic change. According to this view, democratization is not the result of various instruments and strategies intentionally used by (external) norm- or policy-entrepreneurs to either persuade domestic elites to adopt democratic norms or influence their cost-benefit calculation in favor of democratic change through conditionality. Instead, the effects of linkage are diffuse by creating 'multiple pressure points – from investors to technocrats to voters – that few autocrats can afford to ignore' (Levitsky and Way 2005: 25). To this end, it is assumed that linkage influences the

attitudes of domestic actors and turns them into agents for democratic change (Simmons *et al.* 2006; Levitsky and Way 2005; Nye 2004; Whitehead 1996).

The argument of the linkage model follows the 'complex adaptive systems' approach (Cederman 1997: 7), where even small perturbations in the characteristics of individual agents or small groups interacting with each other can have quite dramatic effects on social structures (Johnston 2001: 507). Since such an approach demands the unit of analysis to be the individual (or a small group), it is all the more remarkable that most studies are hitherto limited to the scrutiny of diffusion processes at the aggregate level of the state. In so doing, they take for granted the results of socialization on attitudes and engage in what Checkel calls 'as if' reasoning (Checkel and Moravcsik 2001: 227). If studies have opted for an analysis of micro-level data, they are unfortunately limited to one specific type of linkage in a specific setting (Kern and Hainmueller 2009; Atkinson 2010; Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010).

This paper seeks to explore the first intermediate step in a chain of mechanisms that may finally lead from transnational exchange to democratic change. In a nutshell, it puts the linkage models' constructivist (sub-)argument of attitude change due to norm exposure under the analytic microscope by zooming in on democratic socialization processes at the level of individual state officials. In so doing, it endeavors to enrich the literature on norm diffusion by testing its theoretical micro-foundation.

Dimensions of Democratic Socialization

Democratic socialization is defined as a process of attitude change toward democratic governance, which comes as a consequence of exposure to democratic rules and decision-making practices.[21] Drawing on authors who have taken an unconventional view of democracy beyond the nation-state level, the notion of "democratic governance" corresponds to the manifestation of democratic principles in administrative daily practices. It adopts the idea that democratic principles may be applicable to every situation in which collectively binding decisions are taken (Beetham 1999: 4-5; cf. Dahl 1971: 12). These principles can thus be translated into administrative rules and practices at the level of sub-units of state administration, even within a non-democratic polity. Unlike good governance (Kaufmann *et al.* 2005), democratic governance is not about how effectively and efficiently but how legitimately 'the rules of the political game are managed' (Hyden *et al.* 2004: 2; cf.

[21] This definition largely corresponds to the classical understanding of socialization as 'process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community' (Checkel 2005: 804).

Coston 1998). It focuses on the explicit inclusion of non-state actors in (administrative) decision-making.

For the purpose of assessing state officials' attitudes toward democratic modes of decision-making and implementation, a multidimensional concept of democratic governance is used. Democratic governance may vary in quality along three dimensions: transparency, accountability and participation (Freyburg *et al.* 2007; cf. Bovens 2007; Brinkerhoff 2000; Hyden *et al.* 2004). Transparency is about the provision of and access to various kinds of information on sectoral policy and its consequences for citizens, civil society associations and the media (Zaharchenko and Goldenman 2004). Accountability at the administrative level refers to the obligation for officials to justify the use of resources and the achievement of outcomes toward citizens and independent third parties, and the establishment and application of procedures for administrative review, including the possibility of sanctions in case of infringement (Grant and Keohane 2005: 29; Diamond *et al.* 1999: 3). Finally, participation largely corresponds to the key feature of the conventional understanding of democracy at the level of the nation-state (Dahl 1971; Verba 1967). Transferred to administrative governance, openness to participation means that all willing members of the public should have an equal and effective opportunity to make their interests and concerns known, thereby shaping the outcome of the decisions. Although the margins between these dimensions are sometimes blurred, they are analyzed individually. This allows for the exploration of whether transnational linkage is more likely to influence the attitude toward some dimensions of democratic governance than toward others.

Democratic modes of governance imply changing the culture of administrative rules and practices in authoritarian regimes where 'bureaucracy has been reduced to a service tool of political leaders rather than a professional institution with special skills for independent analysis and action' (Jreisat 2006: 417). Public participation threatens the professional concept that state officials have of themselves as specialists in the area in question, equipped with outstanding knowledge, expertise and experience; transparency directly contradicts the fundamental secrecy of authoritarian regimes where information may be an official's only asset; and accountability poses difficulties for the rigid structure of political authority. Acquainted with democratic modes of governance, however, state officials may prefer policy work that acquires room for *manœuvre* in administrative routines and allows for learning through feedback and involvement of the targets. Consequently, they may possibly seek to

engage in individual and collective strategies to express these attitudes in behavior, that is to implement participatory, accountable and transparent governance styles within state administration, in the long-run.

Democratic socialization manifests itself in the change of the socializees' attitude toward democratic governance. Attitudes are partly generated through one's culture and education, but they are not fixed or genetically set (Perloff 2003: 36-41). They are learned and can be altered and influenced through either communication with others or direct personal experiences. While linkage may indeed shape state officials' attitudes, it does not necessarily impact their behavior in view of likely repressive consequences. Behavior and behavioral intentions are treated as potential consequences rather than integral components of attitude change itself (Zimbardo and Leippe 1991: 31; cf., Eagly and Chaiken 1992; Olson and Zanna 1993; Verplanken *et al.* 1998).[22]

State Officials as Agents for Democratic Change

State officials employed by authoritarian regimes are a relevant target group for scrutinizing as to whether linkage to Western liberal democracies is able to create democratic stakeholders in a non-democratic polity. Arab authoritarian regimes are characterized by traditional paternalistic structures which attach great importance to state bureaucracy for the maintenance and stability of the current regime (Pawelka 2002: 432). This is especially true for bureaucratic monarchies such as Morocco, where political culture is shaped by an 'absolute authority' around the central power of the *makhzan*, the monarchy, and its hegemonic state apparatus (Zerhouni 2004). Whereas the highest and lowest levels of administration reflect the most traditional forms of patrimonialism, the intermediate level is evolving toward modernization (Al-Arkoubi and McCourt 2004). To cope with the more complex requirements of modern administrations and increasingly important international processes, authoritarian rulers have begun to promote young, well-trained specialists in the government institutions. Even though this does not mean that administration is governed by the achievement principle, traditional tribal leaders and informal networks are gradually losing political influence. As a consequence, it is more difficult to control officials at the

[22] The original formulation of a multi-component model of attitude comprises three or even four components – affect, cognition, behaviour, and possibly behavioural intentions. Most recent research in this tradition, however, focuses on affect and cognition. Albeit it is important to analytically distinguish between the affective and cognitive components, a difference in the outcome is not discernible at the current stage of this study. It is thus assumed that individuals have an attitude toward democratic governance that can to a large extent be summarized as a one-dimensional attitude and that this attitude can change through exposure to democratic norms via transnational linkages. At a later stage, however, the differentiation between affection and cognition will be used in order to disentangle two different mechanisms of how exposure to norms can trigger democratic socialization: (cognitive) learning and (affective) identification (cf. Checkel 2005).

intermediate level of the administrative hierarchy by traditional means. It is these officials who make up the target group of this study, as they present promising stakeholders for democratic change.

In order to be fruitful, democratic reforms at the polity level require state officials familiar with democratic modes of governance. Otherwise, democratization processes risk resulting in 'enlightened dictatorship' that circumvents rather than allows effective democratic control by the citizens when used by specific classes and oligarchies to control political power and sustain ineffective, corrupt regimes (Baker 2002: 5; Jreisat 2006). Moreover, as 'government in action' (Jreisat 2007), state officials not only formulate but also implement policy. In contrast to the political elite and diplomats, state officials present that part of the public sector with which citizens actually have contact (Baker 2002: 4; Berger 1957: 5) and thus shape citizens' perceptions of how a political system functions. Finally, state officials themselves constitute a significant social group. In the Arab world they generally represent a large proportion of the educated population and comprise a major component of the (emerging) middle class (Zerhouni 2004: 61), factors commonly seen as social conditions or 'requisites' supporting democratization (Lipset 1981).

Conditions of Democratic Socialization

Linkage is expected to familiarize individuals with rules and norms integrated in the corporate identity of the respective socialization entity, in this case Western democracies, and to render them more receptive to democratic governance. Two dimensions of linkage have attracted increasing attention in the literature as causes of democratization: social linkage and communication linkage. These linkages are also assumed to be the most relevant and particularly suitable for shaping state officials' attitudes for certain forms of administrative rules and practices. Social linkage is about 'flows of people across borders' (Way and Levitsky 2007: 53). State officials' understanding of appropriate governance is likely to be influenced by personal experiences with democratic modes of decision-making when staying abroad for educational or professional reasons for a considerable period of time. 'Through the exchange experience, participants (who may have little exposure to democratic norms and ideas) observe how people behave within a democratic system, acquire knowledge about how democracy [and democratic governance] functions, and learn what to expect of their own leaders and institutions' (Atkinson 2010: 2; cf., Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010; Nye 2004). Officials can also become acquainted with democratic governance at home through

communication linkage, that is 'flows of information across borders' (Way and Levitsky 2007: 53). The view that Western broadcasting nurtures pro-democratic attitudes and undermines public support for authoritarian regimes is widely shared (Whitehead 1996: 6-8; Nye 2004; Wejnert 2005: 56; Kern and Hainmueller 2009). Rather than through personal experiences, exposure to foreign media familiarizes state officials with democratic governance by confronting them with media content that delineates administrative practices in established democracies, exemplifies the involvement of the public in these processes and reports on infringements against democratic governance.

> State officials in authoritarian regimes are more likely to have a positive attitude toward democratic governance …
>
> **H1** ... when they have stayed abroad for educational or professional reasons in a Western democratic country *(social linkage);*
>
> **H2** ... when they regularly use Western media for political information *(communication linkage).*

These influences might be filtered by two domestic factors: the officials' administrative socialization and the politicization of their working environment. Officials that entered public administration after reform-oriented forces had taken government in a (albeit moderate) spirit of administrative modernization are expected to demonstrate a more positive attitude toward democratic governance than their senior colleagues. This proposition accounts for pre-socialization such as 'prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent' with the norms to be transferred (Checkel 2005: 813; Beyers 2005; Hooghe 2005; Johnston 2005). Senior officials in particular – as '"well-connected" members of the old guard' (Baker 2002: 293) – might perceive democratic governance as a real threat to their privileges. Secondly, it is expected that bureaucrats engaged in politicized fields are less receptive to democratic governance. Highly politicized issues lie at the 'pole of power' (Zimmerman 1973: 1204), evoking threats that are vital to major goals of relevant policy makers, in particular in the realm of defense, security and sovereignty. Ministries dealing with (highly) politicized issues are assumedly less open toward transnational influence since the regime is especially eager to maintain control over these fields. The political environment is thus generally characterized by a hierarchical leadership style in which issues are resolved top-down (Waever 1995; Potter 1980: 410) and tinkering with new approaches to administrative governance is hardly possible and often undesired. Consequently, there is a tendency to employ state officials who adhere to authoritarian ruling. These officials attach

less importance to transnational exchange or may cast a more skeptical eye at it. For instance, reading Western newspapers is possibly more motivated by being able to observe "the West", rather than by true interest in learning how to make more democratic decisions. Following these considerations, we should therefore expect that the impact of linkage increases with administrative socialization in a more reform-oriented environment and with relative non-politicization.

> Linkage to Western democracies is more likely to impact positively on the attitude toward democratic governance of state officials …
>
> **H3** ... who entered public administration after reform-minded forces took government *(administrative socialization);*
>
> **H4** ... who work in a non-politicized policy field *(politicization).*

RESEARCH DESIGN: Measuring Attitude toward Democratic Governance

A suitable case to explore the argument is linkage between Europe and Morocco. Although Morocco is widely referred to as the politically most liberalized country in the Arab world, it has shown no noteworthy democratization process in recent decades. Consequently, it can be considered to be a problematic case where attitude toward democratic governance by state officials is likely to be negative, and potential socialization effects can be better differentiated from domestic trends since democratic socialization is unlikely to happen in the absence of external factors. At the same time, within the EU's Southern neighborhood, it presents a "most-likely" case. The establishment of strong linkage presupposes a certain political openness allowing for transnational exchange. In addition, the primary source of linkage is geographical proximity to Western democratic countries (Kopstein and Reilly 2000; Levitsky and Way 2005; O'Loughlin *et al.* 1998: 552). Countries located close to Europe such as Morocco, are generally characterized by a denser web of interaction with European democracies than more geographically distant ones. In terms of generalization this means that if linkage to Western democratic countries impacts on the attitude of state officials in neighboring authoritarian regimes, we should be able to detect such an effect in Moroccan ministries. In turn, in case of a negative finding the conclusion is acceptable that in countries politically less liberalized and geographically more distant than Morocco to Europe, linkage will also show no significant effect.

To determine the effect of linkage on the attitudes of Moroccan state officials toward democratic governance, I apply a 'static-group comparison design' (Campbell and Stanley 1966: 12). According to this quasi-experimental design, randomly selected state officials are assumed to be exposed to different values of a causal variable, here exposure to transnational linkages. Their attitudes toward democratic governance are statistically compared at a single point in time. The effect of linkage is defined as the difference in attitude between state officials that were exposed to linkages ('treatment group') and their colleagues that were not ('control group') while including explicit controls for relevant alternative influences (Halaby 2004: 509-12).

The data comes from an original survey I conducted among state officials in Morocco. To this end, I constructed a closed-end questionnaire, which I presented as dealing with administrative rules and practices in public administration in general. The respondents were selected by a theoretically controlled cluster sampling: I invited all officials working in particular departments of certain ministries to participate. Personal distribution of the questionnaire on site enabled a response rate of approximately 96 per cent; nearly all officials available during a period of three months in the summer 2008 responded. Due to the opportunity to leave inconvenient questions blank and the persuasive approach taken, outright refusal was almost absent.[23] I could thus avoid biases due to complete response refusal by specific groups of officials. The risk of response bias was further reduced by guaranteeing anonymity and strict confidentiality in the usage of the data.

Operationalization of the Dependent Variables

Since this study could not build on existing surveys, it required the creation of suitable democratic governance items in order to measure the dependent variables, the state officials' attitudes toward democratic modes of governance. The three theoretically derived dimensions of democratic governance – transparency, accountability, and participation – are operationalized with issue indicators pertaining to various aspects of administrative governance. Their formulation is inspired by conceptual work on public administration (reform) and linkage of (good) governance and development (Hyden *et al.* 2004; Baker 2002; Page 1985; Berger 1957). All items are measured using a 5-point Likert scale on agreement responses. To minimize the risk of response biases, the statement items are randomly

[23] Only one official flatly refused to fill in the questionnaire; fewer than five officials could not be reached because of professional commitments abroad or holidays. It is difficult to test sample bias conclusively because socio-demographic data on state officials in Morocco are not available. Respondents could choose the language of communication (French or Arabic), a gesture that was warmly acknowledged. Only 9 per cent, however, picked the Arabic version.

distributed in two out of 36 different sets of questions[24]; some of the items appear reformulated in different statements, and some capture statements on non-democratic governance features (negatively-oriented items). Despite the precautions taken in questionnaire design and survey setting, the existence of preference falsification cannot be completely ruled out. However, this hardly signifies a problem for this study. In the long run, I am not primarily interested in identifying the true understanding of appropriate governance among Arab state officials. Instead, I am concerned with estimating the difference in agreement with democratic governance between state officials who were exposed to transnational influences and those who were not. It can essentially be assumed that there is no systematic bias of response tendencies; a socialization effect can therefore not be ascribed to the effect of response tendencies.

In order to assess the dependent variables – the state officials' attitudes toward openness to participation, transparency, accountability and the overall concept of democratic governance – I create two separate scales, one for the positively-oriented and one for the negatively-framed items. For the positively-oriented items, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) helps to determine those items that are most suitable for measuring the dependent variables and produces factor scores of the individual dimensions.[25] The overall concept of democratic governance is measured by the mean of the three individual factor scores.[26] In contrast to scale scores that cover only significant loadings, factor scores allow for a more differentiated assessment of European influences on the officials' attitudes since they incorporate all loadings according to their weighting.[27] The negatively-oriented items measured by a 5-point Likert scale are treated as ordinal-scale variables for the individual dimensions. Democratic governance as aggregated value is calculated by the mean of the values of the three negatively-oriented items. To keep it categorical, the mean is rounded up from each value of .5 to the higher 'full' value.

[24] The two sets of questions are introduced as follows: 'There are different understandings of what determines the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts in public administration. To what extent do you personally agree that the following items serve this function?' (item 7+8) / 'There are different opinions as to what it takes to be a 'good' civil servant. To what extent do you personally agree or disagree that a civil servant should have the following qualities?' (item 1-6).

[25] The exploratory factor analysis is done using the robust mean and variance-adjusted weighted least squares (WLSMV) extraction procedure and the oblique rotation method Oblimin. Further details are provided in the Annex to the introductory chapter of this dissertation.

[26] The factor scores' determinacy – that is the correlation between the factor score estimates and the 'true' factor scores – is adequate for usage as dependent variables, according to Brown (2006: 37) and Grice (2001). Participation has a validity coefficient of .951, accountability of .869, and transparency of .905. The coefficient indicates how close the average estimate is to the true factor score, whereby a value close to 1 is desirable.

[27] Regression on scale scores reveals similar results. Results are available upon request.

The first factor – participation – captures one of the key dimensions in the conventional understanding of democracy.[28] It is traditionally perceived as the involvement of the rule addressees in the rule-making process (item 3). In this sense, participation not only requires that state officials seek to guarantee citizens' knowledge about current governmental decisions in order to enable meaningful participation (item 2). It first and foremost presumes that state officials are willing to admit non-state actors representing all relevant interests to their decision-making processes (item 1). The conflicting item referring to public participation addresses the authoritarian claim of unlimited approval. It reverses the direction of influence – citizens' views should not shape, but are to be brought in line with governmental policies. Transparency as access to information for citizens means that governance-related information about administrative procedures is provided (item 4), and that instead of prepared promotion packages of governmental policy, up-to-date and comprehensive information that is actually demanded is available (item 6). The negatively-framed transparency item embodies the idea that authoritarian thinking is directly threatened if citizens should be granted free access to information of their interest. Finally, accountability refers to 'reviews [of] the expediency and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts' (Schedler 1999: 28). This can be done either by means of independent state institutions ('horizontal accountability', item 7) or by possibilities for citizens and their associations to request scrutiny of administrative practices ('vertical accountability', items 8). The third negatively-oriented item addresses an attitude statement that distorts the meaning of accountability by ascribing the monitoring of the correctness of bureaucratic acts' to the higher authority.

Positively- and negatively-oriented items are analyzed separately; negatively-oriented items were not introduced in the factor analysis. Due to a non-response rate of about ten per cent their number of missing values is comparatively high. Their incorporation would decrease the number of cases and thus lead to a substantial loss of information on the regular items. Secondly, a separate analysis corresponds to the different logic of the two statement types and is more transparent regarding their effect. Agreeing with positively-framed democratic items is assumed to be 'easier' and more justifiable for state officials employed in an authoritarian regime that declares itself a 'modern' state than explicitly rejecting their logical

[28] Annex I displays the exact wording of the items.

opposites that refers to the still prevailing authoritarian culture. The distribution of the outcome variables is shown in Table 1.[29]

Table 1. Attitude toward Democratic Governance

	Participation		Transparency		Accountability		Democratic Governance	
	pos.	*neg.*	*pos.*	*neg.*	*pos.*	*neg.*	*pos.*	*neg.*
Max. value	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Min. value	1.3	1	1.7	1	1	1	1.3	1
Mean	4.48	3.83	4.64	2.17	4.26	3.06	4.46	3.02
Median	5	4	5	2	5	3	5	3
S.D.	.77	1.186	.67	1.186	.98	1.260	.81	1.211
Skewness	-1.712	-.924	-2.31	.711	-1.455	-.288	-1.83	-.167

Descriptive statistics. *Values range between 1 ("non-democratic") to 5 ("democratic") with reversed values for the negatively-oriented items*[30]*; N = 121, cases with missing values excluded listwise; pos. = positively-oriented items, neg. = negatively-oriented item, S.D. = standard deviation.*

Overall, Moroccan state officials show a remarkably high degree of agreement with the attitude statements of democratic governance, given that they are employed by an authoritarian regime hitherto reluctant to pursue any noteworthy political liberalization: Mean and median are clearly located in the realm of positive attitudes toward democratic governance. The analysis of the negatively-oriented items reveals, however, that the officials' understanding of some features is still partially rooted in an authoritarian culture of rule making, as indicated by the consistently lower values.

Operationalization of the Explanatory Factors

Communication linkage[31] applies to Western print media (newspaper and magazines) and television channels that are used for political information (rather than as a source of

[29] For illustrative purposes, scale scores are used because factor scores are composite variables providing information about an individual's place on a factor, which make them more difficult to interpret. Scales were constructed by adding the values of the individual items and dividing the sum by the number of items for each dimension.The point estimate for the scale reliability (ϱ) of participation is .79, of accountability .58 and of transparency .75. The internal reliability is thus adequate for all subscales, in particular given the exploratory character of this study, its objective (attitudes and preferences), and the relatively small number per scale (John and Benet-Martínez 2000: 346). Raykov's confirmatory FA-based method is applied, which is not only insensitive to violation of normality assumption but, most notably, is a more accurate estimate of scale reliability of multi-items measures than the usual Cronbach's coefficient alpha (though the value of the expressions is identical) (Sijtsma 2009; Raykov 2007; Brown 2006: 337-45). For the sake of completeness, Cronbach's α of participation is .68, of accountability .38 and of transparency .46.

[30] The negatively oriented items are reversed, that is 1 stands for 'strongly agree' and 5 for 'strongly disagree'. Consequently, the higher the value the less the respondent is in favor of the respective item.

[31] The regression analyses are re-run for alternative codings without statistically significant differences. The least complex solution is applied. Regression results are available upon request. Annex II displays descriptive statistics and intercorrelation of independent variables.

entertainment).[32] Media penetration is treated as dichotomous with '1' representing regular media usage. Respondents were asked to indicate which newspaper/magazines and television channels they read and watch for political information, in various languages, and how often they do so. Since media products originate predominantly in Europe – about 97 per cent of foreign print media and 94 per cent of foreign TV channels used – the expected influence of communication linkage can be said to be European.

Social linkage refers to the officials' international experiences operationalized as a stay abroad for at least six months for educational or professional reasons in the 'old' member states of the European Union and/or North America (NA). This variable is coded as a binary variable with '1' for residence in the EU and/or in the United States/Canada. There are no significant differences in attitude toward democratic governance between officials that spent a considerable period of time in Europe and those who had been in North America or in both host destinations.[33] Since the number of visitors to North America is very small (N = 9 only NA, N = 6 NA and EU), Europe and North America are subsumed into one category. The two linkage variables are not significantly interrelated.[34] Officials who spent a considerable time in 'the West' do not substantially more often consult Western media.

Politicization refers to the importance of the policy issues for the integrity of the state and the maintenance of political power by the ruling elite. Interviews with Moroccan state officials and non-governmental activists as well as representatives of international organizations, EU member states and the Delegation of the European Commission helped to classify the policy issues under study.[35] The departments of the State Secretary of Water and Environment, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of National and Higher Education, and Scientific Research (N = 56) are treated as non-politicized. Indicators are, for instance, that media coverage is more pluralized and sectoral cooperation is less impeded by political considerations. By contrast, touching upon internally sensitive issues such as corruption, patronage and the entwinement of private business with governmental

[32] A recent study on public support for the East German communist regime revealed that if foreign media was used primarily as a source of entertainment, it may even increase regime support (Kern and Hainmueller 2009).
[33] A non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test comparing the mean ranks for the three dimensions does not display any significant differences in attitude toward democratic governance between officials that spent time in Europe or in North America (df = 2; χ^2 = .310, p = .856 for participation; χ^2 = 1.913, p = .384 for accountability; χ^2 = .208, p = .901 for transparency).
[34] This has been confirmed by cross-tabulation with the non-parametric Kendall's tau-b rank correlation test (p =.161, one-tailed). Contingency table is available upon request.
[35] To guarantee anonymity, I refer to the ministries rather than the individual departments since nearly all officials employed in the selected department responded, which would allow them to be identified. *N* refers to the number of the state officials that filled in the questionnaire.

responsibilities, competition policy, especially control of state aid, can be treated as politicized. Therefore, departments of the Ministry of Economic and General Affairs, the Ministry of Economy and Exterior Finances, the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and New Technologies, the Ministry of Foreign Commerce, the Ministry of Agriculture, Rural Development and Fishing, and the Ministry of Equipment and Transport are coded as politicized (N = 84).

Administrative socialization is operationalized by the years of professional service under the 'new' King Mohammed VI, that is more years of service under the present than under the previous regime (0), or more years of service under the previous regime ruled by King Hassan II (1). With the ascension of Mohammed VI in 1999, a new spirit of political, social and economic reform entered the country while, at the same time, the actual potential for meaningful democratic change remained limited (Zerhouni 2004).

EMPIRICS: Linkage to Europe and Attitude toward Democratic Governance

Multiple regression analyses examine the association of explanatory variables with each of the three democratic governance dimensions and the overall concept. Because of its robustness to non-normality of continuous data, the analyses on the regular items are done with a maximum likelihood parameter estimator (MLMV) that provides estimates with standard errors and mean- and variance-adjusted Chi-square test statistics (Brown 2006: 379). On the reversed items I perform an ordered logit regression model, using the maximum likelihood parameter MLR due to non-normal distribution of the ordinal dependent variables.[36]

Social and communication linkage variables are regressed on the three individual democratic governance factors and the overall concept (Model 1), while controlling for the two alternative explanatory variables, politicization and administrative socialization (Model 2) and, additionally, for gender[37] (Model 3). In Model 2 and 3 the interaction terms are omitted; the purpose is to demonstrate how the effects would appear if the interactions were not taken into account (Hypotheses 1 and 2). In order to test the conditional effect (Hypotheses 3 and 4), cross-product terms of the two linkage variables and the two domestic factors are

[36] Skewness and kurtosis values for the three dependent variables range from -.288 to -.924 and .169 to -.913, respectively.
[37] Gender is expected to have a positive impact since women generally support political modernisation and democratization more strongly than men. Women generally expect to personally benefit in terms of more rights and freedom (Hegasy 2007: 31). 34.7 per cent of the state officials participating in this study's survey are women. Gender is operationalized with 1 for female officials.

introduced. Model 4 (a and b) displays those interaction models that are significant. A better interpretation of the interaction effect is enabled by recoding the modifying variables according to their levels and describing how the results differ (Brambor *et al.* 2006; Braumoeller 2004). This means that I re-estimate the equation separately for each value. In the control models, the two domestic factors are regressed alone on the democratic governance variables (Model 5) and together with the demographic factor gender (Model 6).

Table 2 presents the estimation results for the likelihood of linkage shaping attitudes toward democratic governance. In a nutshell, the results reveal that the influence of transnational linkage on the attitudes of domestic actors depends on three favorable conditions: the degree of politicization, the adaptability of the transferred norms to the authoritarian context and the mode of exposure. Only in non-politicized policy fields can linkage positively shape the attitudes of state officials (Model 4b). If the policy field is characterized as politicized, it risks having a negative effect (Model 4a). Secondly, it makes a difference whether state officials personally experience democratic modes of governance by staying abroad in democracies or whether they learn about it via foreign media broadcasting. Communication linkage significantly shapes attitudes toward positively-oriented items (Table 2a, Model 4); social linkage is relevant for negatively-oriented items (Table 2b, Model 4). Whereas a stay abroad affects exclusively attitudes toward transparent modes (Appendix IIIb, Model 4), media influences attitudes toward transparent and accountable governance (Appendix IIIa, Model 4). Finally, linkage yields no significant effect on participation. Rather, it shapes the officials' attitudes toward transparency and accountability, principles that are related to good, that is efficient and effective, governance and that are thus compatible with authoritarian ruling. The marginal effect is supported by the fact that only a small proportion of total variation is explained by the set of explanatory variables, even after interaction terms have been introduced. Moreover, the quasi-experimental design of this study does not allow certainty that the effect is indeed causal. It cannot be proven that there is the proper time order in that attitude change follows exposure to transnational norms via linkage (and not *vice versa*).

Table 2. Impact of Linkage on Attitude toward Democratic Governance

A Positively-oriented items	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4a)**	**(4b)**	**(5)**	**(6)**
Communicat. Linkage	-.074 (.119)	-.067 (.125)	-.050 (.130)	**.359 (.153)***	**-.333 (.162)***		
Social Linkage	-.055 (.101)	-.070 (.103)	-.070 (.103)	-.027 (.101)	-.027 (.101)		
Politicization		**-.248 (.098)****	**-.249 (.098)***	.306 (.198)	-.306 (.198)	**-.223 (.094)***	**-.224 (.093)***
Admin. Socialization		-.059 (.103)	-.049 (.104)	-.076 (.100)	-.076 (.100)	-.095 (.094)	-.078 (.100)
Gender			.092 (.108)				.125 (.100)
Comm. L. x 1: polit.				**-.692 (.225)****			
Comm. L. x 1: non-polit.					**.692 (.225)****		
R^2	.005	.055	.060	.110	.110	.046	.054
AIC	584.593	872.641	1036.165	812.102	812.102	610.763	788.648
log likelihood	--288.296	-430.320	-511.083	-399.051	-399.051	-301.382	-389.324
N	138	126	126	126	126	135	135

Multiple regression analyses (MLMV). *Regression coefficients are unstandardized; standard errors in parentheses; cases deleted listwise; *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p = .001.*

B Negatively-oriented items	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4a)**	**(4b)**	**(5)**	**(6)**
Communicat. Linkage	.192 (.399)	.501 (.423)	.541 (.425)	.687 (.424)	.687 (.424)		
Social Linkage	.097 (.381)	.306 (.437)	.315 (.439)	**1.507 (.760)***	-.255 (.498)		
Politicization		.148 (.405)	.158 (.408)	**.838 (.460)†**	**-.838 (.460)†**	.242 (.386)	.243 (.387)
Admin. Socialization		-.015 (.427)	-.013 (.427)	-.131 (.427)	-.131 (.427)	.122 (.374)	.130 (.370)
Gender			.216 (.415)				.139 (.391)
Social L. x 1: polit.				**-1.763 (.884)***			
Social L. x 1: non-polit.					**1.763 (.884)***		
R^2	.003	.022	.025	.067	.067	.006	.007
AIC	286.197	251.400	253.123	249.133	249.133	266.173	268.046
log likelihood	-137.099	-117.700	-117.561	-115.566	-115.566	-127.086	-127.023
N	114	103	103	103	103	109	109

Ordered logit regression analyses (MLR). *Regression coefficients are unstandardized; standard errors in parentheses; cases deleted listwise; †p ≤ .07, *p ≤ .05.*

Linkage Effect on Democratic Governance

Exposure to social and communication linkages yields no significant independent effect on state officials' attitudes toward democratic governance (Table 2, Model 1). Hypotheses 1 and 2 on the unconditional effect of linkage can thus not be maintained. Instead, it may be said that the extent to which the professional environment is characterized by politicization affects the degree of agreement with democratic modes or of disagreement with non-democratic modes (Models 2 and 5). If the policy field in which a state official works is politicized, it is less likely that she will agree with democratic governance items. This supports the assumption that in politically sensitive fields officials are employed, who are particularly loyal to the regime. However, administrative socialization does not matter, in other words the attitude of state officials, who experienced King Hassan II's reign reflects the attitudes of their younger colleagues. This is surprising since the new Moroccan generation is commonly perceived as supporting (political) modernization and individualization (Hegasy 2007). Gender also shows no significant influence (Models 3 and 6). To what extent do domestic factors filter the effect linkage has on the state officials' attitudes? In particular, does the effect of linkage depend on the degree of politicization of state officials' professional environment?

The conditioning effect of linkage as shaping the state officials' attitudes toward democratic governance is tested by using multiplicative interaction models. Table 2 displays the significant interaction effects. There is no support for the hypotheses that linkage to Western democracies is more likely to impact positively on the attitude toward democratic governance of state officials who have entered public administration after reform-minded forces had taken government (Hypothesis 3). On the contrary, the degree of politicization matters more. A significant negative effect is reported for the cross-product term of politicization with communication linkage when analyzing the positively-oriented items (Table 2a, Model 4a) and with social linkage for the negatively-oriented items (Table 2b, Model 4a) respectively. If the policy field is politicized, linkage negatively influences state officials' attitudes. In other words, the more they learn about what democratic governance actually means, the more they dislike it. Eventually, democratic governance threatens traditional ways of authoritarian administrative ruling, whereby information is selectively distributed and the higher authority is the first instance of approval. Can Hypothesis 4 regarding the conditioning effect of linkage on the degree of politicization thus be maintained? It is not possible to assess the details directly from this model. Therefore, the conditional effect of

exposure via linkage is evaluated across the two levels of politicization. Table 2 demonstrates that only in politicized policy fields does linkage yield a negative effect on attitudes toward democratic governance (Model 4a). By contrast, in non-politicized policy fields it positively influences the state officials' governance attitudes (Model 4b). This is in line with Hypothesis 4, stating that the likelihood of linkage shaping state officials' understanding of appropriate administrative governance depends on the extent to which their professional environment is politicized. In politicized fields, state officials are employed who are more conformist; what they learn about democratic governance increases their averseness to it. By contrast, in non-politicized fields, officials are generally more receptive toward external influences and can learn to appreciate them.

Interestingly, the type of linkage does make a difference. Whereas communication linkage shapes the attitude toward positively-oriented items, social linkage is relevant for negatively-oriented items. It is assumed that state officials employed in an authoritarian regime have less difficulty agreeing with regular democratic items than explicitly rejecting their logical opposites. The results suggest that officials need to cross a larger threshold if they are to disagree with items that refer to distinctive characteristics of authoritarian ruling rather than to accept items corresponding to the rulers' declarative language. It appears that foreign media broadcasting is not adequate to enable them to do so. Rather, personal experience while staying in established democracies seems to help. To what extent are these findings reflected in the three individual sub-dimensions? Do we find differences in impact of linkage on attitudes toward participatory, transparent and accountable governance?

Linkage Effect on Participatory, Transparent and Accountable Governance

Regression on the individual dimensions – participation, accountability, and transparency – enables us to learn what democratic principles of governance are transferred via linkage (see Appendix III). Overall, the results of the three single dimensions mirror the findings of the regression analysis on democratic governance. The degree of politicization determines the direction of the effect; the type of linkage defines to what extent democratic items are approved or their logical opposites are rejected. However, the analyses reveal an interesting difference. Whereas communication linkage affects agreement with accountable and transparent governance, social linkage influences only attitudes toward transparent governance. Participatory governance is transferred neither by foreign media nor by personal experiences when staying abroad in Western democracies. How can this be explained?

Transparency and accountability are the two dimensions of democratic governance that overlap with the concept of good governance by pointing to ways of how to improve effectiveness and efficiency in administrative decision-making (Kaufmann *et al.* 2005). Participation, in contrast, captures the core principle of democratic rule-making. I therefore reason that linkage shapes attitudes toward those aspects of democratic governance that are less controversial and more adaptable to authoritarian thinking. Eventually, an improvement in good governance corresponds to the official modernization strategy of the Moroccan regime, though understood in a way that hardly threatens maintenance of control of political power (Ourzik 2006). The involvement of the general public in the rule-making process is, however, exactly about this.

So, why is communication linkage significant in influencing attitudes toward both accountable and transparent governance, whereas the significant influence of social linkage is limited only to attitudes toward transparent governance? I assume that whereas the implications of transparent governance for the individual state official can personally be experienced when staying abroad in a democracy, accountability remains an abstract principle. Media, by contrast, can be seen as an important transmitter of democratic governance in both dimensions. It appears that both by spending time in a democracy as well as via Western media, state officials learn that transparency improves not only the quality of public service but can, thus, help to increase satisfaction with the regime's performance. Therefore, I reason that they tend to agree that information should not remain in the hands of the government only but rather be made available to citizens and journalists. Accountable governance, however, is hardly visible for the ordinary state official given that independent state institutions do their daily work silently and routinely. Consequently, Moroccan state officials that stay abroad may rarely witness how the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts is monitored and what consequences this can have for the individual official. Here, it seems as if the media plays the role of a watchdog on government institutions by reporting infringements such as abuse of bureaucratic power. Exposure to foreign media broadcasting may thus reveal how accountability affects the direct control of bureaucratic acts and how it can irritate state officials individually. Again, the influence of linkage depends on how politicized the policy field is in which the state officials is employed. In non-politicized fields providing public goods, such as environment, health and education, it appears that the provision of information and independent scrutiny of administrative

decision-making is not perceived as threatening the regime's authority. Rather, state officials might understand how important transparent and accountable governance is for the well-being of the population. In politically sensitive fields, however, public control of administrative practices is likely to be perceived as extremely perturbing by officials serving in authoritarian regimes. They might also be alienated by how far-reaching transparency is in that even internal governmental material is made available to the public and question what consequences this would have if applied at home.

Conclusion

This paper explored whether transnational linkage to established democracies shapes the attitude toward democratic principles and practices of domestic actors in authoritarian regimes. Studies on the diffusion of norms demonstrate a significantly positive impact of transnational linkages on the probability that a non-democratic regime will engage in processes of political liberalization. By concentrating on processes at the polity level, however, they largely neglect to empirically test the theoretical micro-foundation of their argument, that is the individual attitudinal and behavioral modifications triggered by international factors and required in order to produce change. The results presented in this paper find barely any empirical evidence to support the underlying assumption that attitudes are shaped by exposure to norms via transnational linkage.

More precisely, this paper examined the effect of linkage to established democracies on the attitudes of state officials in authoritarian regimes. Based on the theoretical assumption of diffusion approaches to external democratization, it was hypothesized that exposure to democratic modes of administrative decision-making via media penetration (communication linkage) and/or study visits abroad (social linkage) positively shapes domestic actors' – here Moroccan state officials' – attitudes toward democratic governance. It was further expected that this effect depends on two domestic factors, the degree of politicization of the professional environment and prior socialization. The descriptive analysis revealed that state officials indeed show a remarkably high degree of agreement with democratic governance despite being employed in a non-democratic polity. However, this agreement hardly results from linkage. In contrast to state-of-the-art theoretical work, strong ties to established democracies display no independent significant effect on the attitude of domestic actors toward democratic governance. So, transnational linkage influences the attitudes of domestic actors but yields a positive effect only under specific favorable conditions. First, in order to

bear fruit, linkage has to fall on fertile soil. Domestic actors need to be already receptive to democratic norms and practices; otherwise linkage even risks producing a counter-democratic impact. This finding substantiates the key role of domestic factors for socialization processes, as postulated by Beyers (2005) and Hooghe (2005). Second, domestic actors change their attitudes only toward principles that are more adaptable to authoritarian thinking in that they can be understood as making governance more efficient and effective rather than democratic. Third, different types of linkage produce different effects. It matters whether principles of appropriate governance are personally experienced or learnt via the media. In sum, the findings considerably limit the explanatory power of the linkage model of external democratization.

Certainly, the analysis of state officials' attitudes toward core features of democratic governance and how they are shaped by transnational influences is one step among many toward a better understanding of the stability and decline of authoritarian ruling. This study presents a complement to the existing literature on the diffusion of international norms. It cannot, of course, be viewed as conclusive. Instead, it points to the importance of directly examining the micro-foundation of norm diffusion and casts doubt on the postulated democratizing impact of transnational linkages.

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ANNEX

I. Three Dimensions of Attitude toward Democratic Governance

Participation	
1	'A civil servant should take into account the views and concerns of affected citizens before making decisions'
2	'A civil servant should offer updated information on governmental policy'
3	'A civil servant should ensure that the citizens' views and concerns have an influence on shaping policies'
n	'A civil servant should always seek to bring the public into accordance with governmental policy'
Transparency	
4	'A civil servant should work in a manner that is transparent and comprehensible for the general public'
5	'A civil servant should provide citizens with the possibility of advancing their views as an input for governmental decision-making'
6	'A civil servant should make information available to anyone requesting it'
n	'A civil servant should assure that all information held by public authority remains in the hands of the government only'
Accountability	
7	'Monitoring by independent state institutions ensures the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts'
8	'Possibilities for the general public and its associations to request scrutiny of decision-making process and review of policies ensures the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts'
n	'Instructions of and approval by the higher authority ensures the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts'

n = negatively-oriented item.

II. Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables

	Comm. Linkage	Social Linkage	Politicization	Admin. Socialization
Mean	.79	.43	.60	.61
Median	1	0	1	1
Frequencies '0'	19.2	55.6	37.1	58.9
'1'	74.2	41.7	55.6	38.4
Standard deviation	.405	.497	.492	.490
Observations (*N*)	141	147	140	147
(1) Comm. Linkage	1.00			
(2) Social Linkage	.071	1.00		
(3) Politicization	-.032	-.024	1.00	
(4) Admin. socialization	.194*	.170*	.040	1.00

Descriptive statistics. *Frequencies in percentage; deviation from 100 per cent due to non-responses; one tailed p-value of non-parametric Spearman-Rho coefficients;*p ≤ .05.*

IIIa. Impact of Linkage on Attitude toward Individual Dimensions (Positively-oriented Items)

Participation	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4a)	(4b)	(5)	(6)
Communicat. Linkage	-.118 (.156)	-.130 (.165)	-.090 (.170)				
Social Linkage	-.100 (.139)	-.104 (.142)	-.104 (.143)				
Politicization		**-.317 (.136)***	**-.320 (.134)***			**-.301 (.125)***	**-.322 (.134)***
Admin. Socialization		-.125 (.140)	-.102 (.140)			-.172 (.131)	-.140 (.130)
Gender			.212 (.144)				.241 (.131)
R^2	.008	.074				.051	.072
AIC	666.728	950.942	1113.105			692.723	869.057
log likelihood	-329.364	-469.471	-549.552			-342.362	-429.528
Transparency							
Communicat. Linkage	-.053 (.082)	-.108 (.142)	-.081 (.142)	.332 (.198)	**-.382 (.179)***		
Social Linkage	-.009 (.085)	-.053 (.124)	-.053 (.123)	-.008 (.125)	-.008 (.125)		
Politicization		**-.251 (.115)***	**-.253 (.114)***	.320 (.242)	-.320 (.242)	**-.244 (.114)***	**-.246 (.112)***
Admin. Socialization		.086 (.121)	.102 (.120)	.068 (.120)	.068 (.120)	.017 (.113)	.046 (.110)
Gender			.145 (.119)				.215 (.113)
Comm. L. x 1: polit.				**-.714 (.271)****			
Comm. L. x 1: non-polit.					**.714 (.271)****		
R^2	.003	.040	.050	.084	.084	.031	.053
AIC	628.864	911.916	1074.847	853.112	853.112	661.213	837.531
log likelihood	-310.432	-449.958	-530.424	-419.556	-419.556	-326.606	-413.765
Accountability							
Communicat. Linkage	-.017 (.150)	.037 (.165)	.022 (.169)	**.511 (.228)***	-.259 (.204)		
Social Linkage	-.052 (.127)	-.053 (.131)	-.053 (.131)	-.005 (.127)	-.005 (.127)		
Politicization		-.176 (.123)	-.175 (.123)	.440 (.274)	-.440 (.274)	-.126 (.121)	-.125 (.121)
Admin. Socialization		-.137 (.131)	-.146 (.132)	-.157 (.128)	-.157 (.128)	-.128 (.127)	-.139 (.129)
Gender			-.079 (.132)				-.079 (.126)
Comm. L. x 1: polit.				**-.770 (.304)****			
Comm. L. x 1: non-polit.					**.770 (.304)****		
R^2	.001	.026	.029	.070	.070	.016	.018
AIC	647.068	933.760	1097.690	875.082	875.082	680.868	859.910
log likelihood	-319.534	-460.880	-541.845	-430.541	-430.541	-336.434	-424.955
N	138	126	126	126	126	135	135

Multiple regression analyses (MLMV). *Regression coefficients are unstandardized; standard errors in parentheses; cases deleted listwise; *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01.*

IIIb. Impact of Linkage on Attitude toward Individual Dimensions (Negatively-oriented Items)

Participation	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4a)	(4b)	(5)	(6)
Communicat. Linkage	-.134 (.457)	.067 (.535)	.237 (.544)				
Social Linkage	-.180 (.329)	-.001 (.348)	.010 (.355)				
Politicization		-.670 (.400)	-.715 (.410)			**-.759 (.372)***	**-.826 (.378)***
Admin. Socialization		-.325 (.375)	-.283 (.363)			-.395 (.343)	-.306 (.335)
Gender			.676 (.400)				**.824 (.358)***
R^2	.003	.040	.074			.053	.102
AIC	357.621	321.595	320.302			346.453	342.947
log likelihood	-172.810	-152.798	-151.151			-167.227	-164.473
N	127	116	116			126	126
Transparency							
Communicat. Linkage	.303 (.423)	.663 (.453)	.725 (.477)	**1.046 (.475)***	**1.046 (.475)***		
Social Linkage	.136 (.344)	.479 (.370)	.488 (.374)	**2.371 (.655)*****	-.535 (.472**)**		
Politicization		.327 (.357)	.340 (.360)	**1.585 (.459)*****	**-1.585 (.459)*****	.483 (.350)	.491 (.352)
Admin. Socialization		-.416 (.390)	-.394 (.393)	-.706 (.404)	-.706 (.404)	-.074 (.341)	-.045 (.345)
Gender			.283 (.396)				.211 (.365)
Social L. x 1: polit.				**-2.906 (.805)*****			
Social L. x 1: non-polit.					**2.906 (.805)*****		
R^2	.006	.043	.050	.158	.158	.016	.020
AIC	364.896	319.811	321.236	307.475	307.475	341.260	342.904
log likelihood	-176.448	-151.906	-151.618	-144.738	-144.738	-164.630	-164.452
N	125	114	114	114	114	122	122
Accountability							
Communicat. Linkage	-.214 (.423)	-.210 (.476)	-.223 (.485)				
Social Linkage	.222 (.343)	.022 (.363)	.021 (.363)				
Politicization		.011 (.347)	.011 (.346)			.038 (.334)	.042 (.332)
Admin. Socialization		**.787 (.379)***	**.786 (.378)***			.561 (.344)	.549 (.341)
Gender			-.062 (.357)				-.143 (.342)
R^2	.005	.043	.043			.023	.025
AIC	386.458	355.994	357.965			380.251	382.082
log likelihood	-187.229	-169.997	-169.983			-184.126	-184.041
N	126	115	115			122	122

Ordered logit regression analyses (MLR). *Regression coefficients are unstandardized; standard errors in parentheses; cases deleted listwise; *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p = .001.*

Chapter 3. Planting the Seeds of Change Inside? Functional Cooperation with Authoritarian Regimes and Socialization into Democratic Governance

Is functional cooperation with authoritarian regimes a blessing or a curse for democratization? Scholars predominantly view cooperation with authoritarian regimes as counterproductive in terms of democratization because it helps the incumbent government to remain in power by stabilizing the regime. This paper presents evidence to suggest that functional cooperation can also be considered a promising way of yielding subtle processes of democratization that have hitherto been overlooked. It explores to what extent state officials become acquainted with democratic governance by participating in transgovernmental policy networks, notably the Twinning program, set up by the European Union in order to implement functional cooperation with its Southern neighborhood. The study conducts regression analyses based on original survey data on Moroccan state officials' attitudes toward democratic governance and complements these analyses with a qualitative comparison of different networks. The findings corroborate an optimistic reading of functional cooperation. By significantly shaping the attitudes toward democratic governance of involved state officials, cooperation appears to be able to plant seeds of change inside authoritarian regimes.

Key words: Arab authoritarian regimes; democratic governance; democratization; European Union; functional cooperation; international socialization

Introduction

A new line of research on the resilience of stable authoritarian regimes warns that the global waves of democratization may have ebbed away. Scholars have consequently started to explore determinants of 'authoritarian consolidation' (Burnell and Schlumberger 2010; Göbel and Lambach 2009; Brownlee 2007; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Leib and He 2006). In this perspective, the capacity to maintain authoritarian rule without resorting to coercion but with certain degree of responsiveness to domestic problems is considered key to the survival of non-democratic regimes. Authoritarian rulers are particularly interested in coping with social and economic grievances as these are perceived as threats to the regime's stability. Problems of governance provide incentives for opening up for functional cooperation with economically and politically liberalized countries hoping for effective solutions to current challenges. Drawing upon this, problem-specific cooperation is considered as counterproductive in terms of democratization because it helps authoritarian regimes to remain in power by generating output legitimacy and preserving regime stability (Harders 2008; Schlumberger 2006; Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004).

This paper takes a different view by considering functional cooperation as staging a site of socialization. Rather than exploring the effect cooperation might yield at the level of the regime, it wishes to open the black box of micro-processes in action where cooperation is actually implemented. More precisely, this paper looks at transgovernmental networks which implement functional cooperation between liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes. It examines the effect of participation in these networks on the attitudes of state officials involved toward democratic governance. Focusing on socialization allows a statement to be made as to whether functional cooperation can induce attitude change toward democratic governance, even if it has not translated into effective regime change. The results reveal that functional cooperation indeed yields subtle processes of democratic socialization that have hitherto been disregarded. In light of the ongoing debate about whether a strategy of isolation or one of rapprochement should be pursued by the international community when dealing with non-democratic states, the findings highlight the importance of improving our knowledge of the indirect effects of functional cooperation.

The potential democratizing impact of functional cooperation is examined in an empirical study of Arab state officials that are/were involved in transgovernmental policy networks set up and financed by the European Union (EU) in the framework of its association policy toward the Southern neighborhood. The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) is a prime example of a reform policy that seeks to approximate legal and administrative standards in neighboring countries to those of the Union as a means to manage interdependence and foster integration below membership at the level of sectors (Freyburg *et al.* 2009a). Given that these rules were developed for advanced democracies, they logically embody elements of democratic governance. In this respect, cooperation is not only about acquiring policy solutions and enacting legal requirements, but also about introducing new governance patterns. The actual work of implementing functional cooperation is done in transgovernmental networks that bring together specialists from both established democratic and non-democratic countries. While participating in activities of these networks, state officials employed in a non-democratic polity may become acquainted with democratic principles of decision-making. In this vein, cooperation can unleash potential for subtle democratization processes that are initially quite autonomous from regime-level democratization. In the long run, however, democratization of administrative governance may potentially spill over into the general

polity by inculcating democratic norms and practices on bureaucratic and societal actors and unfolding dynamics that might create a demand for far-reaching democratization of the entire political system.

In order to scrutinize democratic socialization through functional cooperation, an approach is adopted that is empirically and methodologically innovative. Empirically, it enriches research on socialization by exploring the argument in a novel context. Existing research largely concentrates on processes that either occur within international and regional organizations (Kerr 1973; Checkel 2003; Beyers 2005; Hooghe 2005; Scully 2005) or are triggered by them predominantly in Central and Eastern Europe after the implosion of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War (Flockhart 2004; Gheciu 2005; Schimmelfennig *et al.* 2006). This study endeavors to introduce functional cooperation as a site of socialization into transnational norms. It takes transgovernmental networks that are created to implement the EU's reform policy toward its Southern neighborhood as example. Most countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region display a unique combination of authoritarianism and strong statehood that makes them "least-likely" cases for efforts to promote successful democracy from the outside. Hence, attitudes of domestic actors toward democratic governance are likely to be negative, and potential effects of democratic socialization can be better differentiated from domestic trends since these effects are unlikely to happen in the absence of external influences. Methodologically, this study invests in directly examining attitudes rather than inferring them from behavior. To this end, it develops an original scale that measures the degree of agreement with democratic norms of governance, and explores self-collected data based on an original survey among 150 Moroccan state officials. Interpretation of the regression results is fortified with data collected on the basis of 69 interviews that I have conducted in 2007 and 2008 with governmental and non-governmental policy-makers, Commission officials, representatives of international organizations, journalists, and scientists in Morocco, Berlin, Vienna and Brussels.

In the first section I develop the theoretical background to the link between functional cooperation and democratic socialization. In the subsequent section the methodology is specified. Section three provides empirical evidence for the argument and explores the conditions under which democratic socialization can be observed. The results support the

argument that functional cooperation with authoritarian regimes can have a democratizing side-effect on the attitudes of involved domestic actors.

THEORY: Democratic Socialization and Functional Cooperation

Research on international socialization can be classified along three axes: the role of international institutions in socialization, the substance and then the target of socialization. First, whereas some scholars see institutions primarily as norm promoters trying to influence the preferences and attitudes of actors with the help of various instruments and strategies (Risse *et al.* 1999; Finnemore 1993), others follow a more structuralist perspective (Checkel 2005). They consider institutions as sites of socialization in which participating actors internalize transnational norms as a consequence of social interaction and cooperation (Johnston 2001). Second, socialization itself refers to the process of inducting the socializees into transnational norms such as human rights (Risse *et al.* 1999) and democracy (Flockhart 2004; Gheciu 2005), but they can also concern the actors' identities. In the latter case, scholars mainly ask in what way membership of an international organization matters in the sense that being part of the respective organization becomes a factor for identity building (Hooghe 2005; Scully 2005; Kerr 1973). Third, socialization can be conceptualized at both the macro-level of states and state governments and the micro-level of individuals such as members of the parliament or national representatives to international organizations.

Table 1. Approaches to International Socialization

	Socialization *through* international institutions	Socialization *in* international institutions
Role of international institutions in socialization	Actors/Promoters	Site
Substance of socialization in/through international institutions	Transnational norms, e.g. democracy, human rights	International/European identity
Target of socialization in/through international socialization	Nation-states	Individuals

Whereas studies viewing institutions as promoters largely concentrate on socialization into transnational norms of states, the other strand of research that refers to institutions as sites of socialization predominantly examines identity transformation on the part of individuals being delegated to international organizations. This paper integrates both perspectives by showing that individuals can also become socialized into transnational norms by being embedded in international institutions (shaded area in Table 1). It views

transgovernmental policy networks between administrations of liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes as a site for the socialization of individuals into democratic norms.

The efforts invested in theoretically and methodologically complex studies on international socialization bear only modest (if any) positive empirical findings (Checkel 2005; Schimmelfennig 2003; Pollack 1998).[38] Why should we still expect democratic socialization to occur even in "hard cases" such as the mindset of state officials employed in Arab authoritarian regimes? First, attitude change toward democratic administrative governance does not imply changes of loyalty or identity touching upon the core of an individual's personality. Instead, it refers to norms that belong to the professional realm of state officials. Second, democratic norms of governance as politically sensitive norms are not directly promoted but introduced through professional exchange within the framework of functional cooperation. Third, concentrating on attitude change allows subliminal external influences to be captured since functional cooperation may shape attitudes toward democratic governance of domestic actors but trigger no behavioral realization in view of likely repressive consequences. In this vein, this study complements existing research on socialization by examining subtle processes that have been neglected so far.

The theoretical argument proceeds as follows. Functional cooperation between the EU and its authoritarian neighbors is translated into action by transgovernmental policy networks. Policy networks are understood as 'cluster[s] of actors, each of which has an interest, or "stake" in a given […] policy sector and the capacity to help determine policy success or failure' (Peterson and Bomberg 1999: 8). Transgovernmental policy networks, in turn, are described as 'pattern[s] of regular and purposive relations among like government units working across borders that divide countries from another and that demarcate the "domestic" from the "international" sphere' (Slaughter 2004: 14). According to this view, transgovernmental means relaxing the assumption that a nation-state acts as unitary actor. Instead, it suggests considering the emergence of networks that are initiated at intermediate level between government and society and that operate among sub-units of governments 'when they act relatively autonomously from higher authority in international politics' (Keohane and Nye 1974: 41). These networks constitute a site of

[38] Exceptions are the positive findings of Gheciu (2005) and Flockhart's (2004) study on the socialization of national agents in Eastern candidate states into democratic norms and practices. Even though the socialization promoted by the NATO took place in the shadow of the membership perspective, their findings point into a more optimistic direction.

socialization as they bring together specialists from the administrations of both EU member states and neighboring countries in order to implement policy solutions and carry out legal requirements that approximate legal and administrative standards in the ENP countries to those of the Union. Given that the rules to be transferred were developed for advanced democracies, they incorporate elements of democratic governance (Freyburg *et al.* 2009a). Moreover, since the European specialists are professionally socialized in a democratic polity, it is assumed that they will apply and impart democratic governance when serving as experts abroad. As part of their advisory service, they will also address issues suppressed in domestic discourse such as the participation of non-state actors in administrative decision-making and the availability of information to the public. In this vein, their counterparts may possibly become familiarized with practices of administrative governance in democracies and can be introduced to democratic principles of governance unknown under authoritarian ruling. The information made available in transgovernmental networks allows them to contrast European democratic modes of governance with domestic authoritarian rule. As a consequence, state officials may seek to engage in individual and collective strategies to implement democratic governance styles within state administration and expedite regime-level democratization processes in the long-run. All things considered, the EU's approach of establishing functional cooperation with non-democratic non-member countries might be 'capable of unleashing a dynamic of socialization around democratic norms' (Youngs 2001: 360).

Socialization into Democratic Governance

Democratic socialization is defined as a process of attitude change toward democratic governance which comes here as a consequence of exposure to democratic rules and practices of administrative decision-making.[39] It is among others present to the degree that individuals change their attitudes toward democratic norms as a consequence of experiences in policy networks which are not aimed at promoting democracy in the first place. The notion of democratic governance used here corresponds to the manifestation of democratic principles in administrative daily practices. It adopts the idea that democratic principles may be applicable to every situation in which collectively binding decisions are taken (Beetham 1999: 4-5; cf., Dahl 1971: 12). These principles can thus be translated into administrative rules and practices at the level of sub-units of state

[39] This definition largely corresponds to the classical understanding of socialization as 'process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community' (Checkel 2005: 804). For a discussion of alternative definitions, see Pollack (1998) and Johnston (2001: 494-5).

administration, even within a non-democratic polity. Unlike good governance (Kaufmann *et al.* 2005), democratic governance is not about how effectively and efficiently but how legitimately 'the rules of the political game are managed' (Hyden *et al.* 2004: 2; cf. Coston 1998). Governance-driven democratization increases the chances that those affected by collective decisions made at the administrative level will have some chance to influence those decisions.

For the purpose of assessing state officials' attitudes toward democratic modes of decision-making, a multidimensional concept of democratic governance is used. Democratic governance may vary in quality along three dimensions: transparency, accountability and participation (Freyburg *et al.* 2007; cf. Bovens 2007; Hyden *et al.* 2004; Brinkerhoff 2000). Transparency is about the provision of and access to various kinds of information for the general public (Zaharchenko and Goldenman 2004). Accountability at the administrative level refers to the obligation for officials to justify the use of resources and the achievement of outcomes toward citizens and independent third parties, and the establishment and application of procedures for administrative review, including the possibility of sanctions in case of infringement (Grant and Keohane 2005: 29; Diamond *et al.* 1999: 3). Finally, participation largely corresponds to the key feature of the conventional understanding of democracy at the level of the nation-state (Dahl 1971; Verba 1967). Transferred to administrative governance, participation means that all willing members of the public should have an equal and effective opportunity to make their interests and concerns known, thereby shaping the outcome of the decisions. Although the margins between these dimensions are sometimes blurred, they are analyzed individually. This not only allows for the exploration of whether some dimensions of democratic governance are more open to socialization than others; functional cooperation also places emphasis on different dimensions of democratic governance in different sectors. Whereas the involvement of concerned citizens and interested non-state actors is, for instance, especially stressed in cooperation on environmental matters, the establishment of an independent control authority ensuring accountable governance is particularly emphasized in the field of competition.

Hypotheses to be Tested

The idea that policy-oriented cooperation between public administrations of liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes possibly triggers processes of democratic

socialization is based on the assumption that social interaction and exchange among peers matters. Participation in transgovernmental networks is expected to positively shape attitudes toward democratic governance. In this sense, the overall hypothesis reads:

> **H1:** State officials that have been involved in transgovernmental networks have a more positive attitude toward democratic governance than their non-participating colleagues *(cooperation)*.

The corresponding null hypothesis is that participation in transgovernmental networks has no significant impact on attitudes toward democratic governance. First, political socialization scholars usually consider socialization into fundamental political orientations as driven entirely by domestic conditions. Moreover, they argue that these orientations are developed early and remain fairly stable during their existence (Searing *et al.* 1976; Marsh 1971; Dawson and Prewitt 1969). Second, according to rational choice theorists, cooperation can change only the ranking of the actors' preferences but not the preferences and underlying identities and attitudes as such (Fearon and Wendt 2003: 62-5; Moravcsik 1993).

The democratizing potential of participation in transgovernmental networks might depend on other transnational influences. Studies on diffusion of democratic norms point to the distinguished role of exchange programs and foreign media as transferring democratic norms to non-democratic states. Whereas exchange programs allow citizens of non-democratic states to experience democratic decision-making firsthand in a democratic country (Atkinson 2010; Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010; Nye 2004), foreign media broadcasting delineates democratic practices beyond borders (Kern and Hainmueller 2009; Way and Levitsky 2007; Wejnert 2005; Whitehead 1996). Consequently, state officials employed in a non-democratic polity have had experiences with democratic governance before they enter transgovernmental networks. Studies on international socialization identify this 'primacy effect' (Hooghe 2005: 866) as crucial for socialization to occur. State officials that have had few prior experiences inconsistent with the new ones are expected to be relatively susceptible to democratic governance (Checkel 2001: 563). Put differently, state officials that have made prior experiences with democratic governance can be expected to be more disposed to changing their attitudes toward this when they are re-exposed to democratic governance (Johnston 2001: 497). Drawing on

this reasoning, it is hypothesized that at least one of the conditions outlined needs to be satisfied before functional cooperation is sufficient to bring about its socializing effect.

> Participation in transgovernmental networks is more likely to impact positively on the attitudes toward democratic governance of state officials who …
>
> **H2a** … have stayed abroad for educational or professional reasons in a Western democratic country *(stay abroad);*
>
> **H2b** … regularly use Western media for political information *(foreign media).*

RESEARCH DESIGN: Measuring Attitude toward Democratic Governance

This study applies a sequential mixed-method design complementing quantitative research with a qualitative study (Morse 2002) in order to explore the democratizing effect of functional cooperation. The first step is quantitative as multiple regression analyses are used to examine in consecutive order the association of explanatory variables relating to properties of the state officials with each of the three dimensions of democratic governance and the overall concept. In other words, regression analyses are run separately for transparency, accountability, participation and democratic governance as such. The analyses are first conducted entering this study's key variable – participation in a Twinning project ('cooperation') as a dichotomous variable measuring whether the individual state official was involved in a project or not. Subsequently, the analyses are repeated by using dummies for the individual projects. Because of its robustness to non-normality of continuous data, the analysis is done with a Maximum Likelihood parameter estimator (MLMV) that provides estimates with standard errors and mean- and variance-adjusted Chi-square test statistics (Brown 2006: 379). In a second step the individual Twinning projects are systematically compared in order to explore what properties of transgovernmental network facilitate democratic socialization. Whereas multiple regression analyses for the individual Twinning projects enable us to detect differences in norm transfer between individual projects, subsequent qualitative comparison is used to explain these differences.

Sample Selection and Data Collection

EU functional cooperation in the neighborhood can take different shapes. Environmental cooperation in Morocco, for instance, used to be implemented by regional programs such as the Short and Medium-Term Priority Environmental Action Program (SMAP) in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the transnational LIFE-third countries

program established by the Sixth Action Program for the Environment, or multilateral platforms such as the Mediterranean component of the EU Water Initiative (EUWI). The ENP introduced new instruments of bilateral administrative interchange, notably the short-term Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Program (TAIEX), providing targeted expert assistance and the long-term Twinning program, a tool for cooperation on specific policy issues between sub-units of public administration. This Twinning program is particularly suitable for examining the potential democratizing effect of functional cooperation (European Court of Auditors 2003; Cooper and Johansen 2003: 6-7; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore 2003: 631). First, Twinning projects are an administrative reality as they are part of governance within the administration. They aim at modernizing the beneficiary departments through training and reorganization as well as by drafting laws and regulations modeled on the EU *acquis*. The policy solutions offered thus incorporate elements of democratic governance. Second, in contrast to alternative policy reform programs, Twinning projects are based on intensive working relations on a day-to-day basis for a considerable period of time. This not only helps to build relationships based on trust and mutual understanding, but also familiarizes state officials with democratic administrative practices. Third, all projects follow the same tight and formalized structure, which makes them comparable. At the same time, they are issue-specific and show significant differences with regard to properties such as the number of beneficiary departments and the degree of politicization of the policy issues concerned. Since there is no more than one project in any single sub-unit of public administration, the effects of these properties can be isolated. Finally, appointment as participant in Twinning activities is decided on the basis of objective criteria, such as the field of responsibility in the department and professional performance rather than personal contacts and loyalty.[40] In most cases, every state official working in a beneficiary department was involved in at least one of the various activities.[41] Hence, possible interfering effects of selective recruitment (Hooghe 2005; Pollack 1998; Kerr 1973) can be assumed to be marginal.

[40] The survey among state officials covers the question 'How important do you think were the following factors for your own appointment as participant in the Twinning project?' The following answer categories are given: 'international experience', 'language skills', 'education', 'previous work with the person in charge', 'personality', 'professional performance', 'personal contacts', 'field of responsibility in department', measured on a 5-point Likert agreement scale. The same question is included in a survey among the European bureaucrats that served as Twinning experts in Morocco. Responses are complemented by interviews with Twinning participants and project leaders/experts. Descriptive statistics can be obtained from the author.

[41] Consequently, only a few officials were able to experience an indirect socialization effect of functional cooperation due to exchange with immediate colleagues involved in a Twinning project.

The effect of participation in Twinning activities on the attitude toward democratic governance is examined by taking the example of Morocco. As bureaucratic monarchy its political system is characterized by traditional paternalistic structures that attach great importance to state bureaucracy for the maintenance and stability of the regime (Pawelka 2002; Zerhouni 2004). Morocco presents a "most-likely" case among Arab authoritarian regimes since it holds the first rank as the politically most liberalized country in the region. Consequently, a minimum degree of openness can be expected (Al-Arkoubi and McCourt 2004: 983; Mohamedou 1999: 211), which enhances the likelihood that administrative cooperation will induce democratic socialization. Moreover, Morocco was among the first Southern neighboring countries to sign the ENP Action Plan and to initiate Twinning projects. Today it enjoys a privileged status (*statut avancé*) within the ENP. If participation in transgovernmental networks impacts on the attitudes of state officials in neighboring authoritarian regimes, then we should be able to detect such an effect in the case of EU Twinning programs in Morocco. In turn, in the case of a negative finding it is acceptable to conclude that if less institutionalized and located in countries politically less liberalized, administrative cooperation will show no significant effect.

To measure the attitudes toward democratic governance of Moroccan state officials a closed-end questionnaire was constructed entitled administrative rules and practices in public administration in general. Personal distribution of the questionnaire to the state officials on site enabled a response rate of approximately 96 per cent; nearly all officials available during a period of three months in summer 2008 responded.[42] The respondents were selected by a theoretically controlled cluster sampling: all officials working in particular departments of certain ministries were invited to fill in the questionnaire. Two groups of officials are equally covered: officials that participated in a Twinning project (N = 85) and officials that are employed in a thematically related department in a ministry not targeted by a Twinning project (N = 65).[43] The difference in attitude between these two groups is ascribed to the effects of participation while including explicit controls for relevant properties of the state officials (quasi-experimental 'static group comparison',

[42] Due to the opportunity to leave inconvenient questions blank, guaranteed anonymity and the persuasive approach taken, outright refusal was almost absent. Only one official flatly refused to fill in the questionnaire; fewer than five officials could not be reached because of professional commitments abroad or holidays. It is difficult to test sample bias conclusively because socio-demographic data on state officials in Morocco are not available. Respondents could choose the language of communication (French or Arabic), a gesture that was warmly acknowledged. Only 9 per cent, however, picked the Arabic version.

[43] Due to this specific and limited nature of the target group, the questionnaire was cognitively pre-tested by knowledgeable experts (Collins 2003; Presser *et al.* 2004) – psychologists and political scientists specialized in Arab authoritarian regimes – and colleagues with Arab migratory background.

Campbell and Stanley 1966: 12).[44]

The Dependent Variables

Since this study could not build on existing surveys, it required the creation of suitable democratic governance items in order to measure the dependent variables, in other words the attitudes of state officials toward democratic governance. The three theoretically derived dimensions of democratic governance – transparency, accountability and participation – are operationalized with issue indicators pertaining to various aspects of administrative decision-making. Conceptual work on public administration (reform) and linkage of (good) governance and development inspired their formulation (Hyden *et al.* 2004; Baker 2002; Page 1985; Berger 1957). All items were measured using a 5-point Likert scale on agreement responses. To minimize the risk of response tendencies, the statement items were randomly distributed in two out of 36 different sets of questions[45], some of the items appear reformulated in different statements, and some capture statements on non-democratic governance features (negatively-oriented items).

Despite the precautions taken in questionnaire design and survey setting, the existence of preference falsification cannot be completely ruled out. However, this hardly signifies a problem for this study. In the long term, I am not primarily interested in identifying the true understanding of appropriate governance among Arab state officials. Instead, I am concerned with estimating the difference in agreement with democratic governance between state officials who participated in transgovernmental networks and those who did not. It can essentially be assumed that there is no systematic bias of response tendencies; a socialization effect can therefore not be ascribed to the effect of response tendencies.

[44] The 'fundamental problem of causal inference' (Holland 1986) is that for each respondent we never get to observe both potential outcomes but only the realized ones. In other words, for a respondent participating in an EU Twinning project, we never get to observe the counterfactual level of attitude toward democratic governance that she would have had if she had not participated (and *vice versa*). To obtain an unbiased treatment effect it is therefore crucial to find a suitable control group that is sufficiently similar to the treatment group in all relevant characteristics except that it was not exposed to Twinning activities.

[45] The two sets of questions are introduced as follows: 'There are different understandings of what determines the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts in public administration. To what extent do you personally agree that the following items serve this function?' (item 7+8) / 'There are different opinions as to what it takes to be a 'good' civil servant. To what extent to you personally agree or disagree that a civil servant should have the following qualities?' (item 1-6).

Table 2. Three Dimensions of Attitude toward Democratic Governance

Participation	
1	'A civil servant should take into account the views and concerns of affected citizens before making decisions'
2	'A civil servant should offer updated information on governmental policy'
3	'A civil servant should ensure that the citizens' views and concerns have an influence on shaping policies'
n	'A civil servant should always seek to bring the public into accordance with governmental policy'
Transparency	
4	'A civil servant should work in a manner that is transparent and comprehensible for the general public'
5	'A civil servant should provide citizens with the possibility of advancing their views as an input for governmental decision-making'
6	'A civil servant should make information available to anyone requesting it'
n	'A civil servant should assure that all information held by public authority remains in the hands of the government only'
Accountability	
7	'Monitoring by independent state institutions ensures the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts'
8	'Possibilities for the general public and its associations to request scrutiny of decision-making process and review of policies ensures the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts'
n	'Instructions of and approval by the higher authority ensures the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts'

n = negatively-oriented item.

Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) helped to identify the items that are most suitable for measuring attitude toward democratic governance in its three dimensions.[46] Table 2 displays the exact wording of the items. Based on the theoretical idea that a true democrat is one who supports regular democratic governance items and rejects their logical opposites, the dependent variables are assessed using scales that aggregate the positively-oriented items and the negatively-oriented item. The items used for each scale are the positively-oriented items with a factor loading of .40 or more in the factor analysis (Worthington and Whittaker 2006: 823) and the theoretically corresponding negatively-oriented item. Scales were constructed by adding values of individual items values and dividing the sum by the number of items for each dimension. The overall concept of democratic governance is measured by the mean of the three individual scales.[47]

[46] The exploratory factor analysis is done using the robust mean and variance-adjusted weighted least squares (WLSMV) extraction procedure and the oblique rotation method Oblimin. Details on the questionnaire and the EFA are provided in the Annex to the introductory chapter of this dissertation.

[47] EFA enables to determine items that are suitable to create scales with high internal consistency, as corroborated by each scale's internal reliability. The point estimate for the scale reliability (ϱ) of participation is .79 (three items), of accountability .58 (two items) and of transparency .75 (three items), if Raykov's confirmatory FA-based method is applied. This approach is not only insensitive to violation of normality assumption but also presents a more accurate estimate of the reliability of multi-items measures than the usual Cronbach's alpa (though the value of the expressions is identical) (Sijtsma 2009; Raykov 2007; Brown 2006: 337-45). Cronbach's α of participation is .68, of accountability .38

The distribution of the outcome variables is shown in Figure 1 (for descriptive statistics see Annex Ia). The boxes show the middle values of the dependent variables (50 per cent of the data) with the black line indicating the median value, while the ends of the vertical lines ('whiskers') stretch to the greatest and lowest value of these variables. The dashed line represents the mean value of democratic governance as overall category (right box). Since a few outliers are present, as indicated by the points, the whiskers extend to a maximum of 1.5 times the inter-quartile range.

Figure 1. Attitude toward Democratic Governance



Box plot. *Values range between 1 (non-democratic) to 5 (democratic); N = 110, cases with missing values excluded listwise.*

Variables Introduced in the Regression Analyses ('Properties of the actors to be socialized')

The key independent variable of my analysis is participation in a Twinning project ('cooperation'). It is coded as a binary variable with value of 1 if an official participates/d in a Twinning project. The model is completed by introducing two alternative explanatory factors and two control variables that characterize the individual state official.

and of transparency .46. Given the exploratory character of this study, its objective (attitudes and preferences) and the small number of items per scale, the reliability of the individual scales is still acceptable if the theoretically corresponding negatively-oriented item is added to each scale (cf. John and Benet-Martinéz 2000: 346). Since these items could not be introduced in the EFA, Cronbach's alpha has to be used instead of the more reliable approach of Raykov. Cronbach's alpha is .61 for participation, .14 for accountability and .30 for transparency. The lower values reflect the advice not to combine regularly-worded and reverse-scored items in one single scale since doing so might impair reliability of measurement and thus absorb the desired reduction of response biases (cf. Schriesheim *et al.* 1991; Pilotte and Gable 1990). I cross-checked the validity of this study's results by running the regression analyses on separate scales for the positively- and negatively-oriented items; the estimation results are similar and can be obtained from the author.

As alternative explanatory factors I enter two variables – 'stay abroad' in Western democracies and 'foreign media' usage – that have attracted increased attention as transferring democratic norms into non-democratic states. They are both introduced as independent and modifying variables to cooperation.[48] Foreign media usage applies to Western print media (newspaper and magazines) and television channels that are used for political information (rather than as a source of entertainment).[49] Respondents were asked to indicate which newspaper/magazines and television channels they read and watch for political information, in which languages, and how often they do so. Since media products originate predominantly in Europe – about 97 per cent of foreign print media and 94 per cent of foreign TV channels used – the expected influence of communication linkage can be said to be European. Media penetration is treated as dichotomous with '1' representing regular media usage. Stay abroad refers to the international experiences of officials, operationalized as a stay abroad for at least six months for educational or professional reasons in the 'old' member states of the European Union and/or North America (NA). This variable is coded as a binary variable with '1' for residence in the EU and/or in the United States/Canada. There are no significant differences in attitude toward democratic governance between officials that spent a considerable period of time in Europe and those who had been in North America or in both host destinations.[50] Since the number of visitors to North America is very small (N = 9 only NA, N = 6 NA and EU), Europe and North America are subsumed into one category. Officials who spent a considerable time in 'the West' do not substantially more often consult Western media. The two variables are not significantly interrelated (see correlation matrix in Annex Ib).

In addition to the three independent variables, two control variables are included in the model: administrative pre-socialization and participation in previous programs. Officials that entered public administration after reform-oriented forces had taken government and/or that have gained knowledge of democratic governance through participation in previous policy reform programs set up and implemented by Western donors are more likely to demonstrate a more positive attitude toward democratic governance. This

[48] The regression analysis is re-run for alternative codings, e.g. separate categories for television and print media, without statistically significant differences. The least complex solution is applied. Regression results are available upon request. Annex Ib displays descriptive statistics and intercorrelation of independent variables.
[49] A recent study on public support for the East German communist regime revealed that if foreign media were used primarily as a source of entertainment it may even increase regime support (Kern and Hainmueller 2009).
[50] A non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test comparing the mean ranks for the three dimensions does not display any significant differences in attitude toward democratic governance between officials that spent time in Europe or in North America (df = 2; χ^2 = .310, p = .856 for participation; χ^2 = 1.913, p = .384 for accountability; χ^2 = .208, p = .901 for transparency).

proposition accounts for pre-socialization (cf., Beyers 2005; Checkel 2005: 813; Johnston 2005; Hooghe 2005). Senior officials in particular – as '"well-connected" members of the old guard' (Baker 2002: 293) – might perceive democratic governance as a real threat to their privileges. Moreover, officials who are newly employed in the respective administrative sub-unit are less embedded in the prevailing culture of governance, and thus more likely to conform to democratic modes (Checkel 2001: 562; Johnston 2001: 497; Flockhart 2004). Administrative socialization is operationalized by the years of professional service under the 'new' King Mohammed VI, that is more years of service under the present than under the previous regime (0), or more years of service under the previous regime ruled by King Hassan II (1). The reason for this coding is that with the ascension of Mohammed VI in 1999 a new spirit of political, social, and economic reform entered the country while, at the same time, the real potential for meaningful democratic change remained limited (Zerhouni 2004). Participation in previous policy reform programs is entered as a binary variable with value of 1 if the official participated in at least one program. 46 per cent of the respondents had participated in a program set up by development agencies of EU member states, most notably the French Development Agency (AFD) and the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), 36 per cent attended activities organized by the World Bank, 23.2 percent by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 20 per cent by the Japan International Development Agency (JICA), and 18.5 per cent participated in the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Earlier participation in policy reform programs other than the EU Twinning program constitutes a factor independent from 'cooperation' (see correlation matrix in Annex Ib). Again, variables are entered as constitutive and interaction terms.

Features Used in Comparative Analysis ('Properties of the policy networks as sites of socialization')

It is expected that not only properties of the individual state officials but also properties of the individual transgovernmental networks determine the likelihood of socialization into democratic governance. If few beneficiary departments are involved ('size'), external experts stay for a long period of time ('duration'), and interaction occurs in 'less politicized and more insulated, in-camera settings' (Checkel 2003: 213), interaction among the participants is more intense and trustworthy (Slaughter 2004: 198-200; Checkel 2003: 210; van Waarden 1992; Marsden 1990) which, in turn, is expected to make attitude change

toward democratic governance more likely. These three properties are used to explain differences in effect between the individual Twinning projects in Morocco.

The three variables are operationalized using indirect measures at the level of networks rather than identifying values for each individual state official. The size of the network is operationalized as the number of beneficiary departments and ministries involved. Duration refers to the length of the Twinning project in months at the time of the survey. Values for network size and duration are attributed by labeling the highest number of involved units and the longest period, respectively, as 'high' and, correspondingly, the smallest network and the shortest interaction as 'low'. Networks that fall in between these two categories are classified as 'medium'. Finally, politicization is about the importance of the policy issues for the integrity of the state and maintenance of political power by the ruling elite. Although transgovernmental policy networks generally operate without much publicity and are relatively unaffected by the turbulences of political disputes (Pollack 2005: 906; Slaughter 2000: 200-2), functional cooperation is still embedded in politics and affected by political interests and power. Interviews with Moroccan state officials, journalists and non-governmental activists as well as representatives of international organizations, EU member states and the Delegation of the European Commission helped to classify the policy issues under study as high, medium or low. Indicators are, for example, that media coverage is more pluralized and sectoral cooperation is less impeded by political considerations. Touching upon internally sensitive issues such as corruption, patronage and the entwinement of private business with governmental responsibilities, competition policy, for instance, can be regarded as politicized.

EMPIRICS: EU Functional Cooperation and Democratic Socialization in Morocco

In order to estimate the effect of participation in a Twinning project on the attitudes of participating state officials, I calculated four models. In model 1 the dependent variables, that are the three individual dimensions of democratic governance and the overall concept, are each regressed on the Twinning variable; Model 2 controls in addition for the four explanatory variables that refer to properties of the state officials. In Models 1 and 2 (Hypothesis 1) the interaction terms are omitted. In order to test the conditional effects (Hypotheses 2a and 2b), I introduce cross-product terms of the Twinning variable and each of the explanatory factors as dummies (Brambor *et al.* 2006; Braumoeller 2004). Table 3 displays those interaction effects that are significant (Model 3). In the control

model, the state officials' properties are regressed alone on the democratic governance variables (Model 4).

The Democratizing Effect of EU Functional Cooperation across all Sectors

Table 3 presents the estimation results for the likelihood of an EU Twinning project in shaping the participants' attitude toward democratic governance. The results support the democratizing potential of functional cooperation. They reveal, however, that participation in a Twinning project alone does not significantly shape the attitudes of state officials involved (Model 1). Hypothesis 1 on the independent effect of functional cooperation is to be declined. Rather, in order to significantly influence state officials' understanding of appropriate governance, Twinning activities need to fall on fertile soil, that is on state officials, who have personally experienced democratic modes in a Western democracy (Model 3a). This finding supports Hypothesis 2a.[51] In contrast, no significant conditioning effect of Twinning activities can be observed from foreign media usage (Hypothesis 2b). Interestingly, participation in policy reform programs in general ('previous programs') has a significant independent effect on attitude toward democratic governance. However, the positive correlation is not necessarily the result of attendance but may be that of selective recruitment of participants for these programs (Hooghe 2005; Pollack 1998; Kerr 1973). Alternative policy reform programs are less regularized and more prone to self-selection or favoritism than the Twinning program.

Table 3. Results of the Regressions – Democratic Governance

	(1)	(2)	(3a)	(3b)	(4)
Cooperation	.084 (.074)	.068 (.075)	-.092 (.095)	**.272 (.114)***	
Admin. Socialization		-.036 (.073)	-.042 (.072)	-.042 (.072)	-.045 (.074)
Stay abroad		-.052 (.075)	**-.251 (.119)***	**.251 (.119)***	-.049 (.075)
Foreign media		-.085 (.092)	-.055 (.090)	-.055 (.090)	-.062 (.089)
Previous programs		**.217 (.077)****	**.218 (.074)****	**.218 (.074)****	**.221 (.077)****
Coop x 1: stay abroad			**.364 (.148)***		
Coop x 1: no stay abroad				**-.364 (.149)***	
R^2	.012	.096	.152	.152	.089
AIC	236.286	764.886	762.090	762.090	623.859
Log Likelihood	-128.643	-375.443	-373.045	-373.045	-305.929
N	110	103	103	103	103

Multiple regression analysis (MLMV). *Regression coefficients are unstandardized; standard errors in parentheses; cases deleted listwise; *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01.*

[51] Importantly, a stay abroad alone is likewise insufficient to provoke attitudinal change.

The results of the regression on the individual dimensions mirror the findings of the regression on democratic governance overall (see Annex II). Whereas regression on participatory governance yields a similar pattern of significant regression coefficients, the results on accountable and transparent governance differ in that the Twinning program produces neither an independent nor a conditioning effect.

The Democratizing Effect of the Individual Twinning Projects

At the time of this study Morocco benefits from nine Twinning projects that run for at least one year.[52] From these projects, four Twinning projects were selected for the empirical analysis: the Twinning project 'Coordinated Management of the Environment and the Harmonization of National Environmental Legislation' (MA04/AA/EN03), the project 'Development and Implementation of the Legislative, Organizational and Technological Means of Ensuring Free Commercial Trade at Borders' (MA04/AA/FI01), the project 'Support for the Strengthening of the Competition Authorities' (MA06/AA/FI08) and the project 'Reinforcement of the Health Control Organizations – Veterinary and Phytosanitary' (MA06/AA/HE06). These four Twinning projects differ with regard to the properties identified, notably their size, duration and the degree of politicization of the policy field.

The Twinning project on the environment shows the most favorable conditions: a low degree of politicization and a medium-sized network. The project 'Development and Implementation of the Legislative, Organizational and Technological Means of Ensuring Free Commercial Trade at Borders', whose primary beneficiary department is the Moroccan Customs and Indirect Taxes Administration, faces a high degree of politicization and a large number of beneficiary departments involved. Between these two projects range the project on competition matters and the project on health control. An overview of these properties is given in Table 4. The policy fields of competition and customs can be treated as highly politicized, because they touch upon internally sensitive issues such as corruption, patronage and the entwinement of private business with governmental responsibilities. In policy fields providing public goods, such as the environment and, albeit to a lesser extent, health control, media coverage is more pluralized and transgovernmental cooperation is less impeded by political considerations, which are indicators for a lower degree of politicization.

[52] A list of the Moroccan projects is available upon request.

Regression analyses for the individual projects shed light on the democratizing potential of the Twinning program. Albeit these analyses overall show the same effect of participation in a Twinning project on the condition of a stay abroad as the general regression analyses above, they also enable to reveal the differences between the individual projects (see Annex II). Whereas the project on the environment has a significant, independent effect on the attitudes toward democratic governance of involved officials, the projects on competition and health control influence these attitudes only significantly if the involved officials have stayed abroad prior to their project participation. The customs project, however, yields neither a significant independent nor conditional effect.

The analysis produces two additional results. First, the effect of participation in a Twinning project is sector-related. The attitudes toward the sub-dimensions of democratic governance are most significantly influenced toward the sub-dimension that is most relevant in the particular sub-sector. Second, participation in Twinning activities can yield a significant negative effect in some policy fields if the state officials use foreign media products for political information (Hypothesis 2b). Interestingly, Twinning projects shape the participants' attitudes toward the dimension of democratic governance that corresponds best to the projects' sector-specific objectives. The competition project significantly influences attitude toward accountable governance. This reflects the project's objective, which is the establishment of judicial and administrative procedures to ensure a competition control system comparable with that of EU member states. To this end, the project places particular emphasis on the activation and strengthening of the Competition Council to emerge into an independent control authority. It further seeks to 'ensure the right of appeal to independent courts against anti-trust decisions' (European Commission 2004a: 23) and a judicial system with competent tribunals to judge the decisions adopted by competition authorities. The Twinning project on health control of food for consumers particularly emphasizes participation. It aims at strengthening consumer protection by enhancing the involvement of consumer associations and producers in the decision-making on and implementation of product quality policy. This project is successful in significantly shaping attitude toward participatory governance. The Twinning project on environment attaches particular importance to the establishment of 'procedures concerning access to information and public participation' (European Commission 2004a: 36) and even seeks to introduce a Law on Access to Environmental Information. It most

significantly influences state officials' attitudes toward transparent and participatory governance.

The sectoral effects described are not independent effects but require prior familiarization with democratic governance through a stay abroad in Western democracies. Apparently, neither personal practical experience in Western democracies abroad nor attendance of Twinning activities is sufficient in order to socialize state officials into democratic governance. It seems as if both the 'life' experience of democratic administrative governance as practiced in Western democracies and knowledge imparted in policy reform workshops are necessary in order to significantly shape attitudes. An exception is the environmental project as it yields a significant independent effect on the state officials' attitudes toward participatory governance. In contrast, the Twinning project on customs duty produces no significant democratizing effect, although particular importance is attached to accountable governance, especially in terms of internal audit and ensuring the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts in the Customs and Indirect Taxes Administration.

Table 4. Comparison of Network Properties

	Customs duty	**Competition**	**Health control**	**Environment**
Regression results for individual Twinning projects (cf. Tables III in Annex)				
Effect (dimension)	No significant effect	Significant conditional effect (accountability)	Significant conditional effect (participation)	Significant conditional (transparency). Significant independent effect (participation)
Properties of the individual Twinning projects				
Size	Large (2 ministries, 4 departments)	Small (1 ministry, 1 department)	Medium (1 ministry, 2 departments plus provincial departments)	Medium (1 ministry, 5 departments)
Duration	Long (18 months)	Short (9 months)	Medium (13 months)	Long (19 months)
Politicization	High	High	Medium	Low

To what extent can network properties shed light on the differences in the democratizing potential of the individual projects? Table 4 summarizes the comparative analysis. It appears that an intense and trustworthy interaction is crucial for a network to shape the attitudes of its participants. If the interaction setting is less politicized, democratic socialization is facilitated. Whereas the Twinning project on customs duty (high degree of

politicization) yields no significant democratizing effect at all, the environment project (low degree of politicization) is significantly influential in shaping attitude toward democratic governance. If the interaction setting is, however, politicized, a small number of participants seems to still ensure intense and trustworthy interaction and thus to enable democratic socialization. The Twinning project on competition is likewise successful in socializing participants into democratic governance despite a high degree of politicization. The duration of the network, that is the length of contact, appears to have no considerable influence on its ability to shape the participants' democratic mindset. Whereas participation in the Twinning project on customs duty generates no significant influence despite a long duration, the short duration of the Twinning project on competition was sufficient to shape the participating state officials' attitudes toward democratic governance, if they have stays in a democratic foreign country.

The regression analysis further reveals the possibility that participation in Twinning activities can generate a significant negative effect if state officials use foreign media products for political information.[53] However, this is only the case for state officials that participated in the project on competition and on health control, respectively. State officials that benefitted from the project on environmental matters, in contrast, are positively influenced if they use foreign media (see Annex III). Moreover, foreign media penetration is influential on a state official's attitude toward the concept of democratic governance if she worked on competition or on environment. If he is employed in the field of health control, it only shapes the attitude toward the transparency component of democratic governance.

A glance at Table 4 points to the possible explanation that the degree of politicization determines how information on democratic governance provided by foreign media is perceived. It appears that democratic modes of governance are not perceived as a threat to the regime's authority in non-politicized fields which provide public goods, such as the environment. Rather, state officials might understand how important democratic governance is for the well-being of the population. In politically sensitive fields, however, democratic governance is likely to be perceived as extremely perturbing by officials serving in authoritarian regimes. This might also explain why foreign media broadcasting increases the averseness to transparent governance of state officials employed in the field

[53] Again, neither foreign media usage nor participation in Twinning activities alone yields such an effect.

of health control. They could be alienated by how far-reaching transparency can be when even internal governmental material is made available to the public and what consequences this would have if applied at home. These interpretations are, however, only tentative and warrant further study.

Conclusion

This paper explored the democratizing potential of functional cooperation between the administrations of both established democracies and authoritarian regimes. More precisely, it sought to detect whether the ENP Twinning projects as a form of functional cooperation positively shape attitudes toward democratic governance of state officials involved as a consequence of joint problem-solving and social interaction. The results are of relevance for policy-making and academic research alike. They not only provide room for a more optimistic view of the effects of functional cooperation as yielding subtle processes of democratization but also challenge the hitherto predominantly negative findings of socialization effects in and through international institutions.

Three main findings concerning the democratizing potential of functional cooperation in Morocco have emerged from the study presented here. First, functional cooperation can under the condition of prior stay abroad socialize state officials into democratic governance. It thus holds a promising potential of planting the seeds for change inside authoritarian regimes as it significantly shapes the participants' attitudes toward democratic modes of decision-making. Whether and under what conditions the planted seeds, that is a positive attitude toward democratic governance, will be implemented in daily administrative practices warrants further study. It also remains to be seen whether such democratic administrative governance will ultimately spill over into the general polity by unfolding dynamics that promote democratization rather than stabilization of the entire political system.

The findings, however, also reveal that, second, democratic socialization through sectoral cooperation is most significant in those dimensions of democratic governance that are most relevant in that specific sector. This finding strengthens the functional argument of democratic socialization as a side-effect of technical problem-solution. In particular the analysis of the Twinning project on the environment demonstrates that explicit reference to democratic elements in joint policy development is very successful in transferring democratic norms. It would be interesting to see to what extent this finding can be

generalized to policy reform programs other than the EU Twinning project. Importantly, however, when intentionally used for political purposes, functional cooperation risks losing its political innocence and potential to initiate subtle processes of democratization.

A third finding suggests that a low degree of politicization of the policy issues facilitates democratic socialization and that a high degree of politicization can be compensated by intense cooperation among a small number of participants. However, the extent to which the quality of social interaction increases the likeliness of democratic socialization needs to be explored more rigorously.

This study endeavors to be a stepping stone for future research. It provides a first analysis of the democratizing potential of functional cooperation, a cooperation that is demanded by the authoritarian elites, and enjoys scope for intense exchange between Western democracies and authoritarian regimes. The subtle processes of democratization generated by functional cooperation deserve further exploration – in particular in view of the fact that all instruments and strategies adopted by external actors to directly promote democracy (apart from intervention by force) are condemned to fail toward stable authoritarian regimes where the incumbent rulers show little inclination to concede their power.

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ANNEX

Ia. Descriptive Statistics – Dependent Variable

	Participation	Transparency	Accountability	Democratic Governance
Max. value	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
Min. value	2.50	2.25	2.00	2.83
Mean	4.30	4.04	3.84	4.06
Median	4.50	4.00	4.00	4.11
S.D.	.578	.427	.672	.382
Skewness	-.751	-.547	-.635	-.570

Descriptive statistics. *Values range between 1 (non-democratic) to 5 (democratic); N = 110, cases with missing values excluded listwise; S.D. = standard deviation.*

Ib. Descriptive Statistics – Independent Variables

	Cooperation	Admin. Socialization	Stay abroad	Foreign Media	Previous Programs
Mean	.56	.61	.42	.79	.53
Median	1	1	0	1	1
Frequencies '0'	44.4	61.5	57.8	207.	46.7
'1'	55.6	38.5	42.2	79.3	53.3
Standard deviation	.407	.488	.496	.407	.501
(1) Cooperation	1.00				
(2) Admin. socialization	-.018	1.00			
(3) Stay abroad	.051	.170*	1.00		
(4) Foreign media	.201**	.194*	.071	1.00	
(5) Previous programs	.080	.158*	.158*	.198**	1.00

Descriptive Statistics. *Frequencies in percentage; N = 135, cases with missing values excluded listwise. One tailed p-value of non-parametric Spearman-Rho coefficients;*p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01.*

II. Regression Results for Individual Dimensions of Democratic Governance

		(1)	(2)	(3a)	(3b)	(4)
Participation	Cooperation	.195 (.102)	**.194 (.105)†**	.004 (.977)	**.437 (.168)****	
	Admin. Socialization		-.137 (.103)	-.145 (.103)	-.145 (.103)	-.153 (.105)
	Stay abroad		-.112 (.108)	**-.350 (.165)***	**.350 (.165)***	-.092 (.108)
	Foreign media		-.187 (.131)	-.137 (.129)	-.137 (.129)	-.138 (.129)
	Previous programs		**.237 (.109)***	**.228 (.107)***	**.228 (.107)***	**.242 (.111)***
	Coop x 1: stay abroad			**.433 (.212)***		
	Coop x 1: no stay abroad				**-.433 (.212)***	
	R^2	.028	.098	.130	.130	.072
	AIC	426.984	1014.939	1011.245	1011.245	848.356
	Log Likelihood	-210.492	-500.470	-497.623	-497.623	-418.178
	N	133	121	121	121	121
Transparency	Cooperation	-.113 (.075)	-.103 (.079)			
	Admin. Socialization		-.005 (.083)			.007 (.080)
	Stay abroad		-.041 (.083)			-.045 (.082)
	Foreign media		.013 (.097)			-.014 (.094)
	Previous programs		**.204 (.080)***			**.201 (.080)***
	R^2	.016	.071			.056
	AIC	351.751	935.610			767.177
	Log Likelihood	-172.875	-460.805			-377.589
	N	132	121			121
Accountability	Cooperation	.049 (.684)	.004 (.128)			
	Admin. Socialization		-.034 (.116)			-.034 (.116)
	Stay abroad		-.072 (.121)			-.072 (.119)
	Foreign media		.063 (.166)			.064 (.154)
	Previous programs		**.253 (.117)***			**.253 (.117)***
	R^2	.001	.044			.044
	AIC	437.730	994.128			834.799
	Log Likelihood	-215.865	-490.064			-411.399
	N	126	117			117

Multiple regression analysis (MLMV). *Regression coefficients are unstandardized; standard errors in parentheses; cases deleted listwise; † $p \leq .065$, * $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$.*

IIIa. Regression Results - The Twinning 'Customs Duty'

		(1)	(2)
Democratic Governance	Twinning	-.142 (.122)	-.183 (.129)
	Admin. Socialization		-.053 (.073)
	Stay abroad		-.055 (.074)
	Foreign media		-.047 (.089)
	Previous programs		**.232 (.077)****
	R^2	.013	.111
	AIC	159.791	671.043
	Log Likelihood	-76.895	-328.522
	N	110	103
Participation	Twinning	-.246 (.221)	-.344 (.211)
	Admin. Socialization		-.156 (.100)
	Stay abroad		-.095 (.105)
	Foreign media		-.129 (.128)
	Previous programs		**.247 (.108)***
	R^2	.017	.103
	AIC	299.589	897.002
	Log Likelihood	-146.794	-441.501
	N	133	121
Transparency	Twinning	-.234 (.145)	-.206 (.153)
	Admin. Socialization		.003 (.081)
	Stay abroad		-.050 (.081)
	Foreign media		-.002 (.091)
	Previous programs		**.199 (.079)***
	R^2	.030	.081
	AIC	238.359	832.669
	Log Likelihood	-116.180	-409.334
	N	132	121
Accountability	Twinning	-.037 (.144)	-.083 (.157)
	Admin. Socialization		-.039 (.115)
	Stay abroad		-.075 (.118)
	Foreign media		.072 (.153)
	Previous programs		**.256 (.116)***
	R^2	.000	.045
	AIC	313.781	886.563
	Log Likelihood	-153.891	-436.282
	N	126	117

Multiple regression analysis (MLMV). *Regression coefficients are unstandardized; standard errors in parentheses; cases deleted listwise; *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01.*

IIIb. Regression Results – The Twinning 'Competition'

		(1)	(2)	(3a)	(3b)	(3c)	(3d)
Democratic Governance	Twinning	**.256 (.122)***	**.207 (.088)***	**.444 (.098)*****	**.161 (.091)†**	.037 (.097)	**.037 (.076)*****
	Admin. Socialization		-.038 (.074)	-.034 (.074)	-.034 (.074)	-.045 (.074)	-.045 (.074)
	Stay abroad		-.055 (.074)	-.062 (.076)	-.062 (.076)	-.075 (.078)	.075 (.078)
	Foreign media		-.068 (.089)	-.055 (.091)	.055 (.091)	-.053 (.089)	-.053 (.089)
	Previous programs		**.230 (.077)****	**.233 (.077)****	**.233 (.077)****	**.231 (.077)****	**.231 (.077)****
	Twin. x 1: foreign media			**-.283 (.130)***			
	Twin. x 1: no foreign media				**.283 (.130)***		
	Twin. x 1: stay abroad					**.341 (.125)****	
	Twin. x 1: no stay abroad						**-.341 (.125)****
	R^2	.027	.105	.110	.110	.116	.116
	AIC	104.445	615.834	405.490	405.490	464.593	464.593
	Log Likelihood	-49.222	-300.917	-194.745	-194.745	-224.296	-224.296
	N	110	103	103	103	103	103
Participation	Twinning	.150 (.124)	.188 (.154)				
	Admin. Socialization		-.144 (.105)				
	Stay abroad		-.095 (.108)				
	Foreign media		-.147 (.130)				
	Previous programs		**.254 (.112)***				
	R^2	.004	.077				
	AIC	233.461	837.395				
	Log Likelihood	-133.731	-411.697				
	N	133	121				
Transparency	Twinning	.172 (.141)	.067 (.118)				
	Admin. Socialization		.009 (.080)				
	Stay abroad		-.045 (.082)				
	Foreign media		-.014 (.095)				
	Previous programs		**.203 (.081)***				
	R^2	.010	.058				
	AIC	172.917	774.551				
	Log Likelihood	-83.459	-380.276				
	N	132	121				
Accountability	Twinning	.259 (.203)	.201 (.183)	-.038 (.188)	**.664 (.273)***		
	Admin. Socialization		-.025 (.115)	-.038 (.116)	-.038 (.116)		
	Stay abroad		-.070 (.118)	-.120 (.122)	.120 (.122)		
	Foreign media		.061 (.153)	.083 (.150)	.083 (.150)		
	Previous programs		**.262 (.117)***	**.268 (.016)***	**.268 (.116)***		
	Twin. x 1: stay abroad			**.702 (.331)***			
	Twin. x 1: no stay abroad				**-.702 (.331)***		
	R^2	.011	.051	.070	.070		
	AIC	282.603	586.600	702.004	702.004		
	Log Likelihood	-138.302	-421.300	-343.002	-343.002		
	N	126	117	117	117		

Multiple regression analysis (MLMV). *Regression coefficients are unstandardized; standard errors in parentheses; cases deleted listwise; † p ≤ .08, *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001.*

IIIc. Regression Results – The Twinning 'Health Control'

		(1)	(2)	(3a)	(3b)
Democratic Governance	Twinning	-.032 (.071)	.014 (.081)		
	Admin. Socialization		-.047 (.076)		
	Stay abroad		-.051 (.079)		
	Foreign media		-.062 (.089)		
	Previous programs		**.222 (.078)****		
	R^2	.001	.089		
	AIC	215.990	728.534		
	Log Likelihood	-104.995	-357.267		
	N	110	103		
Participation	Twinning	-.054 (.101)	.063 (.122)	-.169 (.168)	.266 (.149)
	Admin. Socialization		-.161 (.110)	-.139 (.108)	-.139 (.108)
	Stay abroad		-.098 (.111)	-.185 (.131)	.185 (.131)
	Foreign media		-.143 (.130)	-.181 (.132)	-.181 (.132)
	Previous programs		**.246 (.113)***	**.251 (.111)***	**.251 (.111)***
	Twin. x 1: stay abroad			**.435 (.217)***	
	Twin. x 1: no stay abroad				**-.435 (.217)***
	R^2	.001	.073	.094	.094
	AIC	357.259	959.985	900.858	900.858
	Log Likelihood	-175.630	-472.992	-442.429	-442.429
	N	133	121	121	121
Transparency	Twinning	-.133 (.090)	**-.155 (.090)†**	.144 (.131)	**-.208 (.103)***
	Admin. Socialization		.020 (.080)	.011 (.080)	.011 (.080)
	Stay abroad		-.028 (.083)	-.008 (.086)	-.008 (.086)
	Foreign media		-.002 (.097)	.045 (.107)	-.045 (.107)
	Previous programs		**.193 (.080)****	**.188 (.080)****	**.188 (.080)****
	Twin. x 1: foreign media			**-.352 (.174)***	
	Twin. x 1: no foreign media				**.352 (.174)***
	R^2	.013	.076	.089	.089
	AIC	280.348	878.066	735.132	735.132
	Log Likelihood	-137.174	-432.033	-359.566	-359.566
	N	132	121	121	121
Accountability	Twinning	.075 (.122)	.127 (.133)		
	Admin. Socialization		-.048 (.118)		
	Stay abroad		-.084 (.122)		
	Foreign media		.055 (.158)		
	Previous programs		**.262 (.117)***		
	R^2	.002	.050		
	AIC	377.908	950.349		
	Log Likelihood	-185.954	-468.174		
	N	126	117		

Multiple regression analysis (MLMV). *Regression coefficients are unstandardized; standard errors in parentheses; cases deleted listwise;* $^{\dagger}p \leq .06$, $^{*}p \leq .05$, $^{**}p \leq .01$.

IIId. Regression Results – The Twinning 'Environment'

		(1)	(2)	(3a)	(3b)
Democratic Governance	Twinning	**.179 (.081)***	.163 (.094)	**-.248 (.117)***	**.195 (.096)***
	Admin. Socialization		-.015 (.072)	-.018 (.072)	-.018 (.072)
	Stay abroad		-.039 (076)	-.025 (.078)	-.025 (.078)
	Foreign media		-.093 (.092)	-.120 (.097)	.120 (.097)
	Previous programs		**.208 (.077)****	**.217 (.077)****	**.217 (.077)****
	Twin. x 1: foreign media			**.442 (.161)****	
	Twin. x 1: no foreign media				**-.442 (.161)****
	R^2	.030	.111	.122	.122
	AIC	195.533	695.634	493.798	493.798
	Log Likelihood	-94.767	-340.634	-238.899	-238.899
	N	110	103	103	103
Participation	Twinning	**.438 (.091)*****	**.401 (.103)*****		
	Admin. Socialization		-.093 (.102)		
	Stay abroad		-.094 (.104)		
	Foreign media		-.178 (.127)		
	Previous programs		**.**183 (.107)		
	R^2	.092	.140		
	AIC	360.973	948.425		
	Log Likelihood	-177.487	-467.213		
	N	133	121		
Transparency	Twinning	.035 (.101)	.121 (.084)	-.043 (.081)	**.393 (.148)****
	Admin. Socialization		.026 (.081)	.012 (.079)	.012 (.079)
	Stay abroad		-.040 (.082)	-.106 (.089)	.106 (.089)
	Foreign media		-.029 (.095)	.012 (.096)	.012 (.096)
	Previous programs		**.186 (.080)***	**.174 (.079)***	**.174 (.079)***
	Twin. x 1: stay abroad			**.436 (.169)****	
	Twin. x 1: no stay abroad				**-.436 (.169)****
	R^2	.001	.067	.100	.100
	AIC	286.390	860.657	778.467	778.467
	Log Likelihood	-140.195	-423.329	-381.233	-381.233
	N	132	121	121	121
Accountability	Twinning	-.104 (.150)	-.205 (.170)		
	Admin. Socialization		-.069 (.122)		
	Stay abroad		-.071 (.119)		
	Foreign media		.100 (.154)		
	Previous programs		**.277 (.123)***		
	R^2	.004	.057		
	AIC	369.190	922.311		
	Log Likelihood	-181.595	-454.156		
	N	126	117		

Multiple regression analysis (MLMV). *Regression coefficients are unstandardized; standard errors in parentheses; cases deleted listwise; *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001.*

Chapter 4. EU Promotion of Democratic Governance in the Neighbourhood

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This article analyses the effectiveness of the EU's promotion of democratic governance through functional co-operation in the European neighbourhood. In a comparative study of three policy sectors in three countries (Moldova, Morocco, and Ukraine), we show that the EU is capable of inducing neighbouring countries to adopt policy-specific democratic governance provisions in the absence of accession conditionality. In line with the institutionalist hypotheses, we find that effective rule adoption can be secured by strong legal specification of democratic governance elements in the EU sectoral acquis and international conventions. However, successful rule adoption does not necessarily lead to rule application.

Key words: Democracy promotion; democratic governance; European neighbourhood policy; external governance; sectoral co-operation.

Introduction

Recent studies link the successful external promotion of democracy by the European Union (EU) to a credible conditional offer of membership (Schimmelfennig *et al.* 2006; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008; Vachudova 2005). Whereas accession conditionality alone is not sufficient to bring about democratic change and consolidation in third countries, there is no evidence for EU effectiveness in its absence. Consequently, the prospects for democracy promotion are gloomy in the context of the European neighbourhood policy (ENP), which does not include a commitment to future membership (Maier and Schimmelfennig 2007). In this paper, we therefore propose to probe into an alternative to political accession conditionality – the 'governance' model of democracy promotion.

The governance model focuses on the democratization potential of transgovernmental functional co-operation in individual policy sectors. In this perspective, technical co-operation offers the EU the possibility of promoting democratization indirectly, through the 'back door' of joint problem-solving. In the ENP, co-operation in areas such as the environment, migration, transport or economic policies intensifies, and new structures of external governance emerge that establish stable horizontal ties between public administrations in the

EU and third countries (Lavenex 2008). This co-operation is based on the EU's *acquis communautaire* and designed to approximate legal and administrative standards in the ENP countries to those of the Union as a means of managing interdependence and fostering integration below the threshold of membership. Because these sectoral rules and standards were developed for advanced liberal democracies, they often contain elements of democratic governance that are then transferred to third countries.

In this article, we analyse the effectiveness of democratic governance promotion in key ENP countries. In line with the institutionalist explanation of external governance (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009), we assume that external governance mirrors the EU's internal policy templates and that it is more effective the more strongly democratic governance is codified in the EU *acquis* and other international legal rules. In addition, the institutionalization of transgovernmental networks and the promotion of the same democratic governance norms by other international actors support and reinforce EU efforts. In the next section, we define our notion of democratic governance and introduce the causal mechanisms of the governance model. We then briefly introduce our cases that focus on three sectors (competition, environment, and migration) and turn to analysing the adoption of democratic governance elements in the relevant sectoral *acquis* in three neighbouring countries: Moldova, Morocco and Ukraine.

Democratic Governance Promotion

In order to distinguish democratization at the sectoral level from democratization at the polity level, we talk of democratic governance rather than democracy. Our notion of democratic governance is based on an understanding of democracy defined according to its underlying principles rather than specific institutions embodying them (see Freyburg *et al.* 2007). Since these principles are applicable to all situations in which collectively binding decisions are taken (Beetham 1999: 4–5), they can be translated into sectoral policy-making. Democratic sectoral governance might thus be achieved by incorporating democratic principles into administrative rules and practices within a non-democratic polity.

By focusing on sectoral governance at the level of sub-units of state administration, we define governance with reference to 'how the rules of the political game are managed' (Hyden *et al.* 2004: 2). In this sense, democratic governance is similar to good governance (see, e.g.,

Kaufmann *et al.* 2005). Good governance, however, refers mainly to the effectiveness of governance and need not be democratic.

To assess how democratic policy-making and rule application are, we use a multidimensional concept of democratic governance. This concept consists of three dimensions on which democratic governance may vary in quality: transparency, accountability, and participation. Transparency refers to both access to issue-specific data and to governmental provision of information about decision-making. Accountability is about public officials' obligation to justify their decisions and actions, the possibility of appeal and sanctioning over misconduct. We distinguish between horizontal accountability that refers to 'all acts of accountability that take place between independent state agencies' (Schedler 1999: 25) such as investigating committees, ombudsmen and anticorruption bodies, and vertical accountability that emphasizes the obligation for public officials to justify their decisions. Finally, participation denotes non-electoral forms of participation such as involvement of non-state actors in administrative decision- and policy-making (cf. the concept of 'stakeholder democracy'; Matten and Crane 2005). The three dimensions of democratic governance may take different forms in different sectors (see Appendix).

In contrast to traditional notions of democratization that focus on changes in state institutions, the governance approach concentrates on changes in rules and practices within individual policy sectors. These changes occur as a consequence of exposure to the EU *acquis* and administrative policy-making in the EU and its member states, and eventually consist in the adoption of the EU *acquis*. This exposure takes place through interaction at the level of administrative experts. The vehicles of policy transfer are transgovernmental networks rather than intergovernmental negotiations between state representatives or transnational exchanges with civil society.

In conceptualizing the conditions for success of democratic governance promotion, we follow an institutionalist approach (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009) that focuses on properties of the EU *acquis* and on institutional factors in explaining EU influence. The more the transposition of the democratic governance elements is legally specified in the EU *acquis* and/or international treaties ('codification'), the more this *acquis* is promoted through institutionalized transgovernmental networks ('institutionalization'), and the more EU activities are supported by other international actors ('internationalization'), the more likely it is that these norms will be effectively transferred to the third country. Transgovernmental

networks are expected to facilitate communication and engage third countries in joint problem-solving, and the coupling of EU norms with international ones as well as their support by international actors strengthen the legitimacy of the EU *acquis*.

Values on these variables vary from weak to strong (see Table 1). Codification is weak if rules need to be adapted to the context of a third country. This is, for instance, the case with state aid policy. Within the EU, the Commission itself takes on implementation functions; in the third countries, however, it is only the national competition authorities. By contrast, if EU and international rules do not need to be translated to the context of a third state, codification is either medium or strong. It is coded as medium if democratic governance elements are only supported by EU law (or international rules backed by EU reference), and as strong if they are demanded by both European and international rules at the same time – as is the case for water management with a strong EU *acquis* and an international convention such as the Aarhus Convention. All three institutional factors are hypothesized to increase the likelihood of rule transfer. Our two dependent variables are the degree of formal rule adoption in domestic legislation and rule application in administrative practices. The explanatory variables and their operationalization are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1. Operationalization of Explanatory Variables

	Value	*Operationalization*
Codification	Strong	Democratic governance elements that are incorporated in both EU *acquis* and international rules and do not need to be adapted to the context of third countries
	Medium	Democratic governance elements that are incorporated in EU *acquis* or international rules and do not need to be adapted to the context of third countries
	Weak	Democratic elements that are incorporated in EU *acquis* or international rules and need to be adapted to the context of third countries
Institutional-ization	Strong	Both bilateral and EU-controlled regional fora dealing with the relevant rules
	Medium	Only bilateral fora dealing with the relevant rules
	Weak	Only third countries' fora
International-ization	Strong	Both the EU and international actor(s) promote relevant rules
	Medium	The EU only promotes relevant rules
	Weak	Only international actor(s) other than the EU promotes relevant rules

For our study, we selected three ENP countries: Moldova, Morocco, and Ukraine. With the exception of Israel (a consolidated democracy and therefore not relevant for our study), these

three countries are among the most active and most liberal participants in the ENP. In other words, they constitute most-likely cases for effective democracy promotion. This selection implies that we can generalize (only) negative findings: if democratic governance promotion is ineffective here, it is most likely to be ineffective in the remaining ENP countries as well. If it is effective, however, this is not necessarily the case in general.

On the other hand, the three countries differ with regard to size, region, and political system. Whereas Moldova and Ukraine are East European postcommunist transition countries that hope to become membership candidates eventually, Morocco is a Mediterranean 'liberalized autocracy' (Brumberg 2002) with no membership perspective. This amounts to a most-dissimilar-systems design (Przeworski and Teune 1970): if we can show that there is a consistent correlation across all countries between the institutional variables and EU rule transfer, we can rule out that these other factors are causally relevant.

The same logic guided our selection of policy sectors: environment (water management), competition (state aid), and migration policy (asylum). All three sectors to varying degrees display elements of democratic governance. Whereas the EU environmental *acquis* provides the most developed democratic governance provisions, these are comparatively weak in competition policy where they are only poorly codified in the EU *acquis* and not supported by international treaties. Asylum policy is one field of migration policy which contains relatively strong democratic elements originating mainly in international conventions, especially with regard to accountability and transparency (see the Appendix for an overview of the strongest codification of democratic governance provisions in each sector).

EU Democratic Governance Promotion: Three Case Studies

The following sections provide the results of the empirical analysis of functional co-operation in three sectors – state aid regulation, water management, and asylum – between the EU on the one hand, and Moldova, Morocco and Ukraine on the other hand. The analysis is primarily based on 161 semi-structured interviews conducted in 2007 and 2008 with governmental and non-governmental policy-makers in the three countries and with Commission officials, as well as on pertinent official documents and reports. The sections establish the values for institutionalization and internationalization before turning to domestic adaptation.

Competition Policy: State Aid

Convergence in the field of competition policy is a priority for EU co-operation with all three countries. As regards *internationalization*, in Moldova the World Bank supports the elaboration of a national competition policy on state aid based on the EU template. Similarly, in Morocco the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) make financial assistance conditional upon the implementation of EU objectives. Ukraine took part in the 2008 OECD Global Forum on Competition's Peer Review, which included state aid. In all three countries, co-operation with the EU is moderately **institutionalized**. While Moldova and Ukraine have not yet participated in a Twinning project on state aid, the EU is actively present as an adviser at various stages of elaboration of competition legislation. In Morocco, the ongoing Twinning project is the main focus of co-operation. Although state aid regulation is not its explicit objective, the issue is covered by daily practices and training programmes. As for regional fora not controlled by the EU, Ukraine is a member of the International Competition Network (ICN), Moldova's membership in the ICN is pending, and Morocco does not *de facto* participate in the ICN despite membership.

In **Moldova**, the Law on the Protection of Competition of 2000 (Parliament of Moldova 2000b) set out a general framework for competition and established a legal basis for an independent competition authority, the National Agency for the Protection of Competition (NAPC), but was not enforced until 2007.[54] Progress in the implementation of the law and the inception of the NAPC was triggered by the EU (European Commission 2004b: 2; 2006b: 10; European Commission/Moldova 2005: Art. 37).

The amended competition law was drafted with the participation of EU-affiliated experts and in 2008 passed a concordance check for compatibility with EU directives at the Centre for Harmonization of Legislation (Parliament of Moldova 2008; National Agency for the Protection of Competition of the Republic of Moldova 2007). Currently, the NAPC, in consultation with international experts, is in the process of preparing a comprehensive law on state aid compatible with EU practices. The draft is expected to introduce to the Moldovan legislation the fundamentals of the principles of *transparency* and *accountability* by affording the NAPC broad competences in receiving information about state aid from all state agencies, requesting further information, authorizing all instances of state aid, investigating possible

[54] Until the NAPC was established to implement the 2000 competition law, the State Anti-monopoly Committee supervised competitive practices in the Moldovan economy according to the 1992 Law on Restrictions of Monopolistic Activities and Development of Competition.

violations, adopting sanctions and applying to court (Parliament of Moldova Draft 1). At present, however, public *participation* in NAPC activities remains limited. The Social Council of the Agency comprised of representatives of other public administration authorities, business and civil society may comment on legislative drafts, though without voting power, but is not allowed to participate in the NAPC's investigations.

Morocco still does not possess any uniform state aid control regime comparable with that of EU member states. The legal basis of Morocco's competition policy is the Law on Freedom of Prices and Competition from 1999. The Prime Minister is the sole authority who may issue rulings on anti-competitive practices. His decisions can, however, be challenged before an administrative court (*accountability*) (Parliament of Morocco 2000). The Competition Council may give the Prime Minister non-binding advisory opinions on all draft legislation concerning state aid allocation (Parliament of Morocco 2000: Art. 16). Nominated by the King, the Council president enjoys direct royal backing, which makes it a less reliant authority (see El Mernessi 2004: 246–8).[55] In order to introduce genuine *participation*, the revised competition law elaborated as part of the Twinning project foresees that the Council and the government need to consult interested parties before taking policy decisions. The revised law also improved provisions on *transparency*.

The competition law is only partially implemented. The Competition Council was activated in January 2009, but it is still far from being an independent authority with decision competencies. Progress in *transparency* is limited to provision of information on the total amount and the distribution of aid in the form of annual reports to the Commission (European Commission 2008a). The revised law leaves publication of decisions at the authority's discretion, but grants access to the records. As for *participation*, even the General Confederation of Moroccan Enterprises is only occasionally consulted by the government, usually after the decision has been informally made.

Regarding the legislative approximation of **Ukrainian** law to EU rules on state aid, there have been several setbacks. In 2004, a draft law on state aid which was closely modelled on EU *acquis* provisions was rejected by the Parliament (European Commission 2006c: 11). In 2007, the Law on Protection of Economic Competition, which had been amended with the aim of introducing provisions on state aid control, also failed in Parliament (Parliament of Ukraine Draft 1; European Commission 2008c: 11).

[55] *Telquel*: 'Conseil de Concurrence. Le coup de pouce royal' (Fahd Iraqi), no. 337, 2009.

Without an appropriate legal framework, the Ukrainian competition authority 'is not provided with the adequate authority required for the independent supervisory authority to exercise the control on state aid' (ECORYS Nederland BV and CASE Ukraine 2007: 120). The present system of granting aid is thus not *transparent*. In April 2008, the European Commission came to the conclusion that no progress had been achieved in the field of state aid (European Commission 2008c: 11).

Environmental Policy: Water Management

Environmental co-operation is relatively highly *institutionalized* and *internationalized*. Moldova and Ukraine are part of several international frameworks of co-operation on water, particularly the Central and Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia (CEECCA) component of the EU Water Initiative (EUWI), including national dialogue, the EU-sponsored Danube–Black Sea Task Force (DABLAS), and the UN Environment for Europe Process (UNECE-EfE). As for Morocco, it participates in the Euro-Mediterranean Water Directors' Forum and took part in the Twinning project on harmonization of environmental legislation completed in July 2007. On a regional level, Morocco is part of the Mediterranean component of the EUWI and used to be part of the Short and Medium-term Priority Environmental Action Programme (SMAP) that ended in 2006. Morocco also benefits from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which couples environmental engagement with the promotion of democratic governance.

Moldova was one of the first countries to ratify the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters in 1999. The 2000 Law on Access to Information translated the provisions of the Convention into domestic legislation, not only with respect to environmental issues, but also for all governmental policy-making (Parliament of Moldova 2000a). However, 'the requirements of the Aarhus Convention continue not to be fully incorporated into [environmental] legislation' (European Commission 2008b: 16). Furthermore, the observance of the Convention's provisions remains problematic. While the EU sees some progress in Moldova's efforts at increasing *transparency* of environmental issues (European Commission 2008b: 15–16), better openness seems to be a goal in itself and does not serve the improvement of public *participation*. As for *accountability,* there is little, if any, participation of the public in legislative and policy-making processes in Moldova. Although the democratic quality of international co-operation on water is relatively high, this does not translate into Moldova's national policy on water. To give an example, whereas engagement of non-state

actors and stakeholders in frameworks such as DABLAS is provided by Moldovan policy-makers as an example of public participation, no comparable scheme exists for national policy programmes.

The main law regulating water resources in Moldova, the Water Code (Parliament of Moldova 1993), having survived several amendments, did not acquire the provisions reflecting Moldova's obligations under the Aarhus Convention, as well as those reflected in the ENP Action Plan. A new law on water is currently being drafted by the Moldovan Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources to enable the application of the EU directive regulating water management policy. Among others, the proposed law contains provisions on public *participation* in policy-making (Parliament of Moldova Draft 2: Art. 94).

In **Morocco**, EU influence on the creation of a Law on Access to Environmental Information (*transparency*) following the Aarhus Convention, as well as on policy-specific laws such as modification and implementation of the Law on Water (Parliament of Morocco 1995), is high, in particular as a result of the Twinning's focus on legal harmonization. With the establishment of the Water and Climate Council, the creation of water basin agencies – local 'petits parliaments de l'eau' (Hatimy 2001: 107) – and the development of contractualization (Agoumi and Debbarh 2006: 51), Morocco has developed a participative, consultative and decentralized approach to water management. The Law on Environmental Impact Studies guarantees public access to environmental information (*transparency*) and the right to appeal (*accountability*) (Parliament of Morocco 2003a). Still, Morocco's environmental legislation shows several shortcomings. Authorities are not obliged to communicate their decisions, and claimants of appeals do not participate in juridical procedures (Ministry of Energy of Morocco 2007). As regards *participation*, the Law on Water established the Supreme Council on Water and Climate, a consultative and non-permanent institution consisting of scientific experts and representatives of provincial and professional associations and serving as a platform for the exchange of ideas (Parliament of Morocco 1995, 1996).

Although the transfer of democratic governance elements to Moroccan environmental legislation has been quite successful, these are hardly applied. Administrative structures, such as the Water Council, are 'empty' (Tazi Sadeq 2006: 138–40), and environmental legislation is rarely addressed by implementing decrees. For the time being, the Law on Access to Environmental Legislation has not been ratified by the parliament. *Participation* of non-state actors in environmental decision-making is ceremonial, since they are invited only after decisions are taken. As for *transparency*, information offered to the public takes the form of pre-arranged reports on the state of the environment and public awareness campaigns

(European Commission 2006a). At the same time, proactive export-oriented enterprises, foreign investors and municipal councils demand activation of the legally established democratic governance norms.

Provisions on access to environmental information, *participation* and *accountability* have been incorporated into **Ukrainian** legislation for many years. A decade ago, scholars acknowledged that '[a]lmost all laws connected with environmental protection and natural resources usage contain the principles of public *participation* in environmental decision-making and other citizens' rights' (Skrylnikov and Tustanovska 1998: 135). After Ukraine became a member of the Aarhus Convention, several laws were amended accordingly, although some shortcomings remain. Regarding the legislation referring to water issues, mention must be made of the Water Code (Parliament of Ukraine 1995) and the law 'On Drinking Water and Drinking Water Supply' (Parliament of Ukraine 2002), which incorporate most provisions of the EU Water Framework Directive (Stashuk 2006: 48–9).

The result of reforms in the sphere of environmental and in particular water governance can be described as mixed. On the one hand, there are some positive judgements regarding Ukraine's progress in *public involvement* and access to environmental *information* (European Commission 2006c: 15). For example, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were involved in the drafting of the Drinking Water Programme of Ukraine for 2006–2020 (ECE 2007: 49). On the other hand, however, this does not mean that the situation is satisfactory. Despite the quite developed legislation, implementation remains 'sporadic' (Fermont and Nicilli 2008: 49; European Commission 2008c: 17). *Access to justice* is guaranteed by the law but in practice remains a problem.

Migration Policy: Asylum

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) run most projects concerning immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers in the three countries (*internationalizatio*n). These projects, however, are largely financed by the EU. In Ukraine, co-operation on migration has been based on separate Action Plans since 2001, and is additionally internationalized by the General Directors of Immigration Services Conference (GDISC), which often implements EU-financed programmes. Co-operation on asylum policy in Moldova and Ukraine is regionally *institutionalized* through the Söderköping and Budapest processes, networks where information and best practices of EU asylum policy are shared. A regional equivalent in the Southern

neighbourhood, which some already call the 'Rabat process'[56], is still in its infancy. Overall, however, these networks focus more on the fight against irregular migration than on asylum proper. Asylum is also excluded from the IOM-led 5+5 Dialogue on Migration. Both in Moldova and Morocco authorities only recently started to acknowledge the existence of problems in the migration sector. Owing to Morocco's reluctance to co-operate, exchange with the EU is primarily informal.[57] Nevertheless, Morocco and the EU have created a working party to deal with social affairs and migration as part of the Association Agreement. Here, the Commission regularly encourages Morocco to implement the Geneva Convention and to fully co-operate with the UNHCR.

In **Moldova**, the preamble to the Law on the Status of Refugees from 2002 (Parliament of Moldova 2002) explicitly states that the law is to bring domestic legislation on asylum up to internationally recognized standards. The ENP Action Plan encourages further efforts in this direction (European Commission/ Moldova 2005: Art. 46) and the first ENP progress report has already acknowledged substantial progress (European Commission 2006b: 11). The recent amendments to the law established the main principles of a human rights approach to refugees and asylum seekers, exhaustively covering the application of the principles of *transparency, accountability* and *participation*, such as non-discrimination, fair consideration of applications for asylum, provision of exhaustive information about procedures, possibilities for appeal and contacting the UNHCR representative.

Yet the implementation of legislation acknowledged by the EU is a major problem. The main concern is the non-application of the human rights approach by the Moldovan migration and border control authorities. These principles are almost exclusively implemented by international organizations, such as the IOM and the UNHCR, and Moldovan NGOs supporting refugees and asylum seekers. Moldova has no national centre for temporary accommodation of illegal migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. In 2008, the IOM, financed particularly through the EU programmes on migration, built a Centre for Illegal Migrants which provide its residents with all necessary assistance including qualified legal support. However, the Centre is not operational yet owing to the absence of a normative framework in Moldovan legislation.

[56] The 'Rabat process' was triggered by the Ministerial Euro-African Conference on Migration and Development in July 2006 and mainly consists of preparatory meetings for the next conference.

[57] There is an office for refugees and stateless people responsible for assistance to and protection of refugees under the authority of the Foreign Minister which, however, has been closed for some years. In the absence of a national asylum procedure the UNHCR office in Rabat undertakes the determination of refugee status.

In **Morocco,** the legal basis of the asylum policy is the Decree on the Implementation of the 1951 Geneva Convention (Parliament of Morocco 1957). However, it has not been enforced owing to disregard of the legal supremacy of international law in Morocco (Elmadmad 2002). The 2003 Law on the Entry and Stay of Foreigners acknowledges the primacy of international conventions signed by Morocco and introduces a few articles on refugees and asylum seekers following democratic norms (Parliament of Morocco 2003b). Their appearance is claimed to be an EU success.[58] For example, in the case of a refusal of an asylum application, it obliges the authorities to explain their decision (*accountability*) and inform asylum seekers of their rights (*transparency*), provide access to a lawyer and allow contesting the decision before an administrative court. However, it does not specify the *participation* of other relevant actors. Furthermore, the law considerably strengthens the administration's discretionary use of power (Rbii 2006: 90–5).

The application of the 2003 Law is problematic since without implementing decrees it did not fully come into force. Further, Morocco has no national centre for temporary accommodation of illegal migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. To compensate for this, the Moroccan Human Rights Organization (OMDH) recently opened the Reception and Legal Centre for Refugees. Its effect remains marginal, however, because Moroccan lawyers and judges are not familiar with international standards and deportations proceed too fast for any juridical procedure to take place.

One of the foundations of the **Ukrainian** migration and asylum policy is the Law on Refugees (Parliament of Ukraine 2001). According to the European Commission, it has some major shortcomings, especially with respect to the accelerated asylum procedure, because this provision is often used to reject claims without substantive investigation. Furthermore, there are limitations to *transparency* and *participation*, since '[i]t does not provide access for legal specialists of non-governmental organizations or UNHCR to refugees' individual files, or for refugees to have legal representation during refugee status determination [RSD] interviews with the Migration Services' (European Commission 2008c: 13).

These legal shortcomings have implications for rule application. The UNHCR concluded that the 2005 amendments to the Refugee Law resulted in more arbitrary rejections. When applications are rejected as 'manifestly unfounded', reasons are not provided in the written notifications (*accountability*). The UNHCR also faces problems getting access to the files of asylum seekers (*transparency*; UNHCR 2007: 6–7, 9, 11). Similarly, lawyers from relevant

[58] *Telquel*: 'Le Maroc brade la question des immigre´s' (Laetitia Grotti), no. 68, 2003.

NGOs have difficulty meeting detained asylum seekers (*participation*). The latter, in turn, often do not receive adequate information from officials about the RSD procedure (ECRE 2008: 65–6). In October 2007, the UNHCR declared Ukraine to be a 'highly inhospitable asylum environment' and advised countries not to return their asylum seekers (UNHCR 2007: 7, 14). However, one development which increases participation possibilities is the creation in 2008 of a Council at the State Committee for Nationalities and Religion that comprises state and non-state actors and also some refugees.

Conclusions

In the concluding section, we present a comparative analysis of the three ENP countries and sectoral policies. Table 2 gives an overview of the findings. We distinguish between strong, medium and weak degrees of democratic governance in legislative rule adoption and administrative rule application. Two outcome patterns are easy to detect. First, there is a clear discrepancy between rule adoption and rule application: whereas the EU has been fairly successful in inducing the three ENP countries to adopt legislation in line with democratic governance provisions, these provisions have generally not been implemented. Second, rule adoption is strongly correlated with the strength of codification and to some extent with the strength of institutionalization.

In the area of state aid, codification of democratic governance provisions is weak. Furthermore, while the Commission is the superior authority in EU competition decision-making, third states have to establish independent national state agencies. Since democratic governance rules are more difficult to translate directly to a third country's domestic system, rule adoption in the area of state aid is also weak. Conversely, strong codification in the environmental policy of water management – accompanied by high degrees of institutionalization and internationalization – is mirrored in comparatively strong rule adoption (and even moderate application in Ukraine). Here, the specified codification makes transposition in the third countries easier. In addition, institutionalized joint policy-making in transgovernmental networks, such as DABLAS, promotes the translation of adopted rules into practice even if, such as in the case of Moldova, the application of participation and transparency rules remains limited to the DABLAS framework. As for asylum policy, the existence of international norms accounts for medium codification. At the same time, institutionalized networks set up in neighbouring countries tend to focus on fighting irregular migration rather than asylum rules proper.

Table 2. Comparative analysis

Sector and policy issue			Competition: *state aid*			Environment: *water management*			Migration: *asylum*		
Country			Moldova	Morocco	Ukraine	Moldova	Morocco	Ukraine	Moldova	Morocco	Ukraine
Independent variables	**Codification**			weak			strong			medium	
	Institutionalisation		medium (active advisor)	medium (Twinning)	medium (active advisor)	strong (CEECCA EUWI, DABLAS)	strong (EuroMed Water, EUWI, SMAP, Twinning)	strong (CEECCA EUWI, DABLAS)	strong (Söderköping process, Budapest process)	medium (EU working party)	strong (Söderköping process, Budapest process)
	Internationalisation		strong (World Bank)	strong (World Bank; OECD; ICN)	strong (OECD, ICN)	strong (UNDP, UNECE-EfE)	strong (UNDP)	strong (UNDP, UNECE-EfE)	strong (IOM, UNHCR)	strong (IOM, UNHCR)	strong (IOM, UNHCR, GDISC)
Dependent variables	**Adoption**	Transparency	weak (strong)*	weak	weak	strong	medium (strong)	strong	strong	medium	weak
		Accountability	weak (strong)	medium	weak	strong	medium (strong)	strong	strong	medium	strong
		Participation	weak	weak	weak	medium	medium	strong	strong	weak	weak
		Democratic Governance	**weak (strong)**	**weak**	**weak**	**strong**	**medium (strong)**	**strong**	**strong**	**medium**	**medium**
	Application	Transparency	weak	weak	weak	medium	medium	medium	weak	weak	weak
		Accountability	weak	weak	weak	weak	weak	weak	weak	weak	weak
		Participation	weak	weak	weak	weak	weak	medium	weak	weak	weak
		Democratic Governance	**weak**	**weak**	**weak**	**weak**	**weak**	**medium**	**weak**	**weak**	**weak**

*Note: *Values in brackets correspond to draft legislation.*

The analysis thus broadly corroborates the institutionalist explanation: EU impact increases with the institutional strength and density of external governance. Not all conditions are of equal importance, however. The correlation is strongest for codification, which can be seen as a necessary condition. If codification is weak or medium, this (relative) weakness might be compensated by higher institutionalization or internationalization. Whether codification would also be sufficient in the absence of institutionalization and internationalization is hard to judge on the basis of our case studies, because strong codification (in the water management case) is accompanied by strong institutionalization and internationalization. Finally, internationalization is strong throughout and therefore cannot account for variation in rule adoption.

Because the correlation between codification and rule adoption holds across countries and policy issues with otherwise very diverse characteristics, we can regard it as fairly well controlled in a most-dissimilar-systems design. Apparently, the transfer of democratic governance provisions does not depend systematically on the size, region, membership potential, or political system of the country or on the diverse bilateral or policy-specific constellations of interest and power between the EU and individual ENP countries. Although a direct test of the power-based and domestic explanations would have been preferable, we thus feel sufficiently confident to disregard these alternatives to the institutionalist explanation for our selected countries.

In sum, our results demonstrate that democracy promotion does take place and shows effects outside an accession conditionality framework. But is the governance model of democracy promotion a viable alternative to the enlargement model based on political conditionality? First, we do not claim that our findings can be easily generalized to the remaining ENP countries. Here, domestic and power-based explanations may well prove more relevant, and it is plausible to assume that the institutional factors emphasized in our case studies will have a much weaker effect in countries that are less liberalized or less interested in intensifying their relations with the EU.

Second, although we observe an impact on legislation, the application of legislation has been almost universally absent or weak. Thus, our findings strongly resemble the 'decoupling' effects of institutionalization (Meyer and Rowan 1991: 57). When faced with external pressures to conform to a strong standard of legitimacy in their institutional environment, organizations adapt their formal rule structures in order to demonstrate good

faith. At the same time, however, 'implementation is neglected, and inspection and evaluation are ceremonialized' (Meyer and Rowan 1991: 58). Organizations seek to decouple their internal activities from their formal structures in order to preserve those old ways of behaviour that correspond to their internal interests and needs. This mirrors exactly the gap between the adaptation of legislation and its non-application that we observe in the promotion of democratic governance.

This does not mean that primarily window-dressing democratic governance might not create a subsequent and unintended positive momentum. As mentioned in the case study on the environment in Morocco, the fact that democratic governance elements exist in domestic laws already has an impact on domestic actors such as enterprises and non-governmental associations that refer to them in their daily activities, demanding their actual realization. The difference between rule adoption and application may also be reduced over time through the intensification of administrative networking and in particular co-operation in application, such as already practised in some relevant policy networks (e.g. DABLAS in water co-operation with Moldova). In this sense, the EU succeeds in 'implanting' a certain potential for democratization within domestic legislation. Yet the case of state aid legislation in Ukraine presents a clear warning that the prospect of practical application may also endanger the adoption of EU rules. When negatively affected and powerful interest groups cannot be sure that regulatory alignment with the EU will remain mere 'Potemkin harmonization' (Jacoby 1999), they are likely to seek to prevent EU-conforming legislation in the first place.

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ANNEX

Democratic Governance in the Selected Sectoral A*cquis*

Polity sector and issue	**Transparency** Access to information	**Accountability** Access to justice & monitoring	**Participation** Involvement of non-state actors in decision-making
Competition – *state aid*	Obligation to provide information and regular reports on - situation of state aid for the body granting state aid and for the body deciding over the lawfulness; - application of certain laws, state aid recovery interest rates and the facts under consideration before the final decision is made to the independent authority. Obligation for the body granting state aid to ex ante notification requirement	- Guarantee of possibility of action of nullity; maintenance of independent and open judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals by the body deciding over the lawfulness of state aid; - Review of state aid activities including possibility to sanction the body granting state aid in case of non-compliance with the decisions of an independent authority	Possibility for interested parties concerned to submit and reply to comments, right to inform about any alleged unlawful or misused aid in investigation and regulation of state aid/ subsidies
Environment – *water management*	Obligation for authorities to provide information on - decisions taken including how public participation was accommodated into decision-making process; - environmental situation	- Obligation for authorities to justify their decisions and to provide information on legal provisions; - Access to review procedure before a court or independent and impartial body to challenge substantive and procedural decisions for citizens	Participation of all willing public in drafting and modification of environmental programmes and plans
Migration – *asylum*	Obligation for authorities to provide information on - motivation for decision and course of procedure at every moment of procedure to UNHCR, the concerned person and its legal advisor; - examination of application at every moment in the course of the procedure to UNHCR and the concerned person and its legal advisor	- Right to an effective appeal before a judicial body against decisions taken on application for asylum including right to legal assistance and representation; - Establishment of appropriate guidance, monitoring and control system including the possibility of enforcement and sanctions in case of infringement by independent third party	- Right for UNHCR, IOM and any other agency of the UN to be involved in cooperation on matters relating to asylum policy; - Allowance to UNHCR, IOM and other agency of the UN to present its views to the authorities at any stage of the procedure on individual applications

Chapter 5. Conclusion

To what extent can processes of democratic change be externally encouraged in authoritarian contexts? The theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of external efforts to promote democratic norms is rather skeptical toward this question. Such an assessment might, however, be biased in that most studies concentrate on the effect of direct strategies of democracy promotion at the level of the state (government). Their results show that explicit and straightforward democracy promotion policies, notably political conditionality and democratic assistance, are unlikely to yield processes of democratization in stable authoritarian regimes. Yet, most of the present authoritarian regimes are exposed to various forms of transnational influences. The largest part of existing studies that examine the democratic impact of transnational linkages such as student exchanges and foreign media usage emulate the research strategies of studies interested in direct democracy promotion policies and, consequently, also expect effects at the macro-level of the regime. In this vein, they echo an equally pessimistic assessment. These studies risk overlooking more subtle processes of democratization, that can be triggered by transnational influences at levels below the polity. In so doing, they miss to actually evaluate the potential of their own theorizing. This thesis wishes to be a stepping stone in uncovering these subtle processes of democratization. Its results suggest that the governance model of democratic governance promotion through functional cooperation is a promising way of encouraging democratic developments in countries where more direct forms of external democracy promotion fail. Functional cooperation is not only able to implant elements of democratic governance in domestic legislation but also to positively shape the attitudes toward these elements among administrative staff.

In this research, I have shown that under the surface of stable authoritarian regimes seemingly immutable from the outside, transnational influences can leave their imprints not only in domestic law codes but also in the heads and minds of relevant domestic actors, notably state officials. The differentiated analyses of transnational influences capture processes of democratic socialization in a sophisticated manner. Each of the different studies composing this dissertation sheds light on a specific aspect regarding the democratic impact of transnational influences.

The strengths of this study can be summarized in mainly three points. First, this dissertation applies an understanding of democratic socialization as an open-end process, which accounts for the fact that attitude changes do not automatically and necessarily translate into behavioral changes. In order to directly measure attitudes rather than infer them from behavior, an original scale was developed using exploratory factor analysis on a unique data set on attitudes toward democratic governance of 150 Moroccan state officials. Second, this dissertation examined the effect of three different types of transnational influences and their interaction effects on the attitudes of state officials in authoritarian contexts. In a first step, it empirically scrutinized the impact of the two linkages most commonly associated with democratization – foreign media broadcasting and educational/professional exchanges. In a second step, it investigated a third, new type of influence, namely transgovernmental networks. Importantly, this study took both the individual independent effects and possible interaction effects into account. In so doing, it goes beyond existing studies on democratization through linkage; a decision which turned out to be important. As the analyses show, transnational influences hardly yield independent effects but depend on favorable conditions. In contrast to state-of-the-art work on diffusion of norms, linkage is only under very specific domestic conditions able to significantly shape the attitudes of domestic actors, here state officials. It appears that the state officials' understanding of appropriate governance can be influenced by engaging them in activities of policy reform programs. This effect is higher if the socializee has had previous experiences with democratic governance.[59] These findings suggest a more positive reading of international socialization than the one provided by existing studies, which are rather skeptical with regard to the socializing power of international institutions. Third, the empirical findings point to the importance of domestic factors, notably the role of the policies' politicization. A qualitative comparison based on information obtained from 69 interviews conducted with representatives from governmental and non-governmental institutions in Europe and Morocco demonstrate that in highly politicized fields such as in competition policy, transnational influences, in particular foreign media broadcasting can have a negative effect on the attitudes toward democratic governance of state officials. Moreover, in these fields it turned out to be less likely that elements of democratic governance are adopted in domestic legislation as a consequence of functional cooperation. This finding is particularly interesting with regard to the recently emerging literature on the counterproductive effects of external democracy promotion in authoritarian contexts.

[59] This difference in effect is not due to the different scales used in order to measure the dependent variables, see Annex to the introductory chapter: 26-30.

This thesis endeavors to prepare the ground for future research. Since its aim was to test the plausibility of the general argument – transnational influences can, under certain conditions, yield subtle processes of democratization even in stable authoritarian regimes – it selected the respective "most-likely" cases among the presently existing stable authoritarian regimes in the EU's neighborhood. It would be interesting to test the argument not only beyond Morocco but also beyond EU functional cooperation, notably the Twinning program. With respect to the country selection, this study will be complemented by analogous analyses on data gained through a survey among more than 200 state officials in Jordan. Jordan is selected as comparable case since it is similar in all relevant factors but one. Among the Arab authoritarian regimes, it equally presents one of the politically most liberalized countries in the region. Moreover, Jordan is a bureaucratic monarchy so that the political system is characterized by similar traditional paternalistic structures which attach great importance to state bureaucracy for the maintenance and stability of the regime. However, Morocco and Jordan have been exposed to different kinds of external influences, in the past as former colonies (France versus Great Britain) and today with regard to the powerful role the United States play in Jordan and the EU plays in Morocco. Of course, it would be also worth studying to what extent transnational influences yield comparable subtle processes of democratization beyond the politically most liberalized countries in the MENA region but also in other regions such as East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.

With respect to the selection of functional cooperation and the European Union as external actor, the questionnaire conducted in Morocco (and also in Jordan) allows detecting the effect of functional cooperation operated by external actors other than the EU such as the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). First sketchy regression analyses point to an interesting finding: It seems as if the effect widely varies among external donors with the World Bank yielding a negative effect. To what extent this finding can be explained by characteristics of the individual functional cooperation will be explored in future research.

Still at the empirical level, by incorporating the additional five Twinning projects of the Jordan case in the analyses, future research will explore to what extent the administrative traditions of the individual European reference countries make a difference. Albeit functional cooperation presents democratic governance norms as functionally appropriate rather than explicitly democratic, the actual meaning is specified by the external experts which are

influenced by their national 'administrative styles' (Sverdrup 2000: 18; Tulmets 2005) – and administrative traditions can substantially vary among EU member states (Knill 2001). It would be interesting to learn to what extent variance in democratic socialization between the individual networks can be explained by properties of the external actor, in addition to domestic factors such as the policies' degree of politicization. Do we find a common non-formalized European system of governance (Bouckaert 2002) despite the absence of a *de jure acquis communautaire* for national public administrations that appears in the external relations at the level of state administration? Moreover, an additional survey is currently conducted among European state officials having served as long- and short-term experts to the selected Twinning projects. Unfortunately, the response rate was neither high nor spread enough at the time of submission of this dissertation to allow entering the European experts' attitude toward democratic governance as a baseline. Future research will explore to what extent the level of agreement with democratic governance among the individual European experts determines the democratizing potential of transgovernmental policy networks.

This study wishes to encourage further exploitation of the data sets on Arab state officials by applying different methodological approaches. For instance, future research will seek to identify the mechanisms leading to attitude change. It shall be distinguished between (strategic and social) learning and identification (Checkel 2005). This could be done by ascribing certain answer patterns to specific mechanisms. For instance, the questionnaire covers certain statement items touching upon instrumental thinking, which could be used as an indicator for strategic learning.

Finally, in order to see how sustainable the detected attitude change is, a panel study assessing the attitudes of state officials toward democratic governance in about five years after the Twinning projects would be highly welcomed. Such a research design would reflect an understanding of democratic socialization as open-end process that accounts for failure and reversibility. It would be interesting to see whether attitude change has ultimately been translated in behavioral changes, at least at the level of administrative governance.

In conclusion, whilst each individual paper contains its specific contribution, I would like to present the general contribution of this dissertation. In authoritarian regimes like Morocco we often have the case that democratic institutions and rules are established but not used in a democratic way (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Schedler and Sarsfield 2007; Levitsky and

Way 2002). As it was shown by this dissertation, this discrepancy between rule/form and practice holds also true at the level of administrative governance. The codes of law are rich in elements of democratic governance, many of them adopted as a consequence of functional cooperation with external actors such as the EU – but these elements are not applied in administrative reality. At the same time, however, we learnt that among the administrative staff there is a generally high agreement with democratic governance, especially among state officials that have had personal experiences with democratic governance while staying abroad in Western democracies and having participated in policy reform programs. Principles of democratic governance thus appear as solid guidelines that can be learned from foreign experts. 'The application of these is, at very least, going to need a melding of foreign experience and domestic experience to create a transformation that is realistic, historically substantive, and likely to make some real difference' (Baker 2002: 11). Although the long-term effects of these traces are difficult to estimate, an optimistic reading suggests that a reform-minded bureaucracy could signify a problem for the maintenance of a regime. Eventually, in any political system the administrative staff has a particular importance in policy-making as it is the body that is actually entrusted with carrying out decisions. As Max Weber wrote '*Herrschaft ist im Alltag primär: Verwaltung*' / 'Everyday rule is primarily administration' (1972: 126). The administrative apparatus operates the machinery of government (Hyden *et al.* 2004; Baker 2002; Heady 2001; Page 1985). Consequently, an understanding of the attitudes toward appropriate governance of state officials who exercise everyday rule and how these attitudes are influenced by transnational influences is crucial in assessing external influences on authoritarian regimes. Surprisingly, the democratization literature has typically ignored this arena despite its importance in shaping perceptions of how a political system functions. This study wishes to draw attention to the democratizing potential of transnational influences, notably functional cooperation in authoritarian contexts.

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APPENDIX

List of Interviews

Representatives of the European Commission

Bruxelles, December 2007

1. DG AIDCO, A6 *Multi-Country Programmes*. Program Manager 'Twinning and TAIEX'
2. DG ENTERPRISE, I.2 *New Approach Industries, Tourism and CSR*. Policy Officer 'International and horizontal aspects'
3. DG JLS, B2 *External Relations and Enlargement*. Policy Officer ‚Migration'
4. DG RELEX, D1 *European Neighbourhood Policy General Coordination*. Policy Officer 'Migration'
5. DG RELEX, D1 *European Neighborhood Policy General Coordination*. Policy Officer 'Environment'
6. DG RELEX, F1 *EuroMed and Regional Issues*. Desk 'Political questions and questions of security EuroMed'
7. DG RELEX, F4 *Maghreb*. Cooperation Officer, Desk 'Morocco'
8. DG RELEX, F4 *Maghreb*. International Relations Officer, Desk Officer 'Morocco'
9. DG RELEX, F4 *Maghreb*. International Relations Officer, Desk 'Questions of justice and interior affairs Maghreb'
10. DG RELEX, L3 *Coordination and Analysis*. Policy Co-ordinator 'Migration'
11. DG TRADE, A1: C2 *Trade Relations with Euromed and the Middle East*. Policy Co-ordinator 'Coordination of bilateral trade relations with Morocco, Algeria, Egypt and Syria'

Rabat, May-August 2008

12. DG RELEX. Section 'Operations'. Head
13. DG RELEX. Section 'Infrastructures, civil society and JHA projects'. Coordinator ENP Action Plan
14. DG RELEX. Section 'Infrastructures, civil society and JHA projects'. Head
15. DG RELEX. Section 'Infrastructures, civil society and JHA projects'. Policy Officer 'Migration, Justice, Human Rights'
16. DG RELEX Section 'Economy and trade'. Head
17. DG RELEX. Section 'Economy and trade'. Project Manager
18. DG RELEX. Project Manager 'Environment, Water, Competition'
19. DG RELEX. Policy Officer 'Water'

Representatives of the EU Twinning Projects

Rabat, May-August 2008

20. Resident Twinning Advisor 'Development and Implementation of the Legislative, Organizational and Technological Means of Ensuring Free Commercial Trade at Borders' (MA04/AA/FI01)

21. Resident Twinning Advisor 'Coordinated Management of the Environment and the Harmonization of National Environmental Legislation' (MA04/AA/EN03)
22. Project Leader 'Coordinated Management of the Environment and the Harmonization of National Environmental Legislation' (MA04/AA/EN03)
23. Resident Twinning Advisor 'Support for the Strengthening of the Competition Authorities' (MA06/AA/FI08)
24. Project Leader 'Support for the Strengthening of the Competition Authorities' (MA06/AA/FI08)
25. Resident Twinning Advisor 'Reinforcement of the Health Control Organizations – Veterinary and Phytosanitary' (MA06/AA/HE06)

Berlin, May 2008

26. Federal Ministry for Economy and Technology. Referat E B 6. National Contact Point ‚Institution Building'

Vienna, May 2008

27. Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs. Department III.4. National Contact Point 'Institution Building'
28. Federal Environment Agency. International Cooperation

Representatives of the Moroccan Government

Bruxelles, December 2007

29. Mission du Maroc auprès des Communautés Européennes. Policy Officer 'JHA'
30. Mission du Maroc auprès des Communautés Européennes. Policy Officer 'Environment'

Rabat, May-August 2008

31. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Program Administration Office. Head
32. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Program Administration Office. Coordinator ENP action plan & association agreement
33. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Program Administration Office. Program Officer ENP action plan & association agreement
34. Ministry of Economic and general affairs. Directorate of competition and prices. Head
35. Ministry of Economic and general affairs. Directorate of competition and prices. Competition and consumer lawyer
36. Ministry of Economy and Finances. Directorate of studies and financial forecast
37. Ministry of Foreign Commerce. Customs and Indirect Taxes Administration. Directorate of relations to Europe and North America
38. Ministry of Foreign Commerce. Customs and Indirect Taxes Administration. Directorate of Research
39. Ministry of Foreign Commerce. Customs and Indirect Taxes Administration. Directorate of Evaluation

40. State Secretary of the Ministry of Energy, Mines, Water and Environment. Bilateral Cooperation Division. Head
41. State Secretary of the Ministry of Energy, Mines, Water and Environment. Directorate of Partnership, Cooperation and Communication. Head
42. State Secretary of the Ministry of Energy, Mines, Water and Environment. Directorate of Partnership, Cooperation and Communication. Administrator
43. State Secretary of the Ministry of Energy, Mines, Water and Environment. Multilateral Cooperation Division. Head
44. State Secretary of the Ministry of Energy, Mines, Water and Environment. Directorate de la regulation and control. Head
45. State Secretary of the Ministry of Energy, Mines, Water and Environment. Directorate of Studies and Planification. Head
46. State Secretary of the Ministry of Energy, Mines, Water and Environment. Directorate of Budget and Human Ressources. Head
47. State Secretary of the Ministry of Energy, Mines, Water and Environment. Water section. Head
48. Ministry of Employment and Professional Formation. General Secretary.
49. Ministry of Interior. Directorate of Water and decontamination
50. Ministry of Agriculture, Rural Development and Maritime Fishing. Division of International Cooperation
51. Ministry of Agriculture, Rural Development and Maritime Fishing. Directorate of Vegetal Production
52. Ministry of Agriculture, Rural Development and Maritime Fishing. Directorate of veterinarian services
53. Ministry of Agriculture, Rural Development and Maritime Fishing. Directorate of Phytosanitary Controls
54. Ministry of Industry. Directorate of Internal Trade
55. Ministry of Industry. Directorate of International Cooperation
56. Ministry of Industry. Directorate of Consumer Protection

Representatives of Non-governmental Associations and Academia

Casablanca, Rabat and Taroudant, May-August 2008

57. General Confederation of Moroccan enterprises (CGEM). Program Manager
58. General Confederation of Moroccan enterprises (CGEM). Head
59. University Mohammed V, Agdal, Department of Law. Head and President of Moroccan Centre of Judicial Studies
60. University Mohammed V, National Centre of Scientific Research. Head 'International Relations'
61. Green Party Morocco. General Secretary
62. Association 'Migrations & Development'
63. Euromed Human Rights Network. Head 'Migration and Asylum'

Representatives of International Organizations and European Development Agencies

Marrakesh and Rabat, May-August 2008

64. German Technical Cooperation (GTZ). Projet 'Mise à Niveau des Entreprises'
65. German Technical Cooperation (GTZ). Program 'Gestion et de Protection de l'environnement'
66. German Technical Cooperation (GTZ). Water Project
67. International Organization of Migration (IOM). National Program Officer
68. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Head of Mission Morocco
69. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Deputy

Questionnaire

The state officials in Morocco could chose between a French and Arabic translation of this questionnaire. There exist two different versions of this questionnaire, namely a version for the state officials that have participated in an EU Twinning project and a version for their colleagues that have not participated in such a project. The difference lies in the number of questions; thus, the version for non-participants includes no questions that explicitly refer to the Twinning project. For reasons of space, I only display the version for the participants; the version for the non-participants is available upon request.

Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich

Center for International and Comparative Studies (CIS)
European Politics

Prof. Dr. Frank Schimmelfennig
Seilergraben 49
8092 Zurich, Switzerland

freyburg@eup.gess.ethz.ch

Dear Madam or Sir,

Prof. Dr. Frank Schimmelfennig is full professor at the Center for International and Comparative Studies (CIS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich in Switzerland, which is one of the leading universities in Europe. Prof. Schimmelfennig is currently conducting a research project on cooperation between public administration of the Southern Mediterranean countries and EU member states. He prepared, as part of this research, a series of questions on some aspects of public administration in the Kingdom of Morocco. These questions will be asked to approximately two hundred civil servants in several ministries. By filling in the questionnaire you personally can contribute to make this research a success. Your answers are of great value for this research project!

The questionnaire should take approximately half an hour to complete. We hope you will find it interesting and enjoyable.

All your answers will be treated in strict confidence. Your answers will never be used in any way that would allow identifying you. They will only appear combined with answers from other respondents as standardized data in scientific publications. We thereby guarantee absolute anonymity.

Completing the questionnaire
The questions cover a wide range of subjects. Most can be answered simply by placing a tick (✓) in one or more of the boxes, as instructed at each question.

We are well aware that these standard answers cannot capture the complex reality of bureaucratic structures and your daily work. Therefore, please feel free to specify your answer choice by commenting in addition to indicating which standard alternative comes closest to your views.

While realizing you are most probably already very busy with your own work and existing commitments, we sincerely hope that you will accept to contribute to our research by filling in the questionnaire. We would very much appreciate any assistance and cooperation.

Yours sincerely,



A We would like to start with some questions about cooperation of your department with international partners.

1. In your opinion, how important are the following international partners for Morocco?

On a scale of 1 to 5, 1 means not important at all and 5 means very important; the scores in between allow you to say how close to either side you are.

*PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ON EACH LINE*

	not at all important 1	2	3	4	very important 5	don't know
United Nations (UN)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
United States of America (USA)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
European Union (EU)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
League of Arab States	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
World Bank	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Japan	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Other(s)						
_____	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
_____	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

2. In general, how would you describe the relationship between the Kingdom of Morocco and the European Union?

On a scale of -2 to +2, -2 means very bad and +2 means very good; the scores in between allow you to say how close to either side you are.

*PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ONLY*

very bad		neither good nor bad		very good	don't know
-2	-1	0	+1	+2	
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

3. Overall, how do you evaluate the EU's foreign policy?

On a scale of -2 to +2, -2 means very bad and +2 means very good; the scores in between allow you to say how close to either side you are.

*PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ONLY*

very bad		neither good nor bad		very good	don't know
-2	-1	0	+1	+2	
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

4. Which statement about the EU's role in the world comes closest to your own view?

*PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ONLY* (✓)

the EU's role is about right	☐
the EU should play a more important role	☐
the EU should play a less important role	☐
don't know	☐

5. How crucial are the following issues for security and integrity of the Kingdom of Morocco at the moment?

On a scale of 1 to 5, 1 means not important at all and 5 means very important; the scores in between allow you to say how close to either side you are.

*PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ON EACH LINE*

	not at all important				very important	don't know
	1	2	3	4	5	
external trade	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
terrorism	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
irregular migration	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
environmental pollution	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
money laundering	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
corruption	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
other(s) _____	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
_____	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

6. During the last years, cooperation between public administrations of the Kingdom of Morocco and of EU member states has been established. There are different perceptions of this cooperation. To what extent do you personally agree or disagree with the following statements?

On a scale of -2 to +2, -2 means that you disagree strongly and +2 means that you agree strongly; the scores in between allow you to say how close to either side you are.

*PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ON EACH LINE*

Cooperation with EU member states…	disagree strongly		neither agree nor disagree		agree strongly	don't know
	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	
a. enables my department to work more efficiently	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
b. helps my department to undertake necessary reforms	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
c. supports my department to work close to the needs and concerns of the citizens	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
d. complicates our work with too much bureaucracy	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
e. interferes too much in our daily work	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
f. forces us to function the same way as the EU member states do	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

7. Your department is/was engaging in a Twinning project, one of the EU's technical assistance programs. In general, in what respect would you appreciate if the Twinning project had an impact?

On a scale of 1 to 5, 1 means that you would not appreciate it at all and 5 means that you would appreciate it very much; the scores in between allow you to say how close to either side you are.

*PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ON EACH LINE*

		not at all appreciated				very much appreciated	don't know
		1	2	3	4	5	
a.	better policy expertise	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
b.	more efficient administrative reforms	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
c.	decision-making closer to the needs of society	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
d.	receiving financial support from the EU	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
e.	deepening of relations with the EU and its member state	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
f.	other _____						
	_____	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

8. As regards your overall impression, in what respect do you think the Twinning project is/was actually beneficial for your department?

On a scale of 1 to 5, 1 means that it is very beneficial and 5 means that it is not beneficial at all; the scores in between allow you to say how close to either side you are.

*PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ON EACH LINE*

		not at all beneficial				very much beneficial	don't know
		1	2	3	4	5	
a.	better policy expertise	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
b.	more efficient administrative reforms	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
c.	decision-making closer to the needs of society	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
d.	receiving financial support from the EU	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
e.	deepening of relations with the EU and its member state	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
f.	other _____						
	_____	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

9. Besides being involved in the Twinning project, in which of the following assistance programs financed by the EU have you personally already participated?

PLEASE TICK ALL BOXES THAT APPLY (✓)

the Twinning project is my first EU program	☐ → skip to 10
TAIEX (Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Program)	☐
SAAP (Support to the Association Agreement Program)	☐
MEDA I or MEDA II projects	☐
other _____	☐

(If you have already participated in any of these EU programs) Approximately, how many years is it since you were last involved in one or more of these programs?

PLEASE NOTE DOWN _____ (YEARS)

10. Have you ever participated in any assistance program financed by foreign donors other than the EU such as the United Nations, USA, and World Bank?

*PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ONLY* (✓)

no	☐ → skip to 11
yes	☐

(If you have participated in such assistance programs) By which of the following international or regional organizations / states was the program undertaken?

PLEASE TICK ALL BOXES THAT APPLY (✓)

United Nations Development Program (UNDP)	☐
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD)	☐
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)	☐
United States Agency for International Development (USAiD)	☐
International Organization for Migration (IOM)	☐
World Bank	☐
Individual EU Member States, e.g. France, Spain, Germany	☐
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and/or Abu Dhabi	☐
Japan	☐
Other(s) _____	☐
_____	☐

11. How important do you think were the following factors for your own appointment as participant in the Twinning project?

On a scale of 1 to 5, 1 means not important at all and 5 means very important; the scores in between allow you to say how close to either side you are.

*PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ON EACH LINE*

		not at all important 1	2	3	4	very important 5	don't know
a.	international experience	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
b.	language skills	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
c.	education	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
d.	previous work with the person in charge	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
e.	party affiliation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
f.	personality	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
g.	professional performance	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
h.	personal contacts	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
i.	field of responsibility in department	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
j.	other _____						
	_____	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

12. On what occasions do you meet your European colleagues in person (in particular in the context of the ongoing/closed Twinning project)?

PLEASE TICK ALL BOXES THAT APPLY **(✓)**

I do not meet any European colleagues in person	☐
meetings on the basis of normal work relations e.g. discussion of possible solutions of policy problems, exchange of information about progress in implementation	☐
study visits e.g. to department in partner EU member state	☐
internship e.g. in department of partner EU member state	☐
seminars / workshops / training sessions given and/or accompanied by European colleagues	☐
other _____	☐

13. How many hours of contact in person do you approximately have with your national colleagues and your European colleagues, respectively, in a typical month (in particular in the context of the ongoing/closed Twinning project)?

PLEASE NOTE DOWN

time with national colleagues	_____	(HOURS)
time with European counterparts	_____	(HOURS)

14. Not counting meeting your European colleagues in person, how often do you have contact with them via phone, email, and fax in a typical work year?

*PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ONLY*

daily	several times a week	once a week	once a month	few times a year	less than once a year	don't know
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

15. Do you welcome your appointment to serve as a participant in a Twinning program?

*PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ONLY*

	(✓)
no	☐
yes	☐

16. To what extent would you appreciate if participation in the Twinning project had an impact in the following respects?

On a scale of 1 to 5, 1 means you would not appreciate it at all and 5 means you would very much appreciate it; the scores in between allow you to say how close to either side you are.

*PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ON EACH LINE*

	not at all appreciated → very much appreciated					don't know
	1	2	3	4	5	
a. getting more professional policy-specific knowledge	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
b. becoming skilled at working in a more efficient manner	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
c. gaining new or deepened contact to European colleagues	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
d. getting to better know ways of involving societal representatives into decision-making	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
e. benefiting from additional EU funding	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
f. getting to know new modes of guaranteeing public access to information	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
g. gaining (more) international experience required for higher positions	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
h. other _____	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

17. To what extent would you say that you personally have indeed benefited from participating in the Twinning assistance program with the EU?

On a scale of 1 to 5, 1 means you did not benefit at all and 5 means you very much benefited; the scores in between allow you to say how close to either side you are.

*PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ON EACH LINE*

		not at all beneficial 1	2	3	4	very much beneficial 5	don't know
a.	getting more professional policy-specific knowledge	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
b.	becoming skilled at working in a more efficient manner	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
c.	gaining new or deepened contact to European colleagues	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
d.	getting to better know ways of involving societal representatives into decision-making	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
e.	benefiting from additional EU funding	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
f.	getting to know new modes of guaranteeing public access to information	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
g.	gaining (more) international experience required for higher positions	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
h.	other _____	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

B Now, we would like to ask you some questions about your daily work and your service in the administration.

18. To which of the following groups of professional positions do you currently belong?

*PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ONLY* **(✓)**

- directorate (Senior officials responsible for the management of administrative unit) ☐
- administrative staff (Junior and Middle level officials) ☐
- operational staff (food inspector, laboratory assistant, police officer) ☐

19. Approximately, for how many years have you been working in the civil service?

*PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ONLY* **(✓)**

- less than 5 years ☐
- 5-10 years ☐
- 11-15 years ☐
- more than 15 years ☐

20. What was your primary occupation before you entered civil service?

*PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ONLY* (✓)

I have entered the civil service directly after my education	☐
private sector, business, private banking	☐
international organization	☐
academia, research, journalism	☐
other ✎ _____	☐

21. There are different understandings of the mission of public administration. To what extent do you agree with the following understandings?

On a scale of -2 to +2, -2 means that you disagree strongly and +2 means that you agree strongly; the scores in between allow you to say how close to either side you are.

*PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ON EACH LINE*

	disagree strongly		neither agree nor disagree		agree strongly	don't know
	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	
administration should serve the state and represent its power	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
administration should serve the people and resolve their problems	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

22. There are different understandings of what ensures the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts in public administration. To what extent do you personally agree that the following items serve this function?

On a scale of -2 to +2, -2 means that you disagree strongly and +2 means that you agree strongly; the scores in between allow you to say how close to either side you are.

*PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ON EACH LINE*

		disagree strongly		neither agree nor disagree		agree strongly	don't know
		-2	-1	0	+1	+2	
a.	professional experience and expertise of the civil service	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
b.	monitoring by independent state institutions (e.g., auditing agencies, ombudsmen, investigating committees)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
c.	instructions of and approval by the higher authority	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
d.	involvement of experts in and outside of the government in the decision-making process	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
e.	possibilities for the general public and its associations to request scrutiny of decision-making process and review of policies	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
f.	other _____ ✎ _____ _____	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

23. There are different opinions as to what it takes to be a 'good' civil servant. To what extent to you personally agree or disagree that a civil servant should have the following qualities?

On a scale of -2 to +2, -2 means that you disagree strongly and +2 means that you agree strongly; the scores in between allow you to say how close to either side you are.

*PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ON EACH LINE*

A civil servant should…	disagree strongly -2	-1	neither agree nor disagree 0	+1	agree strongly +2	don't know
a. get on with his/her work in quietude	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
b. work in an efficient manner	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
c. ensure that interest groups support and facilitate implementation of policies	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
d. take into account the views and concerns of affected citizens before making decisions	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
e. offer updated information on governmental policy, e.g. statistical data, official documents and studies on the effects of particular measures	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
f. always seek to bring the public into accordance with the government policy	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
g. work in a manner that is transparent and comprehensible for the general public	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
h. ensure that the citizens' views and concerns have an influence on shaping policies	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
i. assure that all information held by public authority remains in the hands of the government only	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
j. provide citizens the possibility to advance their views as input for governmental decision-making	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
k. make information available to anyone requesting it (unless the information comes under certain specified exceptions)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

24. Basically, there are several activities the general public can perform in order to show an interest in governmental decision-making. In your own view, how important is it that the general public performs the following activities?

On a scale of 1 to 5, 1 signifies that this quality is not important at all and 5 means that it is very important; the scores in between allow you to say how close to either side you are.

*PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ON EACH LINE*

		not at all important				very important	don't know
		1	2	3	4	5	
a.	request information about current governmental decisions	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
b.	address civil service if advice of how to best comply is needed	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
c.	give opinions as input for governmental decision-making	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
d.	assist government bodies to implement policies	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
e.	other _____						
	_____	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

25. According to your own experiences, to what extent do you agree that the general public actually performs these activities?

On a scale of -2 to +2, -2 means that you disagree strongly and +2 means that you agree strongly; the scores in between allow you to say how close to either side you are.

*PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ON EACH LINE*

		disagree strongly		neither agree nor disagree		agree strongly	don't know
		-2	-1	0	+1	+2	
a.	request information about current governmental decisions	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
b.	address civil service if advice of how to best comply is needed	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
c.	give opinions as input for governmental decision-making	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
d.	assist government bodies to implement policies	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
e.	other _____						
	_____	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

26. Do you personally think that taking into account the concerns and interests of the general public before making policy-related decisions improves or does not improve the work of the civil service?

*PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ONLY*

	(✓)
does not improve the work	☐
improves the work	☐
don't know	☐

27. In your personal view, under what conditions may non-state actors get formal admittance to administrative decision- and policy-making?

*PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ONLY*

	(✓)
no conditions	☐
certain degree of organization	☐
national registration as official interest group	☐

C And lastly just a few details about yourself.

28. Which newspapers and/or magazines do you read for political information, in various languages, and how often do you read them?

*PLEASE NOTE NEWSPAPER/MAGAZINE **AND***
TICK ONE BOX EACH LINE

Name of the newspaper/magazine:	every issue	frequently	occasionally
_____	☐	☐	☐
_____	☐	☐	☐
_____	☐	☐	☐
_____	☐	☐	☐
_____	☐	☐	☐

29. Which television channels do you watch for political information, in various languages, and how often do you watch them?

*PLEASE NOTE CHANNEL **AND***
TICK ONE BOX EACH LINE

Name of the television channel:	every day	frequently	occasionally
_____	☐	☐	☐
_____	☐	☐	☐
_____	☐	☐	☐
_____	☐	☐	☐
_____	☐	☐	☐

30. What is your current educational attainment level?

*PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ONLY* (✓)

- a final secondary school exam ☐ → skip to 31
- a diploma from a university or another higher education institution ☐
- a postgraduate exam such as a doctorate ☐

(If you (post-)graduated at university) In what subject did you attain your main degree?

*PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ONLY* (✓)

- Law / Economics ☐
- Natural Sciences ☐
- Public administration / Political Science ☐
- other _____ ☐

From which university did you attain your main degree?

PLEASE NOTE DOWN

_____

31. In the context of your education and/or work, have you been in the following countries for <u>at least 6 months</u>?

PLEASE TICK ALL BOXES THAT APPLY (✓)

- I have not stayed abroad educational or professional reasons ☐
- in the 'old' Member States of the European Union (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom) ☐
- in North America ☐
- in other countries than the above-mentioned ☐

32. How good is your overall knowledge of the following foreign languages?

On a scale of 1 to 5, 1 signifies that you don't have any knowledge of the language and 5 means that you have an excellent knowledge of the language (read and speak fluently); the scores in between allow you to say how close to either side you are.

*PLEASE TICK **ONE** BOX ON EACH LINE*

	no knowledge 1	2	3	4	excellent knowledge 5
a. English	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
b. French	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
c. Spanish	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
d. German	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
e. Arabic _____	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
f. Other(s) _____	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

33. Are you male or female?

PLEASE TICK ONE BOX ONLY

	(✓)
male	☐
female	☐

34. How old are you?

PLEASE NOTE DOWN

 _____ (YEARS)

35. Do you have any further remarks as regards the reality of bureaucratic structures in Morocco and your daily work? We would be grateful if you shared your ideas with us!

PLEASE NOTE DOWN

36. Do you have any comments on the questionnaire?

PLEASE NOTE DOWN

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR CONTRIBUTING TO OUR RESEARCH!

TINA Margarete FREYBURG

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Born 15.11.1979. Citizenship: German.

CURRENT POSITION

Post-doctoral Researcher & Lecturer, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich, Center for Comparative and International Studies (CIS), Prof. Frank Schimmelfennig (since 2010).

PREVIOUS ACADEMIC POSITIONS

Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich, Research Associate, NCCR Democracy project: 'Promoting Democracy in the EU's Neighbourhood', Prof. Frank Schimmelfennig and Prof. Sandra Lavenex. 2006-2010

Ruprecht-Karls University Heidelberg, then **Free University of Berlin,** Research & Teaching Assistant, Prof. Tanja Börzel. 2003-2006

Visiting Researcher

Harvard University, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Prof. Beth Simmons. 3.2011

Free University of Berlin, Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) "The Transformative Power of Europe", Prof. Tanja Börzel and Prof. Thomas Risse. 2.2011

University of Lausanne, Prof. Ioannis Papadopoulos. 10.2007, 2.2009

French Institute of the Middle East (IFPO), Amman & Foundation Friedrich Ebert Jordan (3 months field work). 6-9.2009

University Mohamed V Rabat, Prof. Mahdi ElMandjra & Foundation Friedrich Ebert Morocco (3 months field work). 5-8.2008

EDUCATION

Ph.D., Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich (not graded). 2010
Thesis: 'Transnational influences and democratic socialization in authoritarian contexts'
Committee: Prof. Frank Schimmelfennig (examiner), Prof. Sandra Lavenex & Prof. Liesbet Hooghe.

M.A. in Political Science, with minors in Psychology, Media & Communication Studies 2006
Ruprecht-Karls University of Heidelberg / University of Mannheim (grade: 1.0/1.0) 'very good with distinction'.
Thesis: 'EU Democracy Promotion – Slovakia and Croatia's Compliance with the EU's Political Accession Criteria' (in German)
Committee: Prof. Tanja Börzel (examiner) & Prof. Hans-Joachim Lauth.

Visiting student, Free University of Berlin. 2005/6

Erasmus exchange student, University of Lausanne. 2002/3

Abitur (A-Levels), Werner-Heisenberg-Gymnasium, Grammar School, Weinheim (Baden-Württemberg), Germany, 'very good with distinction' (grade: 1.1/1.0). 1999

Additional Academic Training

Doctoral Program of the National Centre for Competence in Research (NCCR): 'Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century' / University of Zurich.	2006-2009
University of Zurich, '**Introduction to R**', Dr. Martin Elff.	2009
Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences (GESIS), Mannheim, **'Structural Model Analysis of Categorical Data**', Dr. Angelika Glöckner-Rist.	2009
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH), Zurich, '**Multivariate Methods**', Prof. Andreas Diekmann.	2008
Swiss Summer School on Advanced Methods on the Social Sciences, University of Lugano, '**Survey Research Methods**', Dr. Pamela Campanelli.	2007
NewGov/CONNEX Training, '**Research Design and Methods'**, European University Institute, Florence, Prof. Tanja Börzel, Prof. Adrienne Héritier, Prof. Thomas Risse.	2007
North-West University of Applied Sciences, Olten (CH), '**Qualitative Research Interviewing**', Dr. Jan Kruse.	2007
ECPR Summer School in Social Science Data Analysis and Collection, University of Essex, '**Systematic Qualitative Comparative Methods Research Design**', Prof. Dirk Berg-Schlosser & '**Mixing Methods: Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Methods**', Prof. Max Bergman.	2006
University of Zurich, '**Contemporary Democratic Theory**', Prof. Michael Saward.	2006
Helsinki Summer School, University of Helsinki, '**Towards European Federation**', Prof. Tapio Raunio.	2004

RESEARCH

'Transgovernmental networks and global democratic governance'. Postdoctoral research project. In preparation. This project investigates the global spread of democratic governance through transgovernmental networks initiated and implemented by a variety of external actors worldwide.	2010 to date
'Transnational influences and democratic socialization in authoritarian contexts'. Ph.D. project completed, currently extended as a postdoctoral book project. This project explores the democratizing potential of transnational linkages and (EU) functional cooperation in Arab authoritarian regimes.	2006 to date
'**The impact of EU conditionality under difficult conditions**'. Master project, extended to a collaborative project with Solveig Richter (SWP Berlin). This project analyzes the effectiveness of EU political conditionality in countries characterized by legacies of ethnic conflict, notably in the Western Balkans.	2006 to date
'**Conflicting objectives in democracy promotion**'. Collaborative special issue project of Democratization, co-edited with Sonja Grimm (University of Konstanz) and Julia Leininger (DEI Bonn). This project seeks to clarify the main purposes of democracy promotion policies and investigates the conflicts of objectives in international efforts to support democratization.	2010 to date
'Promoting democracy in the EU's neighbourhood' (Research associate). Research project that was funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF) in the framework of the NCCR Democracy and jointly directed by Prof. Sandra Lavenex and Prof. Frank Schimmelfennig.	2006 – 2009

GRANTS AND AWARDS

International Studies Association's Carl Beck Award (USD 500) for best graduate student paper delivered at the annual meeting of the ISA. 2010

ECPR Award for Best Graduate Student Paper (EUR 500) at the Pan-European Conference of the ECPR Standing Group on International Relations (SGIR). 2010

Special Issue Author Workshop (CHF 11.100), NCCR Democracy and Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF). 2010

Young Researcher Network 'External Democracy Promotion' (EUR 30.090), German Research Foundation (DFG) (together with network fellows). 2010

Various **Scholarships** and **Travel Grants** (approx. CHF 10'300 in total) from the Swiss Academy for Social Sciences and Humanities, the Swiss National Science Foundation, the German Academic Exchange Service, and the Austrian Academy of Sciences (OAW). 2004 to date

TEACHING

Ph.D.-Level

University of Zurich, **Scientific Coordinator of Ph.D. Program**, NCCR Democracy, 10.2010-02.2011.

M.A.-Level

ETH Zurich, M.A. in Comparative and International Studies, in English

- '**The External Relations of the European Union'**, seminar, autumn 2009 and 2010.

University of Lucerne, M.A. in Global Societies and Global Politics, in German

- '**Socialization Processes in and through International Institutions**', seminar, autumn 2010.
- '**Global Challenges and Global Governance: Climate Change'**, lecture series, 2007 (with Prof. Sandra Lavenex and Rahel Kunz).

B.A.-Level

ETH Zurich, B.A. in Government (Armed Forces Officers Bachelor), in German

- '**European Integration**', seminar, spring 2010 and 2011
- '**International Politics**', tutorial, spring 2011.

University of Lucerne, B.A. in Political Science, in German

- **'European Integration'**, seminar, spring 2011
- '**Instruments and Strategies of External Democracy Promotion**', seminar, spring 2009
- '**The European Union – Political System and Challenges**', seminar, autumn 2008 and 2009
- '**Europeanization in Comparative Perspective**', seminar, spring 2008 and summer 2007
- '**Socialization Processes in and through International Institutions**', seminar, autumn 2007
- **'The EU as a Political Community'**, seminar, winter 2006/7.

Organization of annual **study visits to Strasbourg** (European Parliament, European Court of Human Rights), 2007-09.

Guest lectures

University of Ghent, Master course 'EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy', April 2011.

Teaching Skills

Since 2006 Participation at various teaching training programs for lecturers at ETH and University of Zurich. Course topics included moderating and supervising working groups, chairing meetings and moderating discussions, managing conflicts, and lecturing.

SERVICE TO THE PROFESSION

Member of the **executive committee**, **Swiss Political Science Association** (SVPW/ASSP). Deputy representative of the mid-level faculty. 2008 to date

Member of the **executive committee**, **NCCR Democracy Doctoral Program.** Elected representative of doctoral students. 2007-2010

Member of the **network 'External Democratization Politics**', funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). 2005 to date

Co-founder and Instructor of **Soft Skills workshops** for students, Centre for Comparative and International Studies (ETH/University of Zurich). 2006-2009

Referee for the *Journal of European Public Policy, West European Politics.*

Organization of panels at international conferences:

'Socialization in and through international institutions', European Union Studies Association (EUSA), Boston. 2011

'A Historic Turn in Democracy Promotion? What to Make of Recent Experiences', International Studies Association (ISA), New Orleans (with Young Researcher Network 'External Democratization'). 2010

'Democracy Promotion vs. Functional Cooperation', ECPR Standing Group International Relations (SGIR), Stockholm. 2010

'Encouraging Democratic Change in the Middle East and North Africa', European Union Studies Association (EUSA), Los Angeles (with Vera van Huellen). 2009

'The Prospect and Scope of External Democracy Promotion by Regional Organizations in (Semi-) Autocratic Countries', International Studies Association (ISA), San Francisco (with Solveig Richter). 2008

'Democratization and Democracy Promotion: Open and Hidden Potentials for Democratization', German, Austrian, and Swiss Political Science Associations 'The Constitution of Democracies', Osnabrück (with Anne Wetzel). 2008

'External Governance and Democracy Promotion. Transfer of Democratic Norms and Procedures through the Backdoor?', German Association for Political Science (DVPW) – International Relations Section, Darmstadt (with Anne Wetzel). 2007

'Compliance beyond Conditionality', European Consortium of Political Research (ECPR), Essex (with Aron Buzogany). 2006

Organizer of International Author Workshop for Special Issue of Democratization, Zurich. 2011

Organizer of International Workshop 'External Democracy Promotion', Zurich. 2010

Organizer and chair of Career Day for Young Political Scientists, Joint conference of German, Austrian, and Swiss Political Science Associations, Basel (with Katharina Füglister and Silja Häusermann). Organization of panels on publication strategies, career trajectories, (geographical) mobility, research project funding and of tutorials with editors of book publishers. 2011

Chair and/or discussant at 2011 ECPR general conference in Reykjavik, 2011 ISA conference in Montréal, 2010 ECPR conference on International Relations in Stockholm, 2009 EUSA conference in Los Angeles, 2007 German, Austrian, and Swiss Political Science Associations joint convention in Osnabrück, 2006 ECPR graduate conference in Essex.

Invited Talks

European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Frankfurt Institute for Transformation Studies (FIT)	2011
University of Zurich, NCCR Doctoral Program	2010
University Amsterdam, Comparative Politics PhD Club	2010
Free University of Berlin, Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) "The Transformative Power of Europe"	2009

LANGUAGES

German (native), English (fluent), French (fluent).

REFERENCES

Börzel, Tanja
Jean Monnet Chair and Director of the Center for European Integration
Otto Suhr Institute for Political Science
Free University of Berlin, Germany
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P U B L I C A T I O N S

TINA FREYBURG, Ph.D.

Articles in Refereed Journals

Freyburg, Tina 'Transgovernmental Policy Networks as Catalysts for Democratic Change? EU Functional Cooperation and Socialization into Democratic Governance', forthcoming in **Democratization** (2011)**.**

Freyburg, Tina, Sandra Lavenex, Frank Schimmelfennig, Tatiana Skripka, Anne Wetzel 'Democracy Promotion through Functional Cooperation? The Case of the European Neighbourhood Policy', forthcoming in **Democratization** (2011)**.**

Freyburg, Tina and Solveig Richter (2010) 'National Identity Matters: The Limited Impact of EU Political Conditionality in the Western Balkans', **Journal of European Public Policy** 17(2): 262-80.

Freyburg, Tina, Sandra Lavenex, Frank Schimmelfennig, Tatiana Skripka and Anne Wetzel (2009) 'EU Promotion of Democratic Governance in the Neighbourhood', **Journal of European Public Policy** 16(6): 916-34.

Reprinted in (2010) Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig (eds) EU External Governance: Projecting EU Rules beyond Membership, London, New York: Routledge.

Book Chapters

Freyburg, Tina, Sandra Lavenex, Frank Schimmelfennig, Hanno Scholtz, Tatiana Skripka and Anne Wetzel (2008) 'Neue Wege der externen Demokratieförderung: Demokratisches Regieren in der Europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik', in Gero Erdmann, Marianne Kneuer (eds) *Externe Faktoren der Demokratisierung*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 169-93.

Articles Under Review

Freyburg, Tina ,Planting the Seeds of Change Inside? Functional Cooperation with Authoritarian Regimes and Socialization into Democratic Governance'.

– Winner of the Best Graduate Student Paper Award at ECPR Conference on IR 2010 & International Studies Association's Carl Beck Award 2010 –

Freyburg, Tina 'Democratic Socialization: The Missing Link between Transnational Linkage and Diffusion of Democratic Governance'.

Published Working Papers

Freyburg, Tina (2009) 'Democrats without Democracy? Linkage and Socialization into Democratic Governance in Authoritarian Regimes', NCCR Working Paper No. 37. Zurich.

Freyburg, Tina, Tatiana Skripka, and Anne Wetzel (2007) 'Democracy Between the Lines? EU Promotion of Democratic Governance via Sector-specific Co-operation', NCCR Working Paper No. 5. Zurich.

In Progress: Conference Papers & Special Issue

Grimm, Sonja, Julia Leininger, and Tina Freyburg (eds.) 'Do All Good Things Go Together? Conflicting Objectives in Democracy Promotion', already accepted *special issue* of **Democratization**, in principle for issue 3, June 2012.

Freyburg, Tina 'Functional Cooperation with Authoritarian Regimes: A Blessing or a Curse for Democratization?'.

Freyburg, Tina 'Change through Rapprochement? The Socializing Power of EU External Governance'.

Freyburg, Tina 'The Janus Face of EU Migration Governance: Impairing Democratic Governance at Home – Improving it Abroad?'.

Freyburg, Tina 'Transnational Influences and Socialization into Democratic Governance'.